City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

9-2019

Love and Revolution: Queer Freedom, Tragedy, Belonging, and
Decolonization, 1944 to 1970
Velina Manolova
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3506
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

LOVE AND REVOLUTION: QUEER FREEDOM, TRAGEDY, BELONGING, AND
DECOLONIZATION, 1944 TO 1970

by

VELINA MANOLOVA

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in English in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2019

© 2019
VELINA MANOLOVA
All Rights Reserved

ii

Love and Revolution: Queer Freedom, Tragedy, Belonging, and Decolonization, 1944 to 1970
by
Velina Manolova

This manuscript has been read accepted by the Graduate Faculty in English
in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy.

_________________
Date

________________________________________________
Robert Reid-Pharr
Chair of Examining Committee

_________________
Date

________________________________________________
Kandice Chuh
Executive Officer

Supervisory Committee:
Kandice Chuh
Sarah Schulman
Barbara Webb

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

iii

ABSTRACT

Love and Revolution: Queer Freedom, Tragedy, Belonging, and Decolonization, 1944 to 1970
by
Velina Manolova

Advisor: Robert Reid-Pharr

This dissertation examines literary works by U.S. writers Lillian Smith, Carson McCullers,
James Baldwin, and Lorraine Hansberry written in the early part of the postwar period referred to
as the “Protest Era” (1944-1970). Analyzing a major work by each author—Strange Fruit
(1944), The Member of the Wedding (1946), Giovanni’s Room (1956), and Les Blancs (1970)—
this project proposes that Smith, McCullers, Baldwin, and Hansberry were not only early
theorists of intersectionality but also witnesses to the deeply problematic entanglements of
subjectivities formed by differential privilege, which the author calls intersubjectivity or love.
Through frameworks of queerness, racialization, performance/performativity, tragedy, and
(de)coloniality, this work explores the liberatory and revolutionary possibilities unearthed by
such a conceptualization of love.
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Introduction

It is true that all human questions overlap. Men continue to misinterpret the second-rate
status of women as implying a privileged status for themselves; heterosexuals think the
same way about homosexuals; gentiles about Jews; whites about blacks; haves about
have-nots. And then, always, comes the reckoning.
—Lorraine Hansberry (quoted in Steven Carter’s Hansberry’s Drama)
The construction of the world on the basis of difference is quite distinct from the
experience of difference.
—Alain Badiou, In Praise of Love

This dissertation is about possibility. I initially envisioned the project as a theorization of
“intersectionality before it was a thing”—before Kimberlé Crenshaw’s coining of the term in
1989 and before the Black Liberation, Gay Liberation, and Women’s Liberation movements of
the 1970s. Lorraine Hansberry, Carson McCullers, James Baldwin, and Lillian Smith—the
literary subjects of this dissertation—were visionaries. They theorized intersectionality, and they
“did” intersectionality in their works. After World War Two, but before the 1970s, they foresaw
a world in which various divergent marginalized groups would gain consciousness of the
interrelatedness of the powers that oppress them and begin to strategize collective and coalitional
forms of resistance. At some point in the dissertating process, however, I was confronted with
the problem of the before and the related problem of the before of the before. What if
intersectionality began not in 1944 but 1917? Or 1890? How far back “before it was a thing”
would I need to return, and at which point would I forget what questions I was asking in the first
place? I dispensed with this particular line of historical argumentation and decided to ask the
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texts instead. The texts told me that they understood intersectionality because they were written
by strange people interested in other strange people, and that all of these strange people thrived
in interstitial moments of liberatory possibility. Such moments are central to the resilience and
resistance of people of color living under white supremacy, of colonized people working toward
decolonization, of precarious immigrant workers, and of queers and women in search of livable
futures.
The project does engage in a “backward turn” of sorts, to borrow from Heather Love.
Love, in her book Feeling Backward uses “figures that turn backward,” such as Lot’s wife,
Orpheus, Odysseus, and Walter Benjamin’s angel of history as “allegories of queer historical
experience” (5) that allow her to meaningfully engage with the affects of queer modernist texts
often dismissed as “internally homophobic” or “retrograde” (4). Feeling Backward thus explores
“queer modernist melancholia” (5) and also constitutes a melancholic project in its own right in
its relationship to an abject and disavowed queer past, asserting a preference for melancholia
over mourning, since “mourning can be another name for forgetting” (42). It is too early to really
know how this dissertation feels, but I do not believe it feels backward. In its attention to a queer
past, it feels in fact very much contemporary and present. That is to say, the thought of Lillian
Smith, Carson McCullers, James Baldwin, and Lorraine Hansberry feels contemporary. These
writers were prophetic, and so, the questions they raise are of the present moment. Thus, while
my project does not feel backward, it does look backward and reach backward in order to inform
our understanding of the present and inspire our imagining of the future.
And yet, things were quite different from 1944 to 1970. Categories of queer identity
during this period, when at all visible, were much less fixed and immediately identifiable than
the distinct, acronymizable groupings available today. Desire wove itself through and around
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queer bodies less recognizable as distinctly lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. In other words,
before LGBT, there were other possibilities. This is not to suggest that today’s acronyms of
identity foreclose queer possibility. Rather, I am interested in exploring what possibilities
were/are available only a few decades ago. Given how relatively recent this history is, I at times
even hesitate to use the past tense. A visionary writer like Carson McCullers could envision
something like today’s queer identities and paradoxes in the emerging queer subjectivities of her
time. At a time when the state inaugurated institutionalized forms of homophobia through its
military, welfare, and immigration bureaucracies,1 McCullers foresaw homonormative and even
homonationalist queer subjects not so different from the ones we know today. Accordingly, this
project reaches backward for figures, tropes, and moments of the queer imagination that allow us
to untangle webs of desire and identification that inform our relationship to the oft maligned
“identity politics” that continue to shape every aspect of our social existence.
Relatedly, this project is also about “strange affinities,”2 strange bedfellows, “strange
fruit,” strange people, and strangers. This is a strange dissertation, or at least such is its
aspiration. On a personal note, my own pursuit of identity and community has always relied on
identification with others across many vectors of difference. Born in Bulgaria, a small and
somewhat obscure country that few in the U.S. know anything about (the more knowledgeable
remember an association with the Soviet Union they cannot quite define), I was dispatched onto
a surreal suburban American landscape in Virginia at age eleven—an age already sufficiently
fraught and transitional without the violence of such jarring cultural displacement. I sought to
make sense of the absence of sidewalks, and, where sidewalks were present, the absence of
people on them, through television programs such as Beverly Hills, 90210, The Fresh Prince of
Bel-Air, Saved by the Bell, and Family Matters. While these shows offered hopeful dreams of
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community that included strange people, where I could find such community was much less
clear. Via detours through Montreal, Florida, and even France, I eventually landed in New York
City, a haven of constant contact—voluntary or otherwise—among all possible varieties of
strange people. I made my first Bulgarian friend in the U.S. twenty-one years after immigrating
and seven years after moving to New York. Thus, the majority of my most intimate relationships
have been formed and nurtured not through commonality but through difference—in
background, experience, and dimensions of identity such as nationality, sexuality, race, and
class. In short, I relate to and through difference. I make connections through strangeness.
So, too, my intellectual work addresses strange subjects. This dissertation is about queer
writers and black queer writers who imagine relationships and communities formed across
difference as a challenge to white supremacy, heteronormativity, homophobia, patriarchy,
American imperialism, and European colonialism. They are also writers known for having
strange personalities that cannot be separated from their experiences of oppression as women,
queer people, and queer people of color in a period that marks the beginnings of contemporary
U.S. hegemony and its attendant aggressive propaganda promoting patriarchal, heteronormative,
white, suburban families as an ideal of American citizenship and belonging.

Historicizing Intersectionality
The intersectional literary analysis this dissertation offers is informed and inspired by an
understanding that non-intersectional movements for liberation necessarily fail. Movements that
exclude women and queer or gender-nonconforming persons necessarily reinforce patriarchy and
nationalism, which in turn reinforce old and usher in new ethno-exclusionary divisions easily
exploited by militaristic political interests. So-called “white feminism” similarly benefits no one
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in the end, isolating potential allies, and ultimately upholding the violences of racial capitalism
and the prison-industrial complex run by agents of a police state hostile to feminism of any
stripe.3 Conversely, the most successful social movements have always been intersectional, even
if they were not always acknowledged as such. The African American Civil Rights Movement is
a case in point. We now know Martin Luther King, Jr. could have never had as comprehensive
an understanding as he did of anti-capitalism, internationalism and the strategy of non-violent
direct action without the input of Coretta Scott King and Bayard Rustin.4 New biographies of
Rosa Parks, Florynce Kennedy, and Pauli Murray have moreover brought to light the centrality
of women and queer, gender-nonconforming, and transgender persons to the Civil Rights
Movement.5 Even when CRM leadership silenced or undermined these activists’ gender analysis,
they brought an intersectional understanding without which the movement could not have
thrived.
My argument is not invested in locating the exact historical moment when
intersectionality was birthed. I focus on 1944 to 1970 because the collision of the beginning of
contemporary U.S. hegemony, homophile movements, the Civil Rights Movement, and anticolonial movements resulted in a unique historical moment that allows us to think, through
analogy and temporal displacement, about contemporary struggles for black lives, women’s
bodily autonomy, queer rights, workers’ rights, immigrant rights, and decolonization.
Intersectionality could very well date further back in time. Siobhan Somerville, for instance,
locates the invention of modern homosexuality in the United States in the 1890s, during the
dawn of U.S. imperialism, and argues this intervention is closely connected to contemporaneous
discourses of scientific racism. In 1892, the highly publicized trial of Alice Mitchell, who killed
her lover Freda Ward in Memphis, Tennessee, codified into law the category of “the female
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invert” (2). In 1896, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Plessy vs. Ferguson decision codified racial
segregation as both lawful and constitutional. During this period, “the heightened surveillance of
bodies in a racially segregated culture demanded a specific kind of logic, which,” Somerville
argues, “gave coherence to the new concepts of homo- and heterosexuality” (4). Moreover,
“[b]ecause existing cultural stereotypes of African Americans were largely sexualized, the new
discourse of sexual pathology was intertwined with… racialized images” (11). Discourses of
scientific racism and sexual inversion informed one another, often through identical tropes of
perversion and unnaturalness. Thus, racism and homophobia in the United States were in a sense
always intersecting oppressions, provoking intersectional forms of resistance.
Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term intersectionality in 1989 to call attention to legal
discourse's inability to attend to the interaction or intersection between racism and sexism in
addressing discriminatory practices against women of color. Crenshaw offers the image of a
woman of color simultaneously injured by racism and sexism, “lying in the intersection” and
refused help by both “the race ambulance and the gender ambulance” because antidiscrimination law can only address each form of oppression separately (Thomas 2004).
Attention to intersectionality, then, calls for a move away from single-issue identity politics in
which supposedly discrete marginalized groups (gays, women, people of color) are politicized
around supposedly discrete rubrics (sexuality, gender, race) and toward a politics and
understanding of the social world in which these rubrics and struggles are seen as necessarily
overlapping.
Building on the work of Crenshaw and her predecessors, Roderick Ferguson and Grace
Hong point to a historical urgency to complicate intersectional frameworks and develop “new
comparative models” for understanding “how particular populations are rendered vulnerable to
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processes of death and devaluation over and against other populations” (1-2; emphasis added).
As the state and capitalism continually refine their strategies for identifying new types of
subjects and populations to neglect, exploit, and devalue, while appearing to champion social
equality by rewarding certain historically exploited populations for their participation in
marginalizing newly created and devalued groups, social theorists and cultural critics must
rigorously attend to the differences within historically oppressed groups in order to more
precisely map and anticipate the neoliberal state's strategies for perpetuating social and economic
exclusion.
While Hong and Ferguson insist that new comparative models must emerge to respond to
contemporary historical exigencies, they locate the “blueprint” for such models in the 1970s and
1980s women of color feminism pioneered by lesbian-identified women of color such as Audre
Lorde and Cherrie Moraga. This theoretical and political movement made possible – and in fact
already performed – what is referred to today as queer of color critique. Hong and Ferguson’s
conceptualization and application of queer of color critique is one that inspires and informs my
own mode of analysis because it offers an intersectional approach that appreciates the integrally
entangled and multi-dimensional nature of social being, belonging, and exclusion. This approach
does not see identity as a puzzle to be solved through the proper arrangement of its various
components, nor does it gesture toward the democratization of theory through token inclusions of
historically marginalized perspectives. Queer of color critique is not a critical recipe that adds a
pinch of race consciousness to a stew of queer theory methodologies. It is not “deriv[ed] from a
white Euro-American gay, lesbian, and queer theory tradition” (2); rather, it is an incarnation of
women of color feminism—a critical tradition for which the integral interplay among sexuality,
gender, race, and class are a given.
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From Intersectionality to Intersubjectivity
To this end, Audre Lorde begins her essay “Scratching the Surface: Some Notes on Barriers to
Women and Loving” with four succinct definitions—of racism, sexism, heterosexism, and
homophobia—and the assertion that “[t]he above forms of human blindness stem from the same
root—an inability to recognize the notion of difference as a dynamic human force, one which is
enriching, rather than threatening to the defined self, when there are shared goals” (45). Lorde
calls for a celebration of difference that would sound neoliberal were it not a simultaneous call
for collaboration across lines of gender and sexuality toward the political emancipation of black
communities in a white supremacist Unites States. In addition to making an eloquent argument
for intersectional collaboration, Lorde’s essay inspires thoughts about the relationship between
intersectionality and intersubjectivity. Racism, sexism, and heterosexism are defined in the essay
through an identical formula: each constitutes, respectively, “[t]he belief in the inherent
superiority of [one race/one sex/one pattern of loving] and thereby its right to dominance” (45).
Homophobia, on the other hand, is “[t]he fear of feelings of love for members of one’s own sex
and therefore the hatred of those feelings in others” (45). These respective definitions beg the
question of why Lorde seemingly understands homophobia as a much more psychologically
complex phenomenon than, say, racism. Rather than simply constituting a feeling of superiority,
homophobia, according to Lorde, is produced by a complicated entanglement of love and fear.
Frantz Fanon’s term “negrophobia” suggests that anti-black racism is psychologically
similar to homophobia. Relatedly, Lorraine Hansberry, the subject of this dissertation’s final
chapter, argues that it is “the sameness of kind which oppressors most despise in the
oppressed…. It is the reflection of oneself that most enrages when we are engaged in crimes
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against a fellow human creature” (“Thoughts on Genet, Mailer, and the New Paternalism” 14;
emphasis in the original). What are we to make of this? If a homophobe fears he may be gay,
does a negrophobe fear she may be black? In a manner of speaking, yes. Both phenomena, when
defined as phobias, have a basis in a confusion between self and other that results from an
artificial production of otherness. As Hansberry asserts, we do not fear otherness. We fear
sameness. Lorde, I think, would agree. Homophobes “fear… feelings of love” not only for
“members of one’s own sex” but also for gay people. We love otherness. We fear sameness. We
fear, most of all, our inseparability from the other. I understand intersubjectivity as the
transformation of our deeply problematic love for otherness, which most often manifests itself as
violence, into a complex understanding of relationality. This dissertation is about relationships.
Intersubjectivity, too, is love. And intersubjectivity is not unproblematic.
I read Robert Reid-Pharr’s essay “Living as a Lesbian” as, among other things, a love
letter to intersubjectivity. The essay opens with a call for collaboration that parallels Lorde’s,
reflecting on a Barbara-Smith-inspired idea of queer chosen family called “home” during his
college years at Chapel Hill in the mid-1980s: “At home we would recreate ourselves and our
world, fashion a new mode of being, map a way for living in which the vision of the black
freedom struggle would be realized in the daily interaction of black lesbians and gays” (153).
From black-lesbian-inspired intersectional collaboration toward a liberatory politics, the essay
then turns its attention to intersubjectivity and friendship. Through this latter development, a
black gay man lives as a lesbian.
Let us turn, again, to Audre Lorde for a clarification of terms. Lorde defines a lesbian as a
“strongly woman-identified [woman] where love between women is open an possible,” adding
that
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the true feminist deals out of a lesbian consciousness whether or not she ever sleeps with
women. I can’t really define it in sexual terms alone although our sexuality is so
energizing why not enjoy it too? But that comes back to the whole issue of what the
erotic is. There are so many ways of describing “lesbian.” Part of the lesbian
consciousness is an absolute recognition of the erotic within our lives and, taking that a
step further, dealing with the erotic not only in sexual terms. (Hammond 21)
Lorde has defined the erotic as “a resource within each of us that lies in a deeply female and
spiritual plane, firmly rooted in the power of our unexpressed or unrecognized feeling” (“Uses of
the Erotic” 53). What does it mean for the erotic to be female? Lorde understands the patriarchal
suppression of the erotic as central to the oppression of women: “For women, this has meant a
suppression of the erotic as a considered source of power and information in our lives (53). The
erotic is a source of power. Lorde associates it with “nonrational knowledge” (53), creativity,
joy, poetry, sexuality, and love. And while an “anti-erotic” patriarchal and capitalist regime has,
according to Lorde, compartmentalized the erotic into an exclusively sexual, and, moreover,
specifically male-centered heterosexual field of desire that objectifies women, the erotic in its
proper sense, as a creative resource, is not solely the province of women. The erotic belongs
equally to all bodies, indeed, all entities, that have embraced its creative powers. The erotic can
be found in poetry and margarine alike:
During World War II, we bought sealed plastic packets of white, uncolored margarine,
with a tiny, intense pellet of yellow coloring perched like a topaz just inside the clear skin
of the bag. We would leave the margarine out for a while to soften, and then we would
pinch the little pellet to break it inside the bag, releasing the rich yellowness into the soft
pale mass of margarine. Then taking it carefully between our fingers, we would knead it
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gently back and forth, over and over, until the color had spread throughout the whole
pound bag of margarine, thoroughly coloring it.
I find the erotic such a kernel within myself. When released from its intense and
constrained pellet, it flows through and colors my life with a kind of energy that
heightens and sensitizes and strengthens all my experience. (57)
I find myself absolutely stunned each time I read this passage. I was introduced to fictional
western “food” products such as margarine and condensed milk (I remember the latter as
humanitarian aid from Belgium) at the same time that my native Bulgaria was, just as forcibly,
introduced to the fictional western promise of “democracy.” There was no alternative to
neoliberal capitalism, Margaret Thatcher had announced, just as there was nothing else to eat in
the grocery store. And yet, Audre Lorde remembers her experience with margarine, resulting
from analogous conditions of manufactured scarcity, in strikingly sensuous and erotic terms.
Leave it to a great poet to make something out of nothing; to transform something as plastic and
tasteless as margarine into an erotic experience that culminates in orgasm.
A lesbian, then, according to Lorde, is a woman with a feminist consciousness who
embodies the full range of sensual and creative possibilities of the erotic. For Reid-Pharr,
lesbianism is a similar form of consciousness. Lesbianism is friendship and solidarity; it is a kind
of intellectual, political, creative, and emotional compatibility with women who love women. Of
his relationship with black lesbian filmmaker Cheryl [Dunye?], Reid-Pharr writes:
The two of us maintain a type of charming delicacy with each other. I respect her
boyishness as she cherishes my effeminacy. We are a couple, mentioned in one breath as
dinner parties are planned, given to public quarrels over the minutiae of every day life,
constantly aware of each other’s steps and jealous of the intrusion of others. Our

11

lesbianism runs deep. We are drawn together because of our profound love of women,
our unquenchable thirst for companionship, our hot blooded sexual passion, and our
constant struggle to find and create home. (160-161)
Lesbianism is intersubjective. It is intersubjective, first of all, because it is relational. One cannot
be a lesbian in isolation from other lesbians. And in Reid-Pharr’s essay, lesbianism performs an
attempt to inhabit the subjectivity of the other. A black gay man can be a lesbian if he forms part
of a lesbian couple. He can be a lesbian if he loves women. And, finally, he can become a lesbian
if he is interpellated as such, presumably, again, by other lesbians: “To become myself I have
become a lesbian, or at least that’s what I have been told” (158). Poets, writers, and artists with
intersectional and intersubjective imaginations create astounding possibilities. If margarine can
be erotic, then there is no reason why Robert Reid-Pharr cannot be a lesbian.

Love as Possibility
The political and creative project of intersubjectivity is closely related, if not identical, to the
labor of love. Alain Badiou maintains that through the experience of love “you learn that you can
experience the world on the basis of difference and not only in terms of identity” (16-17). Love
demands a new perspective of the world, which Badiou calls “the perspective of Two” or a “Two
scene” (29). Thus, for Badiou, love is a “truth procedure” (38) that concerns difference: “This
truth is quite simply the truth about Two: the truth that derives from difference as such” (38).
The Two scene is the scene of intersubjectivity. Love necessitates an encounter with difference
and, beyond this, a scene of conflict that creates the possibility for transformation. To pursue
love is to embrace possibility.
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The pursuit of love takes on explicitly political dimensions for Badiou. Deeply suspicious
of the algorithm of the dating site, Badiou compares its “safety-first concept of ‘love’” (6) to “the
propaganda of the American army promoting the idea of ‘smart’ bombs and ‘zero dead’ wars”
(7). Let us first acknowledge the immediate problems with this position. Badiou does not in fact
consider the perspective of difference here in the point of view of women or queer people for
whom meeting a strange man who has not been previously screened carries potentially deadly
consequences. Nor does he consider the point of view of sex workers who screen their clients via
Internet sites. (The criminalization of these websites in the United States in 2018, supposedly in
the service of sex trafficking prevention, lead to an immediate rise in the murders of sex workers
by their clients). It is important to acknowledge these blind spots, which are in this case
casualties of unacknowledged male and heterosexual privilege, as much of this dissertation
addresses the contradictions in intellectual production taken on in the service of liberatory
projects, and toward this end, focuses on the perspectives of subjectivities overlooked by such
seemingly “clueless” white male analyses.
At the same time, Badiou importantly points out the false promises of safety made by
algorithmic dispensaries of love. Beyond addressing risks of physical danger, platforms that
screen potential lovers also minimize the risk of encountering difference. Questions that
determine “match” percentages on dating sites not only seek to map how much one may have “in
common” with another—lest we be exposed to new information or cultural consumption
practices previously unfamiliar to us—but are often designed to curtail possibilities for what
Samuel Delany calls “interclass contact.”6 And while encounters across racial or ethnic
identification are possible, they are often mitigated by some other mode of sameness such as
belonging to some form of the same “community”—professional, political, and so on. As Badiou
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explains, “[t]he aim is to avoid any immediate challenge, any deep and genuine experience of the
otherness from which love is woven” (8). Otherness, in Badiou’s discussion, also takes on racial
and orientalist dimensions:
If you have been well trained for love, following the canons of modern safety, you won’t
find it difficult to dispatch the other person if they do not suit. If he suffers, that’s his
problem, right? He’s not part of modernity. In the same way that “zero deaths” apply
only to the Western military. […] The casualties are Afghans, Palestinians… They don’t
belong to modernity either. (9)
Under the brutal regimes of contemporary capitalist and imperialist modernity, a lover who loves
recklessly is expendable, not unlike the lives of orientalized populations whose existence poses
an inconvenience to empire’s conquest of land and expropriation of resources. Lovers are useless
to modernity. The titular character of James Baldwin’s Giovanni Room, the subject of my third
chapter, is described as anti-modern. He is racialized, Southern European, working-class,
undocumented, and believes in love. Thus, David, the novel’s white American protagonist, feels
justified in abandoning him with no explanation. What does Giovanni want from me?, David
wonders, assured in his belief that he owes him nothing. Giovanni is the lover in Roland Barthes’
A Lover’s Discourse. As Wayne Koestenbaum explains in his foreword, for Barthes, those who
say “I love you” are: “Lyric poets, liars, wanderers. Carnival freaks. Cassandras” (xv). These are
figures both outside modernity and integral to the creation of communities and cultural
productions that facilitate the survival of the majority of people subjected to modernity’s
violences: people of color, workers, women, queers, and lovers.
The central contention of this dissertation is that love, defined as a radical project of
intersubjectivity, creates possibilities for new world orders. Love works against white
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supremacy, sexism, heteronormativity, classism, American exceptionalism, and various
imperialisms and colonialisms, and toward queer, decolonial, and internationalist futures. My
readings of the texts that make this argument equally illustrate the disavowals of these
possibilities, disavowals which occur in the majority of cases. Barthes creates a framework for
love as episodes or moments he calls figures. Like possibility, love is interstitial. I am interested
in moments of possibility. Before the disavowal, before the retreat into conformity, there is
possibility. I call these moments love.
Modernity brands the lover as Other. Barthes understands the love story, the narrative of
love, as a domestication and ultimately a rejection of love that allows the lover to be
reintroduced to society after she falls victim to love’s detours from normativity:
Every amorous episode can be, of course, endowed with a meaning: it is generated,
develops, and dies; it follows a path which it is always possible to interpret according to a
causality or a finality—even, if need be, which can be moralized ("I was out of my mind,
I'm over it now" "Love is a trap which must be avoided from now on" etc.); this is the
love story, subjugated to the great narrative Other, to that general opinion which
disparages any excessive force and wants the subject himself to reduce the great
imaginary current, the orderless, endless stream which is passing through him, to a
painful, morbid crisis of which he must be cured, which he must "get over" ("It develops,
grows, causes suffering, and passes away" in the fashion of some Hippocratic disease):
the love story (the "episode," the "adventure") is the tribute the lover must pay to the
world in order to be reconciled with it. (7; emphases in the original)
The love story is subjugated—like the Other and to the Other. The love story, according to
Barthes, is a disavowal of possibility. The four writers around which this dissertation is focused
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all explore possibilities for intersubjectivity that are inseparable from possibilities for and
moments or episodes of love. It is tempting to postulate, based on the readings that follow, that
the failure of intersubjectivity and love is a foregone conclusion. However, it would be a mistake
to read the stories Smith, McCullers, Baldwin, and Hansberry generate as rejections of love and
possibility. Failure and the acceptance of failure are inherent to every progressive and radical
political project. In fact, the only political project that cannot accept failure is fascism. Projects
with progressive and radical visions benefit and learn from failure. Failures help us become
mindful of our endless capacity for stupidity and destruction. Failure is embedded in possibility.
The first chapter examines the critique of what I call liberal white supremacy in Lillian
Smith’s novel Strange Fruit (1944), the possibilities of love as a challenge to white supremacy,
the failure of love in the face of a white supremacist political imagination, the resilience of black
community, and the hope found in black futurity and resistance. My reading of Strange Fruit is
in conversation with Jodi Melamed’s important theorization of U.S. postwar racial liberalism—
an ideological formation she defines as an “official antiracism” of the state, which treats racism
as a cultural and psychological problem without addressing its material conditions and
entanglement with U.S. and global capitalism. Melamed cites Strange Fruit multiple times as an
example of a “racial-liberal novel,” arguing that racial-liberal literary production helped to unify
a mainstream racial-liberal discourse and that it did so through the trope of sympathy. While
Melamed’s argument usefully identifies a prevalent U.S. discourse on race during the period I
examine, her contention regarding racial-liberal novels does not offer any textual evidence from
these works. Through a close reading of Strange Fruit, I demonstrate how the novel actually
critiques the notion of white sympathy as a solution to racism and is, moreover, in agreement
with Melamed’s argument about the dangers in which a reliance on sympathy can place black
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lives. Furthermore, my reading illustrates how what Melamed calls racial liberalism may be
more accurately called liberal white supremacy and how, under liberal white supremacy, love,
with its promise to inaugurate radical change, necessarily fails. Finally, I emphasize Smith’s
solidarity with black resistance and the ways in which this solidarity emerges through a white
lesbian character’s attempt at intersubjective identification with the perspective of black
resistance. Thus, Smith’s queer imagination slips in tangentially but nonetheless meaningfully, as
analogous to and in conversation with black hope.
Conversely, queer imagination is central to my second chapter, which focuses on Carson
McCullers’ 1946 novel The Member of the Wedding. In the novel, Frankie, the queer white
adolescent tomboy protagonist, plans to disrupt the matrimony of a “nice white couple”—as her
family’s black maid, Berenice, calls Frankie brother, Jarvis, and his fiancée, Janice—by inserting
herself in the couple’s matrimonial union at their upcoming wedding. While McCullers
celebrates Frankie’s existing queer familial arrangement, as the protagonist spends most of her
time with her cousin John Henry, who is explicitly characterized as queer and effeminate, and
Berenice, Frankie’s desire to marry the wedding further subverts the reproduction of the
heteronormative, intra-racial, hegemonic, post-War nuclear family. My reading of The Member
of the Wedding situates Frankie as an uncanny figure who queers a normative structure of desire
through her own overenthusiastic desire for normative belonging. Seeking to become normative
through queer desire, Frankie indulges in a fantasy that uncannily mirrors the heteronormative
wedding, exposing not only the failure of the normative but also the hyperbolic normativity of
the assimilationist aspirations of the marginal. Thus, I also argue that McCullers envisions the
contemporary developments of homonormativity and homonationalism. In the novel’s
conclusion, Frankie redirects her desire toward a lesbian love object from a wealthy and well-
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traveled family, deciding that her new friend, Mary, will join her on world exploration she
previously imagined undertaking with Janice and Jarvis, who is a member of the U.S. military.
While McCullers’ novel thus appears to offer a homonormative and even homonationalist
narrative closure—a sufficiently extraordinary feat for a text published in 1946—I argue that
such apparent closure should not be read as a foreclosure of alternative queer possibilities. Like
Frankie’s previous fantasies of queer love, her attachment to Mary suggests a future filled with
perverse disruptions of normative arrangements of love and desire.
Dreams of queer freedom underwritten by postwar U.S. hegemony and imperialism
propel the narrative of James Baldwin’s novel Giovanni’s Room (1956), which I read in my third
chapter. Set in Paris and narrated retrospectively by David, a closeted white gay American
expatriate, the novel’s tragic narrative unfolds as a result of David’s ultimate refusal of love and
connection across difference with Giovanni, an undocumented working-class Italian immigrant,
racialized through descriptions of his “dark” body and features. David’s first-person narration
constitutes an especially brutal iteration of the “love story” as defined by Barthes. The narrator
not only disavows his love affair with Giovanni as a transient and trivial episode in a young
man’s quest to “find himself”; he also refuses, from the start, to claim ownership of his romantic
and sexual love for Giovanni. Furthermore, I argue that Baldwin, through the character of David,
negotiates his own ambivalence regarding the value of theorizing masculinity formations as
ethical models of gendered subjectivity. David’s ambivalence toward queer love stands for
Baldwin’s ambivalent glorification of male gender. I examine the novel’s juxtaposition of and
negotiation between the contemporary Butlerian notion of performative masculinity and a
nineteenth-century model of interiority called “manhood” theorized by Michael Kimmel and
elaborated upon by Kevin Floyd, and argue that Baldwin flirts with but hesitates to embrace a
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third register, which I alternatively call theatrical genderqueerness or genderqueer theatricality.
Genderqueer theatricality thus emerges as another moment of liberatory possibility generated by
intersubjectivity and love.
My final chapter explores, among other things, the theatrical queering of the colonial
humanist ideal of “manhood” in Lorraine Hansberry’s play Les Blancs (1970). Hansberry’s
posthumously produced play intervenes in both liberal and anti-colonial versions of masculinist
humanist thought and cultural production. I argue that Les Blancs, a direct response to what
Hansberry’s calls the “romantic racism” of Jean Genet’s play The Blacks (1961), is also in
conversation with Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks (1952). While indebted to Fanon’s
humanist critique of the racist reification of blackness, Hansberry also offers a feminist rebuttal
to Fanon’s reinscription of the masculinist equation of “man” and “human,” pointing to the
colonialist legacies that this equation perpetuates. Thus Hansberry critiques both Genet’s failed
anti-colonial satire and Fanon’s misreading of the conditions of colonized women and queer
subjects. Moreover, beyond mere critique, Les Blancs offers an internationalist, feminist, and
queer vision of decolonization. Eric, the character in Les Blancs who most clearly understands
the colonial situation and is most capable of sustained revolutionary action, is both racially
amalgamated and homosexual, in direct defiance of the nationalist and homophobic currents of
anti-colonial thought in which Fanon participates. Hansberry thus directly confronts the sexual
anxieties—against miscegenation and homosexuality—of her anti-colonial contemporaries, as
well as the messy complicatedness of love under colonization. Provocatively, in Les Blancs, the
queer revolutionary’s sexual affair with a colonizer (a European philanthropist) sparks the
former’s insurrectionary fervor and facilitates the latter’s acceptance of the prospect of his own
death as well as that of his fellow philanthropists as a necessity for the anti-colonial struggle.
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Love in Les Blancs thus constitutes the most radically intersubjective relationship examined in
this dissertation—that between colonizer and colonized.
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Chapter I
Love and Sympathy: Lillian Smith’s Strange Fruit and the Critique of Liberal White
Supremacy

This chapter explores the missed opportunities of love as a potentially liberatory antiracist force through a close reading of Lillian Smith’s 1944 novel Strange Fruit. It also engages
with Jodi Melamed’s important theorization of postwar U.S. racial liberalism as an ideological
project that consolidates U.S. hegemony by divorcing an understanding of white supremacy from
its material conditions, as well as Melamed’s identification of Smith’s novel as one of the key
literary participants in this project. While Melamed mentions Strange Fruit several times in lists
of novels she argues perform the ideological work of postwar racial liberalism, she does not
perform a reading (even so much as a plot summary) of Strange Fruit or any of the other novels
from this period that allegedly do similar work. I propose that if we in fact read Smith’s novel,
we can discover its critique, rather than reinscription, of racial liberalism and its related affect of
sympathy through an exploration of the missed opportunities of love. Smith painstakingly
documents the formation of the liberal white supremacist subject and the attendant process
through which, under liberal white supremacy, sympathy eclipses love.
Melamed’s theorization of postwar U.S. racial liberalism and racial-liberal novels
informs my analysis of Strange Fruit in crucial ways. Melamed defines racial liberalism, an
ideological phenomenon prevalent between the mid-1940s and late 1960s, as the first in a
historical series of “official antiracisms” deployed by the State to promote egalitarian racial
attitudes without addressing the material conditions that produce and perpetuate the structures of
racism and white supremacy in the U.S. In contrast to 1930s “race radicalism,” which, according
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to Melamed, analyzed global capitalism and racism as symbiotic political and economic
structures, racial liberalism both “universalized U.S.-style capitalism as an antiracist good” (25).
Thus racial liberalism is also necessarily an anti-internationalist Cold War project, directed at
producing a global pro-capitalist consensus while also seeking to shield the U.S. from critiques
of its structural racism by the USSR and other governments worldwide participating in
communist and socialist projects. Racial liberalism, as Melamed explains, abstracts racism from
economic inequality by framing it as an intellectual, cultural, psychological, and moral problem.
Furthermore, Melamed identifies sympathy as the affect most closely associated with the
racial liberal ideology, drawing from Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal’s call that “people’s
great propensities for sympathy” be mobilized to address the American “Negro problem” (qtd. in
Melamed 56). So-called race novels, novels addressing U.S. racial relations, including Strange
Fruit, were, according to Melamed “conceived as purveyors of white sympathy” and able to
“ideologically unify racial liberalism and disseminate it as a commonsense position within
diverse fields of governance, academia, and U.S. national culture” (56). While I am fascinated by
(and more than a little skeptical of) Melamed’s claim that novels can have such a wide-ranging
influence in shaping a uniform mainstream discourse across virtually every field of social,
political, and civic life, I am primarily interested in investigating the extent to which a novel,
specifically Smith’s Strange Fruit, can actually challenge the logic of racial liberalism even
while seemingly exemplifying a number of its tropes. I argue that in writing Strange Fruit, Smith
in fact refuses to participate in the kind of ideological project Melamed identifies as racial
liberalism, and, moreover, exposes the reliance on white sympathy as a solution to racism to be
not only ill-advised but in fact potentially fatal, echoing Melamed’s contention that sympathy

22

kills.1 In Strange Fruit, sympathy is appealed to as a last resort to ebb the violence of white
supremacy, after the failure of love and attendant loss of its revolutionary potential.

1. Love
Set in 1920 in the fictional rural town of Maxwell, Georgia, Strange Fruit is focalized around the
romantic and sexual affair between Tracy Deen, a member of a prominent white family in the
town, and Nonnie Anderson, a soft-spoken woman from a respected black family. Tracy believes
he loves Nonnie but struggles with his white supremacist attitudes, which significantly challenge
his ability to love her. Upon discovering that Nonnie is pregnant with his child, Tracy undergoes
a crisis and vacillates between envisioning a new world liberated from the confines of racial
segregation by the possibilities of love and retreating into complacency within a white
supremacist order that makes his relationship with Nonnie unviable. Tracy’s mother requests that
the town’s white preacher Brother Dunwoodie offer Tracy his guidance, and Dunwoodie
successfully convinces Tracy that he must join the church, marry his white neighbor Dorothy
“Dottie” Pusey (assumed to be Tracy’s girlfriend despite an absence of any form of intimacy
between her and Tracy), and pay off a black man to marry Nonnie and help her raise her baby.
One Saturday evening, Tracy gives his servant Henry one hundred dollars to marry Nonnie and
offers Nonnie two hundred dollars as assistance for raising the child and compensation for
having to marry Henry, suggesting he intends to continue the affair with her even though he will
marry Dorothy Pusey. Nonnie is devastated and refuses to, perhaps physically cannot, respond,
and Tracy leaves the two hundred dollars on the fence of her family’s property and leaves.
Meanwhile, Nonnie’s brother Ed, who is visiting from Washington, DC and wishes to take
Nonnie back to Washington with him, where she can presumably live a better life, overhears at
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the drugstore a drunken Henry brag about the financially profitable arrangement he has made
with Tracy. An incensed Ed returns to the house, grabs his pistol, finds Tracy not too far from
the Andersons’ home, just after he has left Nonnie, and fires two shots that instantly kill Tracy.
When Ed informs the family of what has happened, his sister Bessie organizes his escape,
instructing family friend Dr. Sam Perry to immediately drive Ed to Macon, where he can catch a
night train that will eventually take him to New York. Inexplicably, the townspeople never
suspect Ed or question his disappearance on the night of the murder. Many of them suspect
Nonnie but have no interest in prosecuting her. Soon thereafter, a lynch mob decides Henry must
pay for the murder. Tracy’s sister Laura, telephone switchboard operator Miss Sadie, and Sam
Perry warn Tom Harris, a prominent white man who owns a sawmill, that Henry will be lynched
if he and other powerful white people do not act to stop the mob. Harris believes they are
exaggerating but works with the town sheriff and Tracy’s family to devise and carry out a plan to
protect Henry. Henry is “disguised” as a white woman and hidden in Maxwell’s jail. Harris
subsequently refuses to heed Sam Perry’s warnings that Henry will be caught regardless if the
mob is not stopped. The mob breaks into the jail and lynches Henry, leaving the “good white
people” to wonder what went wrong in their town and leaving Bessie to wonder what kind of
future Nonnie’s baby can have. The novel ends with a description of the body of Dessie, Henry’s
girlfriend, which implies she, too, is pregnant.

1.1 Where There Is Smoke There Is White Supremacy
The novel is composed, in part, of many flashbacks that probe the psychology of its
major and minor characters. Central to Tracy’s ability to imagine a different world are memories
of his time away from the United States, when he is stationed in France during World War One.
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Tracy’s flashbacks to his time in France and the immediate aftermath of his return from the war
outline formative moments in the development of his short-lived consciousness of resistance to
the white supremacist and racially segregated social order of his community and nation. While in
France, Tracy vacillates between thinking about Nonnie as a human lover and an object or thing
available for his use. His thoughts as conveyed through the narrator demonstrate a remarkable
capacity for cognitive dissonance. “She had been something you tried not to think about—
something you needed, took when you needed, hushed your mind from remembering,” Tracy
recalls (50). Pondering the possibility that if they lived in France he and Nonnie would be able to
dance in public transforms Nonnie in Tracy’s mind from an object to a person worthy of love.
All of a sudden, “[s]he wasn’t a negro girl whom he had in a strange crazy way mixed his whole
life up with. She was the woman he loved” (50). While Tracy understands his attitude toward his
relationship with Nonnie through a formula of progression—that was then, this is now—the
proximity and contiguity of the sentences in which she is described as a usable “negro girl” and
“the woman he loved,” coupled with the immediacy of his supposed transformation, suggests he
in fact holds these contradictory thoughts and feelings simultaneously. Thoughts of the
possibility of freedom do not in and of themselves manifest freedom. Certainly not in the case of
a white man who has heretofore regarded his black female lover as someone akin to property, to
be taken when needed. Tracy’s consciousness is the schizophrenic consciousness of white
supremacy, which insists on regarding a person as a thing until the cognitive dissonance of doing
so in spite of the other’s undeniable humanity becomes too unbearable; even when the other is
recognized as human, her humanity is granted only provisionally and conditionally. Like Tracy,
white supremacy humanizes black people fantasmatically without affording them the social and
political status of the human subject.
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For Tracy, this irresolvable contradiction—irresolvable because white supremacy refuses
to resolve it—partially manifests itself in sexual terms, which he understands through a false
mind-body dualism: “[H]is mind ached for the completion of a reality that until now only his
body had accepted” (51). I won’t rehearse here the philosophical, psychological, and
neurological debates and consensuses on the fallacy of mind-body dualism in the early twentieth
century. Smith, a psychologist by training, refutes it with the simple phrase “his mind ached.”
There is no question that the mind-body division is a false one and that, moreover, every
insistence on this duality is instructive. The analogous dichotomy of thoughts and feelings proves
especially so during the brief phase of Tracy’s awakening to questions of social equality,
accompanied by his ability to see his relationship with Nonnie as a potentially viable one.
As he returns from the war, on the train ride from New York to Maxwell, Tracy observes
that the South has “no feeling” (53). He finds himself feeling alien to a white supremacist society
that complains that black people who served in the war no longer accept their place in the
Southern social hierarchy. In all likelihood, such grievances are expressed with great feeling, but
feeling Tracy no longer recognizes as legitimate—or worth feeling. “He listened. They were
words as familiar to him as his own name, but words with which he now refused identification. It
was as if he were the only thing real. The rest was made up” (53). The South remains unreal, a
distant memory to Tracy as he journeys back. He refuses identification with it only to learn
shortly thereafter that feeling on its own cannot usher in a new reality.
Indeed, Smith depicts Tracy’s reunion with Nonnie as dreamlike, in stark contrast to the
sociopolitical reality of an interracial relationship in the 1920s U.S., and in the U.S. South in
particular. Tracy spends part of his first night back in Maxwell with Nonnie. The two share a
romantic evening that resembles a cinematic dream sequence. In a remote abandoned cabin
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owned by Nonnie’s family, Tracy shyly admits he has dreamed of dancing with her and reveals
that he has brought a phonograph and waltz record to the rendezvous. As the record exhausts
itself before the dancers do, “Tracy leaned across her and clicked it off…” (56, ellipses in the
original). Smith’s ellipses give us a literary analogue to the cinematic cut that signals sex and
substitutes its representation and are followed by a paragraph portraying an impossibly
gregarious Tracy and a silent Nonnie, in one of many scenes in the novel that render Nonnie
passive, readily acquiescing to Tracy’s wishes. Tracy’s reflections in this monologue on his time
in France lead to his offhand suggestion of France as a place he and Nonnie could live, which
causes “something [to happen] to Nonnie’s face and he [is] startled—as if he had lighted ten
thousand candles with one small half-thought-out word” (57). France is never mentioned again,
nor does Smith ever verbalize what Nonnie thinks or feels in response to the idea of it. Tracy’s
comment and Nonnie’s facial expression remain the only signals of a liberatory potential lost in
Tracy’s ultimate unwillingness to work to transform, or ever properly address, a paralyzing and
violent social reality.
Something happens in Tracy’s body that same evening that he does not understand and
whose implications he refuses to question or further explore. A chance meeting, when he steps
out of his house in search of cigarettes in the drugstore owned by his father, with the town’s
black Reverend Livingston and his wife Roseanna inexplicably (to him) precipitates an
irreversible shift in his disposition away from “the new world” of possibility he sought to explore
with Nonnie moments before. This encounter with the Reverend and Roseanna does not appear
in any way remarkable. Roseanna does initially greet Tracy somewhat mockingly, having
forgotten “her white-folks manner” (58), but she quickly recovers from this lapse in proper
performance for white people. There is no suggestion of anything unusual about this kind of
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lapse; it is surely something Tracy has encountered before. One is hard-pressed to imagine his
living for more than twenty years as a markedly mediocre (as he is consistently described in the
novel) white man in a segregated Southern town without encountering the occasional forgetting
of politeness or deference from a black person. The Reverend and Roseanna welcome him home,
they and Tracy exchange a few words of small talk, and both he and they head to their respective
destinations. And yet this seemingly mundane encounter affects Tracy profoundly:
In the old world that would have been all. They would have gone on to Negro Quarters,
to be forgotten, and he would have stayed in White Town, forgetting.
But that was not all. As they stood there, between the speaking and the turning away,
Tracy felt as if the blood were draining from his veins.
He went into the drugstore, lighted a counter lamp, took a package of cigarettes, sat down
at one of the tables.
All the feeling he had was a physical sensation. He was tired as hell, that was all, and
nothing was worth doing. There was not a word in his mind that explained his feeling. All
he knew was that thirty minutes ago he had been with the woman he loved. Now there
was a colored girl named Nonnie. That was all there was to it.
He did not sit there, piling facts here and facts there, weighing one pile against another.
The anthropologists had proved there was no superior race. Sure, he knew that. Guys in
the army had said the South wasted half its money and energy and time keeping the
Negro in his place; if they’d stopped doing it, things might not be so bad down here. He
knew that too. Books were written showing this, telling it, proving it even. He didn’t read
books all the time, as [his sister] Laura did, but he knew what the world was thinking. He
knew what the facts were. They had no more to do with his feelings than knowing the
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facts about bone structure or the reproductive process has to do with your feeling about
the mother who bore you.
There was a colored girl named Nonnie. That was all there was to it.
Why it was so, why the accidental meeting with the Reverend and Roseanna could have
done this, he did not know.
All he knew, as he stood there looking at them, a door slammed in his mind, shutting out
the new world, shutting out Nonnie with it. He was just there on the sidewalk, where he
had always been, feeling the feelings he had always felt. He had been somewhere… in a
dream maybe; maybe crazy[…]. Maybe he’d lost, not his memory, but his white feelings”
(59-60).
This passage is quite remarkable in its ability to convey the mundane nature of the way in which
a white person, upon realizing they are given a choice, chooses to continue his complicity in
white supremacy. Tracy is tired. This is understandable as he has had an extremely long day: he
has completed a boat ride from France and a train ride from New York and made love with the
lover whom he has just begun to recognize as someone with whom he could have a viable
relationship. He does not feel like doing anything at the moment besides smoking a cigarette.
And yet, as he ruminates about the difference between fact and feeling, he declares to himself
that the subjective feeling of a white man constitutes objective fact. It is not that he simply does
not feel like doing anything in this very moment; rather, nothing is worth doing. There is no
worth in his working toward the “new world” he knows is possible. He knows racist ideology
has no scientific basis or logical coherence. He knows segregation is both socially and
economically disadvantageous to a society that practices it. But he cannot reconcile fact with
feeling. Perhaps this is so because there is no feeling in the facts he cites to himself, similar to his
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earlier observation about a South and Southerners without feeling. There is no attempt at
empathy toward black Americans made in the complaints by fellow passengers in his white-only
train car that the South is losing the cheap labor of black people who seek social equality, just as
studies of the South by Northern economists take little account of the human subjectivity of the
laborers and profiteers factored into their equations. Nothing is worth doing because Tracy
cannot feel the value of working toward transforming himself and his society. Economic and
sociological studies alone are not enough to convince him, and neither is love. Tracy’s alienation
from his own body does not allow him to connect the two. Rather, it allows him to
simultaneously love Nonnie and continue to identify with the system that disenfranchises and
dehumanizes her.
This passage is in many ways remarkably similar to one in Frantz Fanon’s 1952 text
Black Skin, White Masks (translated into English in 1967). Fanon, while also looking for a
cigarette, reflects on the difference between an “intellectual understanding” of racism and
colorism and a somatic experience that concretizes for him the alienation of a person of color
produced by racism and colonialism:
The black man among his own in the twentieth century does not know at what moment
his inferiority comes into being through the other. Of course I have talked about the black
problem with friends, or, more rarely, with American Negroes. Together we protested,
we asserted the equality of all men in the world. In the Antilles there was also that little
gulf that exists among the almost-white, the mulatto, and the nigger. But I was satisfied
with an intellectual understanding of these differences. It was not really dramatic. And
then.[ . . .]
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And then the occasion arose when I had to meet the white man’s eyes. An unfamiliar
weight burdened me. The real world challenged my claims. In the white world the man of
color encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema. Consciousness of
the body is solely a negating activity. It is a third-person consciousness. The body is
surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty. I know that if I want to smoke, I
shall have to reach out my right arm and take the pack of cigarettes lying at the other end
of the table. The matches, however, are in the drawer on the left, and I shall have to lean
back slightly. And all these movements are made not out of habit but out of implicit
knowledge. A slow composition of my self as a body in the middle of a spatial and
temporal world—such seems to be the schema. It does not impose itself on me; it is,
rather, a definitive structuring of the self and of the world—definitive because it creates a
real dialectic between my body and the world. (110-111, emphasis in the original)
An intellectual understanding of racism, especially from a space geographically removed from
the metropole and predominantly populated by black people such as the Antilles, is not
“dramatic.” Fanon does not feel personally invested in the stakes of such discussions, even as he
participates in political demonstrations against racism, just as Tracy isn’t moved by reading
academic literature that challenges segregation. It is only when Fanon finds himself in the white
space of the metropole, in an embodied encounter with white supremacy when he “meet[s] the
white man’s eyes” that he gains a fuller understanding of the violence of European and white
hegemony. In the “white man’s” world, even the simple gesture of reaching for a cigarette and
searching for matches feels disorienting for Fanon. As Sara Ahmed observes when she analyzes
this passage in her groundbreaking Queer Phenomenology (2006), racism “‘disorients’ black
bodies such that they cease to know where to find things—reduced as they are to things among
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things” (111). The black body in white space must slowly and painstakingly compose itself as a
subject in the face of the objectification that separates it from a world that distributes subjectivity
unevenly.
Searching and reaching for a cigarette, for very different yet very closely related reasons,
dramatizes Tracy’s alienation from his body as well. There are no cigarettes at home, so he opts
to walk through public space in order to acquire them from the drugstore. (Unlike Fanon, he does
not need to purchase them because his family owns the drugstore.) He is thus unexpectedly (for
it is late at night) confronted with the public presence of black bodies who are also public
figures: the Reverend and Roseanna. The encounter disorients Tracy not because he is alien to
the white world. On the contrary, it reminds him he is integral to it. What is unusual about the
encounter is not how Tracy or the Reverend or Roseanna behave; nothing they say or do is
particularly out of the ordinary. What is unusual and what emerges as a tragically missed
opportunity is the very brief moment in which Tracy is able to step out of his body and observe
what happens, as Fanon does, in the third person.
In the space of perhaps a few seconds, Tracy simultaneously exists in both the “new
world” and the old. This is a simultaneity different from the cognitive simultaneity of white
supremacist double consciousness. In this moment Tracy is simultaneously a third-party
observer—someone outside the “old world” that dictates segregated paths, toward the Negro
Quarters and White Town, for himself and the Livingstons, respectively—and a white man
whose presence demands a performance of respect from black people in place of a conversation
with them. Tracy feels “as if the blood was draining from his veins” because he, like Fanon, is
having an out-of-body experience. It is the confluence of his own racism, structural racism, and a
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desire for a new world order, and the weight of this convergence, that produces a vertiginous
effect in Tracy’s body.
Let us look more closely at what could have been potentially disruptive to Tracy about
the behavior of Roseanna and the Reverend in the forgetting of their “white-folks manner” as
Tracy approaches:
They were laughing heartily, having the street to themselves at this late hour, and the
Reverend’s black face was crinkled with laughter as he walked along spryly whirling the
cane that usually he leaned on before white people. Roseanna was floating beside him,
being one of those fat women so light on their feet that their weight seems to act as a sail
filled with a stiff breeze. Her light-yellow face was merry now with her joking.
“If it isn’t Mr. Tracy!” Roseanna’s voice curved to the ground as she spoke his name,
though he heard, too, the razor edge of mockery that cut a swath through her humility. He
had caught Roseanna without her white-folks manner and it was as if she were hastily
buttoning it on as she spoke to him. (58)
What is notable about this encounter is that it is uncanny.2 Tracy has seen something like this
before, but not in the way he sees it this time. The timing of the incident is crucial. At the very
moment at which Tracy decides “his” world will change, he is confronted with the subjectivity of
the other—specifically, the racial other whose subjectivity challenges his claim to ownership
over this new world. Tracy realizes it is not he who will usher in a new world; it is Roseanna,
whose body defies gravity; it is the Reverend, who twirls his cane like a magician. These are not
magical black people who will lead Tracy on his journey to growth and self-discovery; they are
not black people who will hand Tracy “his” new world on a platter and congratulate him for his
ability to recognize them as human. Roseanna and the Reverend are black people who perform
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the same extraordinary feat as millions of their fellow black Americans on a daily basis. They are
black Americans who live, build community, raise their children, and look toward a brighter
future in spite of an entire national apparatus designed to deny them their human worth and
extinguish all hope for a better tomorrow. In the moment in which the Tracy who dreams of a
new world observes himself in the role of a white man who has “caught” the Reverend and
Roseanna living, laughing, and occupying space freely without needing to defer to white people,
the two Tracys return to the same body, and this body gains a visceral understanding that it
cannot oversee the emergence of a new world. It is not for Tracy to grant freedoms to Roseanna
and the Reverend; their freedoms aren’t his to grant. If Tracy were to participate in the creation
of a new world, he would have to give up his jurisdiction over other people’s freedoms. He
would have to, in short, give up his whiteness.
Both Fanon and Tracy experience profound moments of somatic awareness about their
respective places in the white world while “reaching” for a cigarette—an object that signals their
respective places within the historical schema of plantation economies and the Atlantic slave
trade; their shared claim to a male public sphere; and their differential relationships to a sense of
belonging within that public sphere.
However, while Fanon uses such moments to develop a rich analysis of the dialectic between
that world and his own body, Tracy accepts his bodily sensations as indicative of an immutable
world order. Tracy does not understand what he is feeling, while Fanon understands it all too
well. Fanon devotes his life work to such understanding, whereas Tracy gives up at the first sign
that his body may encounter resistance if he dares to challenge white supremacy. Perhaps he
understands to some extent “the facts,” as he puts it, of what such resistance may mean. Perhaps
he understands how relatively little bodily harm he will be exposed to in contrast to a black
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person who participates in similar transgression. Yet, ultimately, his complacency is stronger
than his will to usher in the new world he knows is possible. Tracy inhabits his white body much
too comfortably. To step out of that body to not only observe but actively challenge its
participation in white supremacy would be too disorienting and require too much to be of worth
for Tracy. It would make the Reverend and Roseanna real. It would make their freedom real.
And, most frighteningly, it would place him in the most vulnerable of positions: that of the lover
who must take responsibility for his love.3
Love in this novel is the liberatory force that must be suppressed to ensure the
functioning of white supremacist heteropatriarchy. Tracy’s family, and the white residents of
Maxwell more generally, are aware of this fact, as they are also aware of Tracy’s sexual
relationship with Nonnie. Therefore, at the request of Tracy’s mother, and with the blessing of a
white supremacist social order which he understands as a mandate granted by a higher power, the
town’s white preacher Brother Dunwoodie gives Tracy a private sermon on his responsibilities
as a white man within this social order.
Dunwoodie’s lecture for Tracy features a bizarre combination of vague sexual innuendo,
hideous racism, absurd sexism, and barely sublimated homoeroticism. References to
Dunwoodie’s own past unspecified sin of which “God convicted [him]” (84) at first suggest he
may be a closeted homosexual man, as Dunwoodie explains to Tracy that neither joining the
army nor playing sports “helped” the situation (84). As the preacher’s monologue devolves from
oddly vague allusions to his own supposed history of moral corruption to explicit tirades against
sexual affairs with black women, it becomes reasonable to presume that his past “sin” is closer in
nature to Tracy’s sexual transgressions. This possibility becomes increasingly probable as it
becomes apparent that Dunwoodie cannot conceal his personal investment in the subject.
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Dunwoodie warns Tracy that “[o]f course no decent fine white woman can satisfy [him]”
sexually when he allows himself to be sexually interested in black women, his voice “ris[ing]
shrilly” (87), and advises Tracy to “leave colored women alone and stick to your own kind” (88),
so that they, too, can find and marry “a man their color” and “[l]ive a fairly decent, respectable
life—that is, if a nigger woman can live a decent, respectable life” (88). As he offers this last
piece of advice, Dunwoodie’s voice turns from shrill to “suddenly bitter” (88) in an
unencumbered display of emotion that would read as comical were it not a testament to the ease
with which a white patriarch can frame his own sexual ignorance, racism, and sexism as wisdom
issued by a voice of experience, reason, and morality. Within such a framework, Dunwoodie’s
undisguised resentment, his resentful displacement of personal sexual insecurity onto the figure
of the morally pathologized black woman, is presented as the pathos of a wise, benevolent, and
generous patriarch.
It is unclear whether the bizarre ideas about relationships between men and women that
follow this racist tirade come from Dunwoodie’s intense hatred for women, repressed
homosexuality, or a combination of the two. Regardless, he continues to perform with pathos,
and Tracy, lacking the will to seek a different way to address his own predicament, seriously
considers the preacher’s words. Dunwoodie frames his theories on gender relations with a wellrehearsed reiteration of the division of the gendered division between public and private spheres,
where men are credited with “do[ing] the work,” “mak[ing] a living” for their families, “do[ing]
the farming,” and “creat[ing] the cities,” whereas women’s essential domestic labor is not
recognized as labor (89). Yet Dunwoodie also appears to find the public/private separation
between men and women insufficient in creating what he deems a necessary emotional distance
between the two genders for the proper functioning of a patriarchal society. It is not enough for
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Dunwoodie that women’s labor as well as much of their social life is confined to the home, as he
fears that women, even thus confined, can lay claim to a man’s soul if he does not take special
care to protect himself from forming a relationship with them beyond the minimum interactions
required for the basic day-to-day functions of a nuclear family. Dunwoodie explains:
[W]hen a man gets over into a woman’s world, he gets into bad trouble. He don’t belong
there. He belongs in a man’s world. God wants your soul where it belongs, for then He’ll
be surer of getting it than if it was on the other side—where some woman’ll get it all[…].
I don’t preach it in the pulpit. But it’s good preaching, just the same. Too much love
makes you soft. No-count! Tying you to a woman’s apron strings! Women wouldn’t
understand that—and, as I say, I don’t preach it in the pulpit.
Now some men have a deep feeling for God. It comes to em easy. Others get it slow. The
hard way. But a man makes a living and feeds those younguns his wife says are his, even
if he ain’t sure he loves them yet, don’t he? And a man gets on the Lord’s side and joins
the church, supports it and his town’s affairs, even when his heart’s not in it much, at
first.
But this is what happens after a time. After a time God begins to seem like a real Man to
you. Not something your mother loved and told you to love. But your own Kind. I mean
that in a holy and sacred way. And what men are doing, their work, their interests, seems
more important to you and satisfying than anything in a woman’s world. So when I say,
get on the Lord’s side, I mean one thing when I talk to the ladies and another when I talk
to men. (89-90; emphasis in the original)
Dunwoodie believes loving women is catastrophic for men. He further believes only men know
how to love God because God is a man—“a real Man,” capitalized by Smith to emphasize the
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homoerotic deification of a man’s love for other men as well as the homoerotic personification of
the Christian deity as a man who fits criteria for masculinity performance that warrant being
called a “real man.”4 “Too much” love for women is not good for men; it makes men “soft,”
which presumably translates to “not sufficiently manly.” Softness, for Dunwoodie, is clearly a
transgression of gendered belonging, and softness also connotes excessive kindness or empathy,
presumably for women, and, in the context of this conversation, also for black people. Tracy’s
problem is that he loves Nonnie, and love causes a double transgression of segregated
belonging—into “a woman’s world” as well as a black world.
Men, then, are not meant to love women because God is a man, and because God is a
man, only men know how to love God. Men are to love God like they would love “a real
Man”—“[n]ot something your mother loved and told you to love. But your own Kind.” Women
do not know how to love men, and men should not love women. Of love between women there is
no mention. The preacher’s world is an exclusively homosexual male one. The directive that
Tracy should love “his own Kind” here (capitalized again to suggest the deification of men and
masculinity) is inseparable from his earlier instruction that Tracy “stick to [his] own kind” (88)
and marry a white woman. While his marriage to a white woman is instrumental to the
continuation of patriarchy, white supremacy, and racial segregation, loving a white woman or
loving any human being is, according to the preacher, detrimental to such systems of hierarchy
and dominance. Dunwoodie denies the eroticism of his statement that a man knows how to love
his “own Kind”—other men—immediately after he makes it: “I mean that in a holy and sacred
way.” Men know how to love men and must sublimate that desire for worship for a deity
personified in the masculine. With enough effort, that deity will “begin to seem like a real Man.”

38

Despite having gained both an intellectual knowledge (through his travels) and a visceral
knowledge, though falling in love with Nonnie, that a world radically different from the one
espoused by the preacher is both possible and necessary, Tracy chooses to listen to Dunwoodie
and accept as a role model a man who has chosen to repress his own erotic desire (desire for sex
and love) in the service of a white supremacist belief in a concept of a “white race” created by a
higher power with a mandate to subjugate another allegedly inferior “race” of people.5 Perhaps
Tracy is flattered to be called a man. Perhaps no one has suggested he is a “real man” before, and
the invitation from the preacher into a secret society of real-Man-worshipping men (secret
because Dunwoodie does not talk about worship and God in these terms in mixed company) is
difficult to resist given Tracy’s questionable reputation among the town’s respectable and not-sorespectable white people. Or perhaps his decision comes down, once again, to that fateful
meeting with the Reverend and Roseanna Livingston, which ostensibly cements in Tracy a
“bodily sensation” of stuckness within a white supremacist order and its perpetuation.
Tracy attempts to escape this stuckness and the preacher’s invitation to join a society of
repressed homosexual white supremacists by making an effort to remember another night with
Nonnie. The evening takes place at a secluded spot by a river, in fact the very spot where Tracy
has taken the preacher just after his invitation of “trying it on the Lord’s side—and man’s, for
while” (90) as part of his attempt to reject the preacher’s world for a world in which
transgressions in sex, love, and “softness” generate possibilities for more egalitarian interactions
between humans of differential gendered and racial privilege. I’d like to explore the problems
with the premise of a liberatory potential in a relationship between a white man and a black
woman in the U.S., and specifically in the post-bellum South, before returning to an analysis of
this scene.
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1.2 Is There an Interracial Sexual Relationship?
Jared Sexton titles the third chapter of his book Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness
and the Critique of Multiculturalism with the provocative assertion that “There Is No
(Interracial) Sexual Relationship,” adding the parenthetical modifier of the “interracial” to
Jacques Lacan’s (in)famous dictum that “there is no sexual relationship” (“il n’y a pas de
rapport sexuel”). Because Lacan’s statement, also known as his formula for “sexuation,” hints at
the power differential implicit in all sexual relationships, a variation of that formula that
foregrounds the specificity of race could offer useful insights into the power imbalances of
interracial relationships and how such imbalances are symptomatic of the larger structures of
racial violence in our society. However, I ultimately find Sexton’s use of Lacan unconvincing
because he sticks a little too closely to Lacan’s formula, which I argue fails to take into account
the foundational violences that produce the traumatic kernel of the Real found at the heart of the
social antagonisms he articulates. Further, I believe it is important to unpack the Lacanian
formula of “there is no sexual relationship” as well as any and all variants that add race, class, or
any other index of social, political, and historical oppression to this conceptualization. I find the
tendency of scholars to ascribe a queer or otherwise liberatory potential to Lacan’s statement
extremely worrisome, as it unwittingly reifies political and historical categories such as race and
gender as ontological.
The principal problem of the “sexuation” formula used by Lacan and Lacanians is the
persistent lack of clarity in what is meant by the words “sex” and “sexual.” At no point does
either Lacan, Bruce Fink (the preeminent English-language translator of and source for
interpreting Lacan), Slavoj Žižek, or any other of a number of Lacanian thinkers clarify whether
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the “sex” and “sexual” in “there is no sexual relationship” refer to gender, sexual acts, sexual
proclivities, or sexual orientations. In fact, Lacanians systematically conflate these various
meanings and thus conveniently evade engaging with discussions about the relationship between
“sex,” gender, and sexuality that feminist and queer studies scholars have taken on for the last
four decades. Sexton quotes and expands upon an explanation by Joan Copjec that attempts to
get at the heart of the antagonism expressed in the formula. Unfortunately, Sexton’s own
analysis, too, remains unclear in the very basic, dictionary definition, of its usage of the words
“sex” and “sexual”:
Joan Copjec (1994) puts a finer point on it when she writes that there is a “radical
antagonism between sex and sense…. Sex is the stumbling block of sense…. Sex is
produced by the internal limit, the failure of signification” (204). In this sense, sex is an
effect of the Real (“produced by… the failure of signification”) and sexual difference is,
as a result, understood as real difference. Racial difference, on the other hand, would
seem to present itself as a symbolic difference, what Foucault might call the functional
effects of a discursive regime. (183-184, emphases in the originals)
On its own, Copjec’s excerpted statement reads as a fairly “common-sense” observation about
the irrationality of sexual drives and desires. Who and what we desire evades our rational
understanding and ability to conceptualize through language; our bodies, as we observe in
Smith’s protagonist Tracy, can follow a path at odds with the social structure within which they
exist. Yet Sexton’s interpretation resorts to the ambiguous phrase “sexual difference” (alluding
to the equally problematic Lacanian concept of “the Real of sexual difference”), which
reproduces the nonsensical and reactionary conflation between “sex” in the sense of “sexual
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encounter” and “sex” as the antiquated, biologically and anatomically determined term for
“gender.”
Furthermore, Sexton’s reference to Fink’s translation of Lacan’s “il n’y a pas de rapport
sexuel” as “there is no such thing as a relation between the sexes” does not help the case for the
use of Lacan’s formula in the service of a politics of liberation (Fink 1995: 98 in Sexton 181).
While Lacanians such as Fink insist that “the sexes” in Lacan’s formulation of “sexual
difference” and “sexual relationship” (or the lack thereof) do not correspond to gendered, male
and female bodies, neither they nor Lacan offer any examples of an attempt at a “relation
between the sexes” that imply anything other than an attempt at a heterosexual relationship, that
is, a sexual relationship between a cisgender woman and a cisgender man.6 “The sexes,” then,
remain exactly what they sound like: a binary set of anatomically constituted participants in what
Judith Butler has termed the “heterosexual matrix” that aligns sex, gender, and sexuality. Thus,
while Lacan’s suggestion that there is no such thing as a heterosexual relationship may at first
sound intriguing to scholars in search of queer possibility, such possibility is foreclosed from the
start. If an attempted heterosexual relationship proves impossible beyond the mere fantasy or
illusion of a relationship, a queer sexual relationship does not even appear on the horizon of
possibility.
My point here is not to invalidate Sexton’s thesis or dismiss his use of Lacan. Rather, I
interpret his choice of a Lacanian formulation as symptomatic of a certain impasse produced by
language in its inseparability from power and violence. Sexton’s Amalgamation Schemes assails
an ideologically conservative underpinning of multiracial discourse that reifies racial categories
and heteronormative definitions of sex, love, and family. Multiracialism’s “sexual politics,”
Sexton maintains, “imply a production of race in the field of heterosexuality, nominating, more
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specifically, the reproductive sex act as the principal site of mediation for racial difference itself”
(7). In other words, biologically essentialist understandings of race are also heteronormative—
“races” are reproduced or “continued” through reproductive heterosexual coupling, and so, the
field of interracial sexuality within multiracial discourse is reduced to reproductive
heterosexuality. “[T]o the extent that one thinks of race as biological (e.g., genotype, phenotype),
one thinks of race mixture in heteronormative and reproductive terms” (7-8). Sexton therefore
proposes “[d]islodging biological notions of race” as a “condition of possibility for the queering
of interracial sexuality, including its disarticulation from the specter of miscegenation” (8).
To the extent that Sexton’s intervention necessitates a critique of a discourse that reifies
heterosexuality and racial categorization within a formula for love in which the multiracial or
postracial subject is produced biologically and discursively by, for example, one white and one
black parent of “opposite” “sexes,” the application of a Lacanian theory of sexual relationship
and sexual difference functions as a kind of double-edged sword. On the one hand, a Lacanian
critique offers a powerful rejoinder to uncritical and untheorized multiculturalist notions of
“love” as a magical solution to structural inequalities by highlighting the uneven distribution of
power embedded in all sexual relationships. Yet, at the same time, even if we are to entertain a
generous reading of Lacan and accept the claim that the two sides in his formula of “sexuation”
do not necessarily correspond, respectively, to one cisgender male and one cisgender female
person, his argument that any (attempted) sexual relationship is comprised of a meeting of two
incompatible forms of desire (termed phallic jouissance and Other or female jouissance)
nevertheless produces an impasse that reifies socially constructed and determined categories as
essentialized effects of the Real.7
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The impasse of “sexual difference” produced by patriarchy is analogous to the impasse of
racial difference produced by white supremacy. Thus, Sexton’s claim that “sexual difference” is
to be “understood as real difference,” and “racial difference… present[s] itself as symbolic
difference” rehearses a deeply problematic (and long discredited) formula that considers gender,
in contradistinction to race, to be rooted in an originary biological reality (that of anatomical
“sex”) of which gender is considered to be a discursive effect.8 Through this juxtaposition,
Sexton also misses an opportunity to effectively queer interracial sexuality by theorizing race
and gender as analogous and similarly (discursively) produced indices of power and violence.
A more fruitful avenue of exploration of the problematics of interracial sexual
relationships between people of European and African descent would be their historical
foundation, in the U.S. context, in the system of chattel slavery and its legacies. Although Sexton
develops his point that “there is no interracial sexual relationship” through the Lacanian
framework implied by the sentence, he does gloss the historical reasons for which this may be
the case. To this end, Sexton objects to “the assertion within multiracial discourse that
consensual sexual relations between white male slaveholders and enslaved black females
allowed genuine interracial intimacy to flourish under the regime of chattel slavery in the
antebellum United States” (153). He notes that this assertion is facilitated by “an ethical evasion
of the foreclosure of black female consent under the conditions of enslavement,” and, moreover,
argues that the problem of “black female sexual consent in relations with white male
slaveholders” is related to “a broader problem of political consent from the captive community
and its descendents for the project of multiracial democracy up to the present moment” (153,
emphases in the original).

44

Saidiya Hartman offers an illuminating analysis of the historical conditions of
(im)possibility surrounding an enslaved woman’s ability to give sexual consent. Under slave law,
an enslaved woman could neither legally give nor refuse consent, rendering her rape legally
impossible. This “disavowal of rape,” Hartman explains, “most obviously involves issues of
consent, agency, and will that are ensnared in a larger dilemma concerning the construction of
person and the calculation of black humanity in slave law since this repression of violence
constitutes female gender as the locus of both unredressed and negligible injury” (80). Hartman’s
definition of “female gender” as an entity constituted by violence and its denial bears comparison
with Sexton’s definition of race as “the relation one suffers and/or enjoys with respect to the
state-sponsored organization of violence and sexuality” (9). If race is constituted by violence and
its relationship to sexuality, it is not clear how gender, a formation clearly entangled with the
sexual violences that produce racial difference, should have any relationship to an ahistorical
antagonism of the Real. Hartman’s analysis of the production of female gender under slave law
crucially underscores the intersectional relationship between race and gender as symbolic (that
is, operating with the realm of language) indices of the related forms of violence—patriarchal
and white supremacist—that construct the enslaved person as the paradox of an undeniably
human person who holds the political status of dehumanized property.
Such an understanding of the intersectional operations of race and gender under a regime
of white supremacy allows us to better utilize Sexton’s point about the relationship between
sexual and political consent. Sexton’s work ultimately critiques a certain tendency within what
he calls multiracial discourse in the United States to pathologize “black identity… as an
antiquated state of confinement from which the ‘multiracial imagined community’ (Stephens
1999) must be delivered,” a tendency he interprets as “a refraction of the pronounced fear of
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‘black domination’ that underwrites the history of white supremacist discourse: whether
postbellum alibis for institutionalized lynching, segregation, or disenfranchisement or the
propaganda of ‘reverse discrimination’ fashionable today” (7). Sexton’s arguments raise
important questions about the stakes of black participation as well as black refusal to participate
in a postracial project that may or may not reckon with a white supremacist history, present, and
their consequences. In the context of Smith’s Strange Fruit, it is equally important to ask
whether Nonnie’s presumed sexual consent equates to political consent to the “new world” Tracy
imagines; whether Tracy seeks her consent in the first place; and, finally, to what extent Tracy
and Nonnie’s respective positonalities as a white man and black woman in a segregated 1920s
Georgia town make Nonnie’s sexual and political consent possible.
Nonnie and Tracy’s relationship has its roots in Nonnie’s childhood and Tracy’s
adolescence, during an incident that prompts Nonnie to position herself as an object of exchange
within a white supremacist patriarchal system. When Tracy protects a seven-year-old Nonnie
from sexual assault by another white boy—proclaiming, “Beat it. She’s not that kind” (4), thus
distinguishing her from other seven-year-old black girls who presumably are the “kind” that
desires to be raped—Nonnie rebuts her attacker’s statement, “I didn’t know she was yourn,” by
announcing to Tracy, “I am yourn” (4, original emphasis). Nonnie, thus, from a very young age,
understands her situation as that of a black female person who belongs to a white man, in this
case a white savior who emerges as an option preferable to that of a white rapist within a rather
limited spectrum of black female choice.
Like Sexton, Tracy suspects there may not be such a thing as an interracial sexual
relationship, even while his attempt to be part of such a relationship allows him to envision and
maintain hope for the possibility of a different world. During the night with Nonnie which Tracy
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recollects in an attempt to counter Dunwoodie’s white supremacist indoctrination, Tracy feels
“shamed and confused” (92) by his role in the relationship and the position of power he inhabits.
“[H]e knew that she had never seen a river in the moonlight before… that somehow he had
conferred a great favor” (92). To think of sharing something one loves, in this case an aesthetic
experience of nature, with one’s lover as conferring that lover a favor is at best quite odd.
Perhaps Tracy cannot divorce his position as lover from his role as savior; the original “favor” he
granted Nonnie in protecting her from a rapist continues to structure his subjectivity in the
relationship. But love is not a favor. To love one must relinquish power, of which the power to
grant favors is just one kind.
All sexual relationships occur within and perform power dynamics. A differential in
power does not make a sexual relationship impossible. And while the dynamics of subject-object
and self-other within sexual relationships are quite complicated and difficult to disentangle, I
propose a sexual relationship requires a level of recognition of the subjectivity, and, in the case
of human beings, humanity, of the Other. Tracy demonstrably struggles with such recognition.
As Tracy and Nonnie are about to have sex in the moonlight, “everything seemed right and
good” (93). And, as is often the case with sexual relationships, afterwards, things get weird:
But later, as they lay there, relaxed, looking up at the sky, she had pulled his hand to her
breast. He felt her heart beating under it and suddenly, lying there, she seemed not the
Nonnie whom he had a way of taking for granted as you’d take a piece of cornbread, but
a girl off somewhere by herself and sad about something. He drew her to him and ran his
hand across her hair, not knowing what to say. Not knowing in this damned upside-down,
devilish world what to say to a girl like this. (93)
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The emphasis is mine. Within the white supremacist thought patterns performed in this novel, the
comparison between a black woman and cornbread slips in casually—a dependent clause latched
onto a previous dependent clause. In this “upside-down… world” of white supremacist
perception, Tracy cannot tell the difference between his lover and cornbread. To take one’s lover
for granted is one thing; to take one’s lover for granted “as you’d take a piece of cornbread” is
quite another. Must Tracy feel Nonnie’s heartbeat to remind himself that she is not a spongy
supplement to Sunday brunch? Perhaps. There is, most certainly, no sexual relationship with
cornbread.
It is no wonder then that Tracy is ultimately swayed by Dunwoodie’s rhetoric. In addition
to illustrating Tracy’s inability to distinguish between Nonnie and cornbread, this flashback also
demonstrates his intolerance toward any mention to the structural racism which their relationship
would need to navigate if it were made public. Even a brief reference by Nonnie to her
experience as a black woman sends Tracy into a panic. When Nonnie suggests that her desire to
be protected by someone is related to growing up as a black girl, Tracy’s inner monologue
sounds an alarm: “Negro. She’d said it. Now everything would be spoiled. Ruined as it always
was!” (94, original emphasis). Tracy has not only given up on imagining a new world; he cannot
even acknowledge the reality of the world in which he lives, where it is not possible to attempt
any kind of relationship between a white and black person without addressing their racial
difference. When Nonnie reassures Tracy that she is not interested in discussing race—“Race is
something—made up, to me. Not real” (95)—Tracy feels momentary relief. Yet, it is not clear
how he decides, based on Nonnie’s comment, that their relationship may be viable after all.
“She’s my girl,” Tracy tells himself. “She’s lovely and beautiful, and she’s mine. […] Holding
her there, he knew he loved her—as a man loves the woman who fits all his needs” (95). A man
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who loves a woman for no other reason than his belief that “she fits all his needs” mistakes
possession for love. Distinctions between love, need, use, and ownership, as well as distinctions
between a person and cornbread remain murky for Tracy.
As the affair with Nonnie threatens to throw Tracy’s world into chaos, Dunwoodie’s
invitation into a white supremacist homoerotic patriarchal society offers the seduction of stability
and order. Nonnie cannot be “Tracy’s girl,” he comes to realize, because the social order that
allowed his forefathers to own black girls and women no longer exists, and a new order that
facilitates a consensual relationship between a white man and a black woman has not yet been
established. This in-between space of normative orders is a space of possibility that Tracy lacks
the vision to transform into a future. After the moonlit evening with Nonnie, Tracy heads back to
“White Town,” once again, full of hope. And yet, “the moment he opened the screen door of his
house and entered that hall, things changed as if he had found his sense of direction out in the
swamp—and lost it again” (96-97). Tracy’s home is with white supremacy.
Thus, faced with a choice between the pursuit of love and white supremacist
complacency, explicitly framed by the preacher as a rejection of love, Tracy chooses the latter:
Sitting there under the big oak tree by the preacher, who breathed deep and steadily now,
sweat rolling down his neck and forehead—Tracy tried to feel again what he had felt that
night two months ago under the same oak tree, on the same old riverbank. But it wouldn’t
come. He remembered every word they had said, every moment they had been here—as
if it had happened to someone else a hundred years ago. Nonnie was only a name today.
A name and an obstacle. A colored girl blocking a white path. (97, emphasis added)
The sight of the preacher sleeping the “effortless sleep”9 of those who embody supremacy
inspires neither love nor hope. Tracy once again observes himself in the third person, failing to
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reconcile his analysis of his body with his experience of that same body. Aligning oneself with
white supremacy is a form of dissociation. It nullifies personal experience. Tracy is not Tracy.
He does not know if he exists in the past or the future. On the one hand, temporal disorientation
is integral to the experience of love. As Alain Badiou observes, “everyone’s existence, when
tested by love, confronts a new way of experiencing time” (33). Yet, Tracy opts to resolve this
disorientation by disavowing his identity as lover. He cannot accept love’s challenge to his
existence. He does not wish to build a new world. Love is what landscape architects call a
“desire line”—an unofficial path delineated by “marks left on the ground… where people deviate
from the paths they are supposed to follow” (Ahmed 19-20). In Strange Fruit, love is a desire
line paved over by a master plan. The lover is always an obstacle, and the “colored girl blocking
a white path” is an intolerable obstacle to whiteness.

2. Sympathy
Under white supremacy, love necessarily fails. When love fails, we are left with
sympathy. Love involves a confrontation with the subjectivity of the other. From love, “you
learn that you can experience the world on the basis of difference and not only in terms of
identity” (Badiou 16). Sympathy’s engagement with difference is at best superficial. Sympathy
maintains white supremacy. And as Melamed argues, and Smith’s novel confirms, sympathy
kills.
Sam Perry, a physician and friend of the Andersons, believes “decent white people” live
in the town (177). He can count them on one hand. They are Tut Deen, Tracy’s father, a
physician, and soda fountain owner; Pug Pusey, father of Tracy’s fiancée Dorothy “Dottie”
Pusey; and Tom Harris, owner of a sawmill, who is kind to black people and kind to his
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employees, yet refuses to hear the latter’s appeals that he provide a living wage (177-179). In an
internal monologue, Tom Harris, who uses chain-gang labor, reasons that the best way to keep
these unpaid incarcerated black male workers well-behaved would be to “bring a drove of black
women” once a week to have nonconsensual sex with them (302). Harris does not plan to act on
this idea; he has some inkling it may be unethical, imagining his wife “would quit him tomorrow
if she knew he thought such a thing” (302). Like other white men in this novel, Harris defers
questions of right and wrong to (white) women and the Church.
Some of these white women, specifically, telephone switchboard operator Miss Sadie and
Tracy’s lesbian sister Laura,10 warn Tom Harris that Henry will be lynched if he does not use his
power to stop the lynching, as does Sam Perry. A delusional liberal who cannot stand to have his
own supremacy ideologies challenged, Tom Harris compares Sam to his wife, who “is always
imagining things” (339). While Tom Harris believes women and black people imagine things
and exaggerate white supremacist violence, he does take measures to protect Henry. Tom Harris,
who has witnessed a number of lynchings of black men in his lifetime, understands measures
against a lynching to consist, in this case, in dressing a large black man such as Henry in
improvised drag meant to disguise him as a white woman and hiding him in the town’s jail (324).
A self-professed rational white man, who, unlike his wife, Laura, Miss Sadie, and Sam, does not
“imagine things” such as the proven dangers of white supremacist violence, Tom Harris does
imagine Henry’s absurd disguise will protect him. He also imagines Henry will be protected by
the law, symbolized by the jail, in a town where lynchers are never tried.
Liberal sympathy quite literally kills Henry. Sympathy also kills and buries love. Tom
Harris postulates that “[m]any a man in Maxwell knew why Tracy was killed on the Old Town
road” and, in his bottomless ignorance and self-delusion, believes that “of course the women
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didn’t” (300-301). Tracy’s body is found in “Colored Town” just after he has proposed marriage
to Dorothy Pusey. All signs point to a crime of passion. And at the same time, to prosecute
Nonnie is out of the question. “Best thing folks can do now is hush it up,” Harris decides. “Get
the boy buried, hush the talk. Bring that mulatto girl to trial, pretty as she is, and you’d spread a
scandal from end to end of the United States” (301).11 The men in this town know very well that
women are capable of murdering them—whether in self-defense or in response to accumulated
indignities. “Get a woman mad enough, she’d do you in, in a minute,” observes plantation owner
Captain Ruston, who also believes Nonnie killed Tracy (361). And yet, the thought of any public
acknowledgment of this fact is so intolerable to Tom Harris that he must assure himself that the
town’s white women would never suspect (or identify with) Nonnie. Moreover, public
acknowledgement of a black woman’s murder of a white male lover would constitute an
irrevocable attack on a U.S. body politic whose coherence is maintained by a suppression of its
history of chattel slavery and denial of ongoing racial violence. There is no interracial sexual
relationship—consensual or otherwise—in Maxwell, Georgia, or in U.S. history. For the Tom
Harrises of the nation—its liberal white supremacist ruling class—this fiction must be defended
to ensure the endurance of polite racial oppression, which works in tandem with the spectacular
extra-judicial executions of black people to sustain white supremacy.

3. Hope: A Black and Queer Perspective
That no one suspects Ed Anderson, Nonnie’s brother, or questions his sudden disappearance the
night of the murder is among the less believable elements of Smith’s plot. One could argue
Smith constructs such a plot in order to appeal to liberal white readers who may be outraged by
reading about the lynching of an innocent black man in a novel thought to operate within the
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genre of social realism. Yet, there are other, more realistic ways, to achieve such an effect. We
know from the novel’s title that an innocent black man will be lynched, and yet, the lynching is
not the main focus of the novel; the focus of the novel is the psychology of white supremacy. At
the same time, the novel also allows us to contemplate black survival and its relationship to hope.
Ed Anderson is protected by an organized black community that performs an instinctual
knowledge of fugitivity under white supremacy. As she helps plan her brother’s escape, Bessie
stops to think, “as if all her race’s knowledge of how to escape the hands of white men would
offer itself to her, only for the thinking” (229). While Ed’s murder of Tracy is clearly carried out
in anger, it would be a mistake to read Ed’s character as indexical of an appeal to liberal white
sympathy. Ed is not an illustration of a damaged black psyche; he is not a Bigger Thomas
character. Ed is consistently characterized as a person who seeks a life of dignity for himself and
his family; a life he does not believe is possible under the racial apartheid of Maxwell, Georgia.
(While Washington, DC, where Ed lives, is also a segregated city, it nonetheless affords black
communities with a relative social and economic autonomy that does not exist in Maxwell.)
Arguably, Ed’s murder of Tracy is a perfectly rational response to Tracy’s sale of Nonnie. While
the sale of human beings is no longer legal in Maxwell, the town’s legal system has no
provisions for the trading of women under (white supremacist) patriarchy. Moreover, the town’s
law enforcement authorities enforce laws against murder only selectively, as demonstrated by
their refusal to prosecute Nonnie or the members of Henry’s lynch mob. In Maxwell, conflicts
are solved through murder and mob violence. Ed knows he has no other recourse. Consequently,
Smith does not seek her readers’ sympathy with the predicament of Ed and his family; she
invites their solidarity.
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While she performs solidarity with black self-determination and fugitivity, however,
Smith misses an opportunity in the character development of Nonnie. The novel offers detailed
biographical information and transcribes extensive inner monologues for its many characters,
including minor ones not mentioned in this chapter, and yet, we are left with a rather limited
understanding of Nonnie’s perspective. We largely understand Nonnie from the point of view of
her siblings and other characters in the novel. Nonnie’s family, the Andersons, have a reputation
for being educated and proud of their blackness, although the latter is more so the case for
Nonnie’s sister Bessie than it is for Nonnie. While both sisters have graduated from Spelman
College, only Bessie is described as having gained pride in her blackness as a result of the
curriculum’s lessons in black heritage and politics. Nonnie, on the other hand, tells Tracy that
“[r]ace is something—made up, to [her]” (95), and her assertion is not a commentary on the
concept of race as a racist, eugenicist fiction, but, rather, a statement of colorblindness that
deflects from a discussion of the violence produced by racialization.
Nonnie’s views on race sound odd to her siblings Bessie and Ed, who embrace their black
identity and are conscious of their racial oppression under American white supremacy. She is
also the only character referred to as “mulatto” in the novel, even though all evidence suggests
she and her siblings come from the same two biological parents. The novel’s narrative, along
with this figurative use of the term “mulatto,” then, implies a revision of the tragic mulatto trope,
where it is not so much Nonnie’s identity that is in crisis, but rather, the identities of all other
characters in the novel, none of whom are described as racially “mixed.” Additionally, it is not
Nonnie’s character who suffers a tragic fate, but, rather, her white lover and the black man he
hires as his replacement. Nonnie’s strangeness lies in her ability to simultaneously deny the
material violences of race and racism and somehow emerge miraculously unscathed by them.
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Aside from her family members, the only person curious about Nonnie’s point of view is
Tracy’s lesbian sister Laura—one of the novel’s two queer characters. Laura’s lesbianism is not
a subject of discussion in the town and is known only to Laura, her lover Jane, and Laura’s
mother, who communicates this knowledge by stealing one of Jane’s letters to Laura and
destroying a small clay nude sculpture made by Laura and inspired by Jane. An avid reader,
Laura is not only intellectually curious, but, like Smith, also curious about people’s motivations.
This curiosity leads to “queer” thoughts about Nonnie: “It’s queer to think of a colored girl
knowing your brother better than you do. Why had she killed him? Not the kind to flare up in
anger. […] He must have done something very dreadful to have made her do it. […] No one has
said it. No one ever would… and yet… they must know” (321). It is only fitting that the lesbian
character would contemplate the town’s open secrets, even if, in this case, the secret concerns a
shared (and incorrect) assumption rather than a known fact.
Laura plans and comes very close to executing her plan to ask Nonnie how she found
“the courage” to kill Tracy. As her family and that of Tracy’s fiancée prepare for his funeral,
Laura sends for Nonnie, and attempts to speak to her. However,
Laura could find nothing to say. She pressed back the question, struggling to keep it from
forming words that might slip through her lips. What did he do that gave you the
courage? Nobody loved him much, except you, but you must have loved him. You have
to love a thing—you have to love someone a great deal to kill her, don’t you? You have
to love and hate what you kill, a great deal, don’t you—
“—before you can find the courage—”
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She spoke the words aloud and was utterly confused at the sound of her voice. Then,
perceiving that the girl had not heard […] she forced herself back into the conventional
attitude of white mistress and colored maid. (322-323)
Tellingly, this queer character’s irrepressible utterance concerns courage—the courage to do or
say the forbidden—while her imagined conversation with Nonnie contains a queer slip of the
tongue that transforms her brother into a hypothetical female lover. Laura is incapable of
composing a sentence in her mind that includes the phrase “to love a man”—the man becomes a
thing that takes the form of a woman when de-objectified. Her fantasy of a queer transgression of
boundaries demarcated by race, open secrets, and symbolic limits to language surrounding
funeral rites (such as the ones on which Antigone insists) is both utopian and informed by an
entitlement produced by whiteness. Laura momentarily feels she can say anything to Nonnie,
including things she would never dream of saying to a white person. As Laura imagines the
dissipation of boundaries between herself and Nonnie, boundaries erected by centuries of white
supremacist domination, the line between queer and white fantasy is blurred, suggesting a
moment of self-reflection on the part of the queer white author writing a novel about the radical
(and unfulfilled) potential of interracial love.
Smith leaves us, in the end, with queer and black hope. Early in the novel, Nonnie tells an
uncomprehending Tracy that she wants her baby: “I’ll have something they—can’t take away
from me” (6). This is the only instance in the text where Nonnie alludes to racial oppression. For
all of her insistence that she is not interested in questions of race, she seems well aware of how
her body, as a black female body, is situated within U.S. history. Nonnie understands her
pregnancy as an opportunity to claim ownership over a body whose sovereignty is threatened
under American white supremacist patriarchy. Relatedly, Nonnie also rejects her sister Bessie’s
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insistence on respectability politics when the latter argues that Nonnie should have her
pregnancy terminated lest she and her family be disgraced by the “concubine” status the birth of
a white-fathered baby would imply for Nonnie (123, 127). Her simple statement, “I’ve got to
have my baby, Bess,” ends all further discussion and succinctly performs a politics of black hope
and resilience that gestures to the novel’s vision of futurity and world-making.
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Chapter II:
Love and Belonging: The Elusive “We of Me” in Carson McCullers’ The Member of the
Wedding

Carson McCullers’ The Member of the Wedding envisions new community and family
formations by directly interrogating the institution of marriage through a queer protagonist
whose imagination subverts the ritual of the exogamous, intra-racial, heterosexual wedding. In
McCullers’ 1946 novel, Frankie Addams, a twelve-year-old tomboy living in a Georgia town,
seeks membership in a new community after she is socially rejected by other adolescents.
Because Frankie is not invited to return to the “club” of older adolescent girls who were
previously her friends and because she is not aware of any other existing “club” that wants her as
a member, Frankie must create a new community that will include her. Rather than bond with
others who have been similarly excluded, Frankie invents a new kind of club: she decides she
will insert herself into the matrimony of her brother Jarvis and his fiancée Janice, become a
member of their wedding, and join them on their honeymoon and subsequent travels.
Paradoxically, Janice and Jarvis are desirable for Frankie in part because they exemplify
normativity, as a conventionally attractive young, white heterosexual couple, but also because
Jarvis’s employment in the U.S. military facilitates world travel that for Frankie, symbolizes
queer freedom.1 Frankie falls in love—not with Jarvis or with Janice but with the couple and
their wedding, naming her desire with the simple sentence, “They are the we of me” (42). My
reading of The Member of the Wedding examines how this “impossible desire”2 queers
heteronormative arrangements of sex, love, and community that have perpetuated racial
segregation and white dominance in the mid-twentieth century. Further, I trace the novel’s
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exploration of the uncanny and its relationship to desire to demonstrate how both attraction to a
violent normativity and utopian and non-normative queer desire are uncanny processes that
collide within the wedding as object of desire. Concurrently, I examine the process of queer
subject formation and its relationship to the formation of a cross-racial, inter-class, and queer
collectivity that emerges in tandem with the vexed and ideologically ambiguous collectivity
facilitated by the wedding.
Frankie’s primary familial arrangement throughout much of the novel is in fact
interracial, multi-generational, interclass, and composed of both straight and queer people—
herself, her six-year-old cousin John Henry West, who is explicitly characterized as a
genderqueer sissy boy, and the family’s servant Berenice Sadie Brown, a black heterosexual
woman. Frankie’s mother died on the day she was born and her father, though not unloving, is
somewhat distant toward Frankie and rarely present in the novel. Berenice and John Henry, then,
effectively constitute Frankie’s family. While Frankie is driven to devalue this primary family, as
she comes of age in a culture that privileges the heteronormative and racial exclusivity signaled
by white (people’s) weddings, her communion with John Henry and Berenice facilitates her
subsequent imaginings of queer and cross-racial community formations.
Frankie does not just imagine new social formations; she also actively participates in
their creation. Thus, she is doubly creative. She envisions the new social possibility of getting
married to a wedding couple and tells her story to Berenice as well as to strangers in town.
Through this act of storytelling, she connects with strangers and creates an imaginary community
of listeners who are informed about her intended transformation of the genre of the wedding.
This storytelling also allows her to refine her vision of the wedding, as she revises the story each
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time she tells it to a new person, artfully shaping and re-shaping her narrative: “the telling of the
wedding had an end and a beginning, a shape like a song” (62).

Love and the Uncanny
Rhythmic, musical storytelling is intrinsic to Frankie’s mode of belonging among and relating to
people. In the novel’s opening paragraph, we are introduced to Berenice, Frankie and John
Henry in the middle of a hot summer, as they sit “at the kitchen table, saying the same things
over and over, so that by August the words began to rhyme with each other and sound strange”
(3). One example of their repetitive conversation is Berenice and Frankie’s mulling over the
disappearance of the family cat Charles. Continually rehearsing the same theories about his
whereabouts without arriving at any conclusion, “each gloomy afternoon their voices sawed
against each other, saying the same words, which finally reminded Frankie of a raggedy rhyme
said by two crazies” (31). Similar to Frankie’s creative storytelling while walking through town,
the trio of Berenice, John Henry and Frankie also tells tales to create community. While they do
not consciously revise their stories, constant repetition allows them to hear these stories in new
ways, producing new and unexpected rhymes. Thus the three create their own music, their own
language, and their own family.
When she falls in love with Janice-Jarvis,3 however, Frankie distances herself from her
trio and decides to join a new one by creating a new rhyme. Changing her name to F. Jasmine for
the purposes of marrying the wedding, she links herself to Janice-Jarvis through the imagined
formation of “the JA three of them.” Her falling in love and wanting to associate with this couple
is undoubtedly linked to a desire to belong to an entity that is socially recognized as desirable. In
a sense, F. Jasmine seeks to identify with a dominant model—a wedding of a heterosexual

60

couple. At the same time, she is envisioning something unheard of and building a new
community through her presentation of her vision.
F. Jasmine’s community creation is an uncanny process. It begins with imagining a
kinship with each person she informs of her plans, feeling “an unexplainable connection…
between herself” and “total strangers,” including the Portuguese owner of a local inn, the Blue
Moon café, a soldier in the café, and a woman sweeping her porch in a different part of town.
Experiencing a unique joy in sharing her story, F. Jasmine swells with affection for the strangers
who listen. The woman on the porch “leaned on the broom, listening,” and “when [F. Jasmine]
looked into the lady’s eyes, she loved her, though she did not even know her name” (62). While
F. Jasmine’s love for this woman is not a sustained fixation like her love for Janice-Jarvis, it is
similarly uncanny insofar as there is always something uncanny about love at first sight. One
sees something, recognizes something she already knows, without quite knowing what this
something is or how she knows it.
Freud’s theory of the uncanny is helpful in mapping Frankie’s community building and in
examining her desire for the wedding. Furthermore, the work of fiction central to illustrating the
theory in his essay, E.T.A. Hoffmann’s “The Sandman,” offers a useful point of comparison to
The Member of the Wedding. Both texts confront the inherent uncanniness of falling in love, and
a brief comparison of the experiences of their protagonists reveals crucial differences in how
normatively and non-normatively gendered and sexually oriented subjects navigate this
uncanniness.
In his eponymous essay, “The Uncanny,” Freud offers an etymological examination of
the concept, reviewing various dictionary entries for “unheimlich,” the German word for
“uncanny.” The word “heimlich” literally means “homelike” and also connotes the domestic,
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familiar, known, and safe, whereas “unheimlich”—unhomelike—connotes the foreign, strange,
unsettling, and scary. However, Freud observes “heimlich” and “unheimlich” are not always
defined as opposites and that in fact, in some of the definitions and examples, the “heimlich”
morphs into the “unheimlich” and the “unheimlich” just as easily slips into the “heimlich.” Freud
maintains that “heimlich is a word the meaning of which develops towards an ambivalence, until
it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich. Unheimlich is in some way or other a subspecies of heimlich” (4). Ultimately Freud concludes that the uncanny “is in reality nothing new
or foreign, but something familiar and old—established in the mind that has been estranged only
by the process of repression” (13). The familiar and the uncanny are thus at times one and the
same, and an uncanny occurrence performs an unexpected return of the estranged, repressed
familiar.
Such is the wedding for Frankie—both familiar and strange, and thus compelling for
reasons she does not understand. Frankie’s first few dialogue lines in the novel directly express
the uncanniness of the (impending) Janice-Jarvis wedding: “It is so very queer…. The way it all
just happened…. I have never been so puzzled…. I just never saw any two people like them.
When they walked in the house today it was so queer” (3-4). The dreamlike vision of the
wedding Frankie conjures up amid these remarks is similarly uncanny as well as unsettling:
Frankie sat at the table with her eyes half closed, and she thought about a wedding. She saw a
silent church, a strange snow slanting down against the colored windows. The groom in this
wedding was her brother, and there was a brightness where his face should be. The bride was
there in a long white train, and the bride was also faceless. There was something about this
wedding that gave Frankie a feeling she could not name. (4)
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This generic picture eerily abstracts all particularity and individuality from the wedding couple
and the wedding. There is only a church, presumably silent because empty, a generic faceless
groom whom Frankie can intellectually identify but cannot experientially recognize as her
brother, and a faceless as well as nameless bride, wholly interchangeable with any other. This
scene resembling an archetypal dream is all Frankie can produce, at this early stage in the novel,
in attempting to remember what it is she recognizes in the sight of Janice-Jarvis.
There is an inherent creepiness in this generic scene, evoked perhaps most strongly by a
particularly creepy object: the nameless, faceless bride. A generic bride-as-object also serves as a
focal point in Hoffmann’s “The Sandman.” “The Sandman” is a story about a young man, the
university student Nathaniel, who falls in love with a doll, Olympia, because he is quite literally
unable to distinguish between a woman and an inanimate object (similar to Tracy Deen’s less
literal but equally disturbing difficulty with differentiating between his lover and cornbread in
Smith’s Strange Fruit). Stated otherwise, it is a story about the impossibility of heterosexual love
within a sexist imaginary that disregards the particularity and agency4 of women. Freud insists
the story is about male castration anxiety, and he has a point, insofar as the failure to recognize
and relate to another human being—a prerequisite for love—is a metaphorical act of selfcastration. In Freud’s view, the imagined agent of castration is the “bad” disciplining father—a
reasonable hypothesis if this father is understood as a metonym for patriarchy. One could argue
that the son is castrated by the father who has taught him to be heterosexual but has not taught
him how to love. However, the son also castrates himself by accepting the model of power and
desire introduced by the father. Olympia, the doll crafted by two of Nathaniel’s evil fathersurrogates, is not unlike the faceless bride or the idea of the wedding. She is interchangeable,
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uncanny in her capacity to resemble any and all women, and a likely object of love at first sight
in her ability to conjure up a theoretically infinite number of intangible associations.
Frankie, too, is socialized within a heterosexist imaginary, and, not conforming to her
assigned gender role, she at times finds herself in a predicament similar to Nathaniel’s. She falls
in love, albeit momentarily, with a woman she has never met, who has never spoken to her,
assuming, without any evidence, that the woman is interested in her story, just as Nathaniel’s
love for Olympia is amplified with each day he spends speaking to her while she says nothing,
thus expressing, in his mind, their transcendent, spiritual connection. Aside from creepy, onesided obsessions, however, Nathaniel and Frankie also share a particular kind of queer desire: the
desire for something impossible within established economies of love that do not allow us to
marry dolls or weddings. Because desire can only be repressed temporarily and the repressed
always returns, heterosexist and heteronormative socialization is never fully successful, and its
inevitable failure produces queer possibility.5
The uncanniness of the wedding, as Frankie imagines it in her vision, announces the
wedding’s queer possibility. One is puzzled at first about why the couple and their wedding
strike such an uncanny chord for Frankie. Berenice, for instance, does not see them as strange at
all, remarking that they constitute something rather unremarkable—“a nice white couple” (29).
Yet, as Frankie’s reverie reveals, nice white couples are creepy, as are white churches and white
weddings. They are creepy because of their generic nature, their compulsory whiteness, and their
suppression of desire—particularly female desire. And the creepy, I would suggest, is a not-sodistant cousin of the uncanny. Derived from the idea of stealthy motion, the creepy, like the
uncanny, creeps up on us after a period of strategic hiding.6 Thus, the generic structure of the
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wedding is uncanny because it is hiding something—or many things. In particular, blackness,
queerness, and their conjunction are central among the specters hidden by Janice-Jarvis.
A scene Frankie witnesses during her epic story-telling, community-building journey
through the town hints at the racial and sexual content repressed by Janice-Jarvis and reveals a
connecting thread between Berenice and F. Jasmine: their shared understanding of the
uncanniness of love. I quote at length, to capture the full effect of the passage:
[T]he main thing that brought back the wedding frame of mind was an accident that
occurred on the way home. It was a mysterious trick of sight and the imagination. She
was walking home when all at once there was a shock in her as though a thrown knife
struck and shivered in her chest. F. Jasmine stopped dead in her tracks, one foot still
raised, and at first she could not take it in just what had happened. There was something
sideways and behind her that had flashed across the very corner edge of her left eye; she
had half-seen something, a dark double shape, in the alley she had just that moment
passed. And because of this half-seen object, the quick flash in the corner of her eye,
there had sprung up in her the sudden picture of her brother and the bride. Ragged and
bright as lightning she saw the two of them as they had been when, for a moment, they
stood together before the living-room mantelpiece, his arm around her shoulders. So
strong was this picture that F. Jasmine felt suddenly that Jarvis and Janice were there
behind her in the alley, and she had caught a glimpse of them—although she knew, and
well enough, that they were in Winter Hill, almost a hundred miles away.

F. Jasmine lowered her raised foot to the pavement and slowly turned to look around. The
alley lay between two grocery stores: a narrow alley, dark in the glare. She did not look at
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it directly, for somehow it was as though she was almost afraid. Her eyes stole slowly
down the brick wall and she glimpsed again the dark double shapes. And what was there?
F. Jasmine was stunned. There in the alley were only two colored boys, one taller than
the other and with his arm resting on the shorter boy’s shoulder. That was all—but
something about the angle or the way they stood, or the pose of their shapes, had
reflected the sudden picture of her brother and the bride that had so shocked her. And
with this vision of them plain and exact the morning ended, and she was home by two
o’clock. (74-75)
F. Jasmine is “stunned” by a seemingly unremarkable scene’s ability to invoke a haunting,
uncanny feeling. There is nothing remarkable about two black boys, one with his arm on the
other’s shoulder, just as there is nothing remarkable about a white middle-class heterosexual
couple. Indeed, it is unclear at first what these two couplings have in common apart from their
banality. What is significant is that they “reflect” one another in a striking and singular way that
is difficult to explain. White reflected against black, heterosexual against homosocial: these are
contrasts, but not exceptional or unique ones in any obvious way. Yet they are striking for
Frankie, whose queer unconscious sees them as inextricably linked. The homosocial is never just
homosocial7—it always contains the potential for queer connection, just as the heterosexual is
not a self-evidently natural orientation, but rather a momentous achievement, marked by the
culmination of years of successful socialization, internalization of taboos and prohibitions,
repression of instincts, and proper direction of desire, resulting in the production of a mature,
adult desiring subject.8 Just as the familiar, or heimlich, slips unexpectedly into its opposite, the
strange or unheimlich, so is heterosexuality often at risk of resembling its supposed opposite,
homosexuality. Similarly, as ideological racial formations founded upon dubious science and
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history, whiteness and blackness risk blurring the boundary that separates them, a boundary
policed for centuries in the U.S., during slavery and after, by official and unofficial codes of
segregation. The two black boys startle Frankie, uncannily reflecting the “nice white couple” that
exists to keep both blackness and queerness at bay.
Crucially, the scene Frankie witnesses is an “accident,” not merely an incident, as it
unveils queerness, a phenomenon that can be rightly described as an accident of socialization—
certainly not its intended effect—and also “a mysterious trick of… [an] imagination” necessarily
unleashed, in the face of heteronormative conditioning, to envision alternative trajectories of
love, sex, and sociability. Just as F. Jasmine describes the wedding as “more a feeling than a
picture,” so is this scene, initially, blurry “half-seen,” or more felt than seen. Yet the intensity of
the sudden feeling conjured up by the conceptually fuzzy tableau that catches Frankie’s
peripheral vision gradually brings her desire into focus and perspective. And in this process there
are momentary flashes of clarity, a “sudden picture,” a “glimpse,” a light-bulb moment
connecting a vague feeling of queerness to the Janice-Jarvis assemblage.9
Uncanny black queerness emerges out of a dark alley, “stunning” Frankie with its bold,
absurd resemblance to her attraction to the wedding couple. She is “afraid” at first to “look at it
directly,” for she knows instinctively that there is something off, something not quite right, with
the picture lurking in the shadows. We later learn about an incident perhaps present in the back
of Frankie’s mind: the murder of a young black man, Lon Baker, in the alley next to Frankie’s
father’s store (92). Alleys are thus dangerous and dark, containing scenes of black life, love and
death, scenes repressed, suppressed, and at times violently obliterated by whiteness. And so,
Frankie’s gaze seeks to domesticate the danger in the alley, perceiving the embrace of the two
black boys as a banal occurrence, bewildering in its ability to conjure up the wedding. But such
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domestication is impossible, as “the pose of their shapes,” the suggested entanglement of their
bodies, makes their connection to the wedding unmistakable.
Because the narrator withholds our access to Frankie’s words as she relates the episode
to Berenice, there is no way of knowing how she names, in this telling, a certain “feeling that she
had never named before” (98), but Berenice’s response allows us to surmise that Frankie is
talking about love, and in particular, the uncanny repetition of one’s own idiosyncratic
recognition of love. Berenice is “astonished” (98) by Frankie’s story and immediately recognizes
the intangible feeling to which she refers. This story, Berenice asserts, is “one of the queerest
things I ever heard of” (99) because it verbalizes a feeling that has brought about uncanny
repetitions in her own life:
“I know what you mean,” said Berenice. “Right here in this very corner of the eye.” She
pointed to the red-webbed outside corner of the dark eye. “You suddenly catch something
there. And this cold shiver run all the way down you. And you whirl around. And then
you stand facing Jesus knows what. But not Ludie10 and not who you want. And for a
minute you feel like you been dropped down a well.”
“Yes,” F. Jasmine said. “That is it.”
“Well, this is mighty remarkable,” said Berenice. “This is a thing happening to me
all my life. Yet just now is the first time I ever heard it put into words.”
[…]
“Yes, that is the way when you are in love,” said Berenice. “Invariably. A thing
known and not spoken.”
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So that was how the queer conversation began at quarter to six on the last afternoon. It
was the first time ever they had talked about love, with F. Jasmine included in the
conversation as a person who understood and had worthwhile opinions. (99-100)
Berenice recognizes that Frankie has experienced love because Frankie has articulated love’s
fundamental connection to the uncanny, having stumbled upon an uncanny repetition that is part
of a long series of repetitions that will structure Frankie’s future libidinal trajectory. Fittingly,
Berenice illustrates the workings of uncanny repetition as a structuring element of love by retelling a story she has told Frankie many times before: the story of Ludie Maxwell Freeman—the
love of her life—their marriage,11 his death, and her tendency to “copy [her]self forever
afterward” in seeking reminders—and remainders—of Ludie in each of her subsequent choices
of lovers and husbands (107). In one case, Berenice is attracted to, and eventually marries, a man
because his disfigured thumb reminds her of Ludie’s (104-5). As far as Berenice’s unconscious
is concerned, this man has acquired the thumb that was lost in Ludie’s death and has thus
brought Ludie back to life. Her subsequent husband has also acquired something that belonged to
Ludie, and has done so in a much more literal fashion, by having purchased the coat Berenice
pawned in order to give Ludie a proper funeral (105-6). To properly part with Ludie, Berenice
also parts with a reminder and remainder of his—a remainder returned to her by another man.
These new husbands are ciphers—vessels filled with traces of that which can never actually
return yet returns endlessly in the psyche through the replicatory logic of the unconscious.
Perhaps because these repetitions of Ludie are consistently housed in men who prove to
be violent, Berenice is distinctly aware of the dangers of love propelled by uncanny repetitions.
Moreover, she envisions a potentially even bleaker future for Frankie because of the intangible
nature of her first true love object.
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“If you start falling in love with some unheard-of thing like that, what is going to happen
to you? If you take a mania like this, it won’t be the last time and of that you can be sure.
So what will become of you? Will you be trying to break into weddings the rest of your
days? And what kind of life would that be?”

[…]
“You just laying yourself this fancy trap to catch yourself in trouble,” Berenice went on.
“And you know it.” (108)
In Berenice’s view, that obscure object of desire, the wedding, ushers in a conceivably endless
chain of impossible love objects and narratives. One is already sufficiently “caught” when
following traces of a lost love leads her to a series of undesirable relationships. And for Berenice,
Frankie’s future is potentially even less desirable. In her view, Frankie risks inhabiting the
paradoxical and even more perilous position of being simultaneously “caught” and lost, because
there is no clear roadmap for how to pursue her object of desire.
Berenice urges Frankie to escape from the path of desire that threatens to catch or trap her
while escape is still possible. If Frankie were drawn to a love object with obvious character flaws
that happened to arrive in a more socially acceptable form—for instance, “a nice white boy
beau,” (109) as Berenice puts it—Berenice may be less likely to object. We convince ourselves,
after all, that there is something romantic in our patterns of attraction to certain kinds of flaws in
our lovers, that there is something romantic in being “caught” in these patterns. But there are
other ways of being “caught” that are hardly romantic. As a working-class black woman living in
the 1940s American South, Berenice is particularly attuned to what it means to be “caught” in a
situation one cannot escape. Berenice explains to Frankie and John Henry that while everyone is
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“somehow caught” in a certain set of circumstances through an accident of birth, Berenice is
“caught worse” than both of them because she is black:
Everyone is caught one way or another. But they done drawn completely extra bounds
around all colored people. They done squeezed us off in one corner by ourself. So we
caught first-way I was telling you, as all human beings is caught. And we caught as
colored people also. (119)
Being caught in a certain trajectory is intrinsic to the human condition, but some human subjects
are caught in predicaments that are more difficult to escape because others have found it
convenient and to their personal benefit, given the opportunity, to confine them to social
categories that restrict their possibilities to live the lives they wish to live. Berenice is caught by
a legacy of slavery and indentured servitude that not only forecloses for her the American
promise of upward economic and social mobility but also significantly restricts her options for
familial and social arrangements. Because of her job as a domestic worker—the most attractive
employment option for a working-class black woman in America during this period, especially in
the South—she is stuck in a kitchen with Frankie and John Henry for far too many hours of the
day. Her other option would be to marry T.T. Williams, a friend to whom she is not attracted,
who would be able to provide for her. Either way, Berenice is familially caught by being
attached to a family that is neither biological nor chosen.
Frankie is attuned to the fact of Berenice’s confinement and its relationship to being
black in America. Although she is not as aware of the additional economic disadvantages faced
by black women in particular—as she admits to Berenice, she “didn’t realize” that Berenice earns
six dollars per week until the latter informs her of this (85)—she is aware that black people are
not afforded the material freedoms that allow Frankie to dream of a future as a privileged globe-
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trotting American. It is John Henry who asks Berenice why she claims to be “caught worse,” as
“F. Jasmine understood why she had said this” (119). Frankie is in the habit of walking by the
town prison12 and “star[ing] for a long time” (124) at the building, pondering conditions of
immobility, confinement, incarceration, and unfreedom. She knows a few of the prisoners—“all
of them colored”—including a friend of Berenice’s “accused by the white lady she worked for of
stealing a sweater and a pair of shoes” (123). While this example highlights the asymmetry
between (future) Frankie’s and her black neighbors’ personal sovereignty as (un)free citizens,
visiting the prison while crafting a highly unrealistic plot to escape a heteronormative future also
calls attention to the fact that both queer and black Americans are disenfranchised subjects. “The
jail did not frighten her this evening,” we are assured, “for this time tomorrow she would be far
away” (124). Yet we are well aware that her plan to elope with the wedding couple is as viable as
the chances of escape for prisoners who “beat on the stone walls or wrench at the iron bars” of
their cells (123).
Berenice knows this, too, and it is because of this knowledge and her attunement to
multiple ways of being “caught,” both psychic and material, that she so ardently urges Frankie to
abandon what strikes her as an utterly hopeless trajectory of romance. Berenice may hope that
Frankie’s first love, her love for the wedding, is somehow controllable and therefore avoidable.
If this is the case, then Berenice recognizes that one is not born queer; one becomes queer. And
yet, it is worth asking whether a queer white tomboy who wants to marry a wedding is somehow
more “caught” than a straight black woman who chooses her partners on the basis of their
thumbs or coats. We are all equally caught in irrational webs of desire. What distinguishes desire
that is socially recognized as queer is its social vilification on the basis of object choice, usually a
highly generic form of object choice such as the gender of the potential partner or the number of
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partners one wishes to have. It is easier to vilify the generic; doing so does not require an
expansive imagination. Frankie’s queer desire can easily be read as a combination of the generic
sexual aberrations of bisexuality, incest, and polyamory. Indeed, when one combines aberrations,
one becomes more aberrant than someone situated at a single node of queerness. Frankie could
thus be read as triply queer. Even so, such a reading overlooks the unique queerness of desiring
an abstraction—a marriage—as one’s object choice.

Queer Subject Formation as World-Building
Frankie is aware that both she and her desire for the wedding are queer. Recovering from her
uncanny reverie of the white wedding and its faceless bride and groom, she remarks to Berenice
that “[w]hen [Janice and Jarvis] walked into the house today it was so queer” (4). For Frankie the
wedding couple provokes queer feelings that call attention to her emergent queer identity.
Pondering an adolescent growth spurt that makes her stand out visually, Frankie reflects that
“she was grown so tall that she was almost a big freak, and her shoulders were narrow, her legs
too long” (4), and that if she continues growing at the same rate, by age eighteen “she would
grow to be over nine feet tall. And what would be a lady who is over nine feet high? She would
be a Freak” (19). A capitalized “Freak” is antithetical to “a lady,” whom conventional standards
of beauty and feminine presentation expect to be of much smaller proportions.
Frankie’s self-perceived freakishness reminds her of the freak show at the annual town
fair, whose list of participants is fairly standard for a Southern town fair during this period: “The
Giant,” who is over eight feet tall, along with “The Fat Lady,” “The Midget,” “The Wild
Nigger,” “The Pin Head,” “The Alligator Boy,” and “The Half-Man Half-Woman” (19).
Exhibiting a combination of physical abnormality, racial otherness, (racialized) animality, and
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gender hybridity, these so-called freaks frighten Frankie because she detects a secret, shared
kinship between her deviance and theirs. She fears interpellation by the freaks and what she
perceives as their knowing gaze: “She was afraid of all the Freaks, for it seemed to her that they
had looked at her in a secret way and tried to connect their eyes with hers, as though to say: we
know you. She was afraid of their long Freak eyes” (20). This gaze is also uncanny because both
familiar and unfamiliar, strange and familial. It pulls her toward a “home,” an otherness, a
freakishness she recognizes in herself but seeks to repress. It summons a fear that her own
freakishness may similarly confine her to spectacular, stigmatized otherness. Tellingly, the
narrator repeats the image of the Freaks’ “long eyes” that “know” Frankie when she visits the
prison. Looking at prisoners as they look out through their metal bars, “it seemed to her that their
eyes, like the long eyes of the Freaks at the fair, had called to her as though to say: We know
you” (124). While Frankie attempts to connect with strangers in town by gazing into their eyes,
she instinctively rejects the gaze of freaks, prisoners, and otherwise socially banished subjects,
and its invitation for connection. The freaks’ “long” eyes know too much about her, can see too
far into her past and future, and probe too deeply into her hidden yearnings and fears. In fact,
Frankie suspects she may become like them regardless of whether she returns their gaze
intentionally, that, in other words, returning their gaze may be inevitable. “Do you think I will
grow into a Freak?” (21), she asks Berenice, hoping for assurance that she will not, for she
“doubt[s] if they ever get married or go to a wedding…. Those Freaks” (20). Frankie understands
that normative rituals of inclusion exclude obvious deviants and hopes she can sneak into the
wedding, with her deviance undetected, in order to hijack and marry it.
Frankie’s attempted disavowal of freaks and freakishness, however, is not consistent with
her plans for the wedding. For to reject the gaze of the freak is also to disavow her own gaze, the
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desiring gaze of a lover, community-builder, and world-builder—subject-positions coextensive
with one another. The Member of the Wedding offers an articulation of the lover which
McCullers elaborates upon in her 1951 novella The Ballad of the Sad Café (hereafter abbreviated
as Sad Café). Sad Café suggests that a lover is someone who creates a world in which love is
possible. Its narrator describes the lover thus:
First of all, love is a joint experience between two persons—but the fact that it is a joint
experience does not mean that it is a similar experience to the two people involved. There
are the lover and the beloved, but these two come from different countries. Often the
beloved is only a stimulus for all the stored-up love which has lain quiet within the lover
for a long time hitherto. And somehow every lover knows this. He feels in his soul that
his love is a solitary thing. He comes to know a new strange loneliness and it is this
knowledge which makes him suffer. So there is only one thing for the lover to do. He
must house his love within himself the best he can; he must create for himself a whole
new inward world—a world intense and strange, complete in himself. Let it be added
here that this lover about whom we speak need not necessarily be a young man saving for
a wedding ring—this lover can be man, woman, child, or indeed any human creature on
this earth. (216, emphasis added)
In Sad Café, the lover’s world is entirely of her own creation. Without a consenting beloved—
which does not exist in Sad Café—the lover’s world and the lover’s vision of a world in which
love is possible remain a figment of her imagination. Thus the Sad Café lover-beloved dyad is
plagued by a fundamental incommensurability. The lover and beloved speak cross-purposes:
each is necessarily talking at and not with the other for the simple reason that they are incapable
of hearing each other. The lover remains isolated in her own world, which becomes the container
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of a love with no viable outlet for expression. But the lover nonetheless creates that world, thus
creating the potentiality for love. The lover must create that world—she is constitutionally
compelled to do so—and this is true of any lover, including a lover who represents the most
conventional and normative pairing of desire and embodiment imaginable: the young man saving
for a wedding ring. A lover such as Frankie, a queer tomboy who desires something truly
unprecedented, must therefore be exceptionally creative and imaginative in building this new
world.
An additional obstacle emerges from the fact that wanting to marry a wedding is not just
unprecedented but also, at least at first glance, quite absurd. It is significant, however, that some
recognizably absurd desires are more viable than others. If one can have a relationship with a
doll—as Nathaniel does in the Hoffmann story—then why can’t Frankie have a relationship with
a wedding? Both Frankie and Nathaniel have designs for the Other to which she cannot possibly
consent, yet, up to a point, Nathaniel is able follow through with his plans. The key difference in
their respective designs lies in the fact that while Frankie intends to disrupt a heteronormative
arrangement, Nathaniel’s plans are mitigated by a long-established heteropatriarchal narrative in
which men choose the women they intend to marry, and these women have little choice in the
matter. Hoffmann’s story satirizes the non-consensual structure of patriarchy and compulsory
heterosexuality13 by presenting a doll that cannot talk back as the ultimate fantasy of a man in
love. But what is the ultimate love fantasy of a polymorphously-oriented twelve-year-old
tomboy? This is much less clear. For even though Frankie appears singularly fixated on the
wedding, the purview of her desire is in fact much broader. Her ultimate fantasy is perhaps the
ability to form an instant emotional bond with any person or grouping of persons she encounters.
And as with her plans for the wedding, Frankie is convinced that this is not simply a fantasy but
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a reality. She forms these connections organically as she wanders about town telling the tale of
the wedding, building (imagined) communities as alternatives to exclusive structures such as
heterosexual marriage and cliques of popular kids, as well as to more inclusive structures to
which she belongs but does not wish to, such as her non-normative, non-chosen kitchen family.
The wedding then is not just a singular obscure object of desire but a focal point around which a
larger assemblage of affective connections gathers. As Frankie tells its tale and strangers listen—
or at least she imagines that they do—communities are gathered by the conjuring of a future
gathering.
While it isn’t possible for the wedding to consent to Frankie’s plans, the wedding, unlike
a single human subject who becomes the unsuspecting object of (unreciprocated) love, invites
desire in a systematic and premeditated way. For it is not just Frankie’s story about the wedding
but the wedding itself that gathers desire. The white wedding of a white military couple in
wartime constitutes a ritual celebration of the nation, its imperialist strivings, and its propagation
through the idealized, heteronormative, nuclear family. Frankie is a properly desiring American
subject insofar as she wishes to share in the prestige of a military family that travels and
represents the nation overseas. She also desires heterosexuality, but her queer imagination
produces its own interpretation of what this means. It never occurs to Frankie that she should be
a bride—or even a groom for that matter—in a two-person heterosexual wedding, but she desires
the (straight) couple because the couple itself is hegemonically desirable. Frankie, in other
words, wants to have heterosexuality without wanting to be heterosexual.
The question, then, of what Frankie actually wants is quite complicated. She is not just an
adolescent but also a queer adolescent who has a particularly fraught relationship to what she is
supposed to want. It is easy—and not at all original—to dismiss Frankie’s fantasies as symptoms
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of a confused adolescent phase with no lasting or long-term significance. But adolescent
fantasies and understandings of the world can be formative—as Berenice certainly
understands—of one’s affective and sexual trajectory as an adult, and adolescent interpretations
of normative sexuality can furthermore offer a fresh and instructive outsider’s perspective into
the hegemonic social order that is attempting to initiate this outsider. Frankie’s desire to
(literally) have heterosexuality without properly participating in the institution constitutes an
effective refusal of heteronormative interpellation through a subversive response to the hailing of
compulsory heterosexuality.
Subversive as Frankie’s desire may be, however, there remains the problem of its
inability to be reciprocated and thus realized. This is the problem of the beloved. For McCullers,
the beloved is often a surprising and unlikely object. The beloved, according to Sad Café, can
conceivably be anyone or anything:
[T]he beloved can also be of any description. The most outlandish people can be the
stimulus for love. A man may be a doddering great-grandfather and still love only a
strange girl he saw on the streets of Cheehaw one afternoon two decades past. The
preacher may love a fallen woman. The beloved may be treacherous, greasy-headed, and
given to evil habits. Yes, and the lover may see this as clearly as anyone else—but that
does not affect the evolution of his love one whit. A most mediocre person can be the
object of a love which is wild, extravagant, and beautiful as the poison lilies of the
swamp. A good man may be the stimulus for a love both violent and debased, or a
jabbering madman may bring about in the soul of someone a tender and simple idyll.
Therefore, the value and quality of any love is determined solely by the lover himself.
(216)
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And while beloveds can differ infinitely in personality, appearance, morality, and lifestyle, all
beloveds, at least in the world of Sad Café, share a common characteristic—they hate being
beloved:
It is for this reason that most of us would rather love than be loved. Almost everyone
wants to be the lover. And the curt truth is that, in a deep secret way, the state of being
beloved is intolerable to many. The beloved fears and hates the lover, and with the best of
reasons. For the lover is forever trying to strip bare his beloved. The lover craves any
possible relation with the beloved, even if this experience can cause him only pain. (216)
The beloved bears the burden of being interpellated into a world not of her making, where she is
expected to embody a projection of the lover’s desiring vision. The wedding certainly cannot
anticipate being hailed as the beloved in Frankie’s world, and there is something creepy in
Frankie’s assumption that it will automatically consent to marrying her even though she has not
discussed this possibility with Janice-Jarvis. However, the wedding-as-beloved also complicates
the lover-beloved dynamic articulated in Sad Café because the white wedding itself is creepy,
and it is moreover not merely a passive recipient of desire but a ritual that actively seduces
people into believing that it is desirable.
The wedding is creepy not only because it perpetuates compulsory heterosexuality and
racial segregation but also because of its compulsory likeability. One is required to like the
wedding; one cannot dislike a wedding or even be indifferent to it without being cast (out) as
anti-social. Given this requirement to like the wedding, how can one be blamed for liking it a
little too much? I maintain that the wedding isn’t really an innocent beloved after all; it is not a
passive receptacle for Frankie’s love. The wedding is an agent that acts on other agents—
individuals, couples, families, and communities. The concept of a wedding preys on our fears—
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of loneliness, isolation, and death—and consumes our hopes and dreams of being desired, loved,
and cared for. In Frankie’s case, the wedding preys on these fears compounded with the added,
peculiarly isolating experience of being a queer adolescent attempting—and failing—to locate
her desires among accepted scripts of romantic and sexual companionship.
Yet this creepy parasite, the wedding, can also unwittingly stage scenes of transformative
queer possibility. Insofar as the wedding also occupies the structural position of a lover within
McCullers’ schema, it too can envision and create new worlds. A wedding could potentially
invite many different kinds of desiring subjects to participate in it, and these subjects could in
turn transform its designs for them. A wedding could then become a site for subversive queer
performance. Elizabeth Freeman offers the example of a “marry-in” at the University of Chicago
in the early 1990s where “a woman married her motorcycle, pairs of best friends stood up
together, and a sexual threesome marched down the aisle” (x). Queers and other subjects
interested in non-normative sexual and social arrangements could certainly respond in creative
and disruptive ways to weddings that interpellate them as beloveds. In Frankie’s case, however,
while her fantasy of marrying Janice-Jarvis is certainly subversive and queer, the wedding
proceeds according to its own prior heteronormative plan without seeking her consent. The
relationship between Frankie and the wedding, then, could also be articulated as a lover-lover
deadlock, in which the worlds of the two lovers collide but cannot complement one another.

Compulsory Heterosexuality and Queer Resistance
Freeman argues in her reading of McCullers’ novel that “[b]ecause it is grounded in
performance, ‘wedding’ foregrounds activity and transformation, instead of status and identity”
(49-50). Prior to this potential scene of transformation, however, a wedding necessarily
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engenders a scene of reinscription of the very modes of status and identity Frankie’s fantasy
ultimately resists. For Frankie is in fact interpellated by heterosexuality, within a strikingly
disturbing and uncanny scenario that eerily foreshadows what she calls the “failure” of the
wedding, when she is taken on a date by a man who shares her brother’s occupation—a drunk
soldier she meets while she wonders around town, presenting her narrative of the wedding
through her newly discovered F. Jasmine persona.
An outstandingly obnoxious drunk, the soldier attempts to buy a dancing street monkey,
which is clearly not for sale, from its owner and musical accompanist on portable organ when F.
Jasmine first encounters him. While the monkey is not someone with whom F. Jasmine can share
the story of the wedding, there is a kinship between these street performers—the dancing
monkey and the storytelling Frankie. Perhaps because it too inhabits a liminal identity—as a
non-human animal that has skillfully mastered certain human performative conventions—the
monkey bridges the personas of F. Jasmine and Frankie. “The old Frankie had always loved the
monkey and the monkey-man. They resembled each other—they both had an anxious,
questioning expression…. After watching them a long time, the old Frankie, fascinated, began to
take on the same expression as she followed them around. And now F. Jasmine was eager to see
them” (66-67). Frankie/F. Jasmine doubly monkeys the monkey and the monkey-man, imitating
both their expression and their doubleness. Like the monkey and the monkey-man, Frankie and
F. Jasmine mirror each other, anxiously questioning who is who; who is in charge and who is
performing. Thus Frankie/F. Jasmine is also an uncanny figure, embodying the trope of the
double, a theme Freud develops in his essay. In Hoffmann’s stories, Freud identifies characters
whose “self becomes confounded,” an occurrence represented “by doubling, dividing and
interchanging the self” (9). This meeting of F. Jasmine and Frankie, who both enjoy the company
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of the monkey and the monkey-man who mirror them in their doubleness, reveals the
uncanniness of Frankie. Frankie always returns, despite F. Jasmine’s attempts to repress an
identity that refuses a trajectory directed toward a heteronormative ideal of maturity. F. Jasmine
can never successfully separate herself from the “old”—but actually young, supposedly
childlike—Frankie’s fascination with playfulness, for she is in fact a product of this very
tendency, fashioned out of Frankie’s fanciful imagination, even while that imagination is
tempered by externally imposed narratives of growth and maturation and their relationship to
proper gender presentation.
The monkey senses Frankie/F. Jasmine’s friendliness and appeals for her intervention
when the drunk and “angry” soldier aggressively insists that the monkey be sold to him—
actually “grab[bing] at [his] chain” (67). He climbs onto F. Jasmine’s shoulder for safety and
comfort and latches onto her head “with his little monkey hands” (67). This escape plan proves
successful, momentarily stunning everyone, including the soldier, who stands “slack-jawed,
surprised” that the “handful of dollar bills” (68) he holds in his hand are not sufficient to
complete a transaction to which no one has agreed.
While the monkey and the monkey-man momentarily interpellate “the old Frankie,”
Frankie leaves the scene with the soldier as F. Jasmine, perhaps in an attempt to prepare herself
to perform her F. Jasmine persona at the wedding. F. Jasmine could potentially perform—on
Frankie’s behalf—the heteronormative rituals in which Frankie cannot partake. F. Jasmine is
perhaps the kind of double charged with fulfilling “all those unfulfilled but possible futures to
which we still cling in phantasy, all those strivings of the ego which adverse external
circumstances have crushed” (Freud 9). She may be a more successful interloper in the
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heterosexual arrangement Frankie desires to participate in and thus queer. If Frankie cannot
marry Janice-Jarvis, then perhaps F. Jasmine can.
Yet, F. Jasmine’s agency is limited by the very system she seeks to infiltrate. The soldier
violently interpellates her as a particular version of F. Jasmine—a fantasy version not unlike
Nathaniel’s Olympia. F. Jasmine’s ability to engage in conversation, a characteristic that
crucially distinguishes her from Olympia, is irrelevant in this context because the soldier is
woefully lacking in this regard. In the obverse of the manifest narrative of the Hoffman story, it
is the soldier, not F. Jasmine, who is the automaton. It is not clear what the soldier hears when F.
Jasmine speaks, but it is clear that he does not process her words; he only registers the facts that
she is young—though she appears much older to him than she actually is—female, and speaking
to him. When F. Jasmine generously offers an expression of sympathy for his desire to own a
monkey, he approaches her strictly as a speaking female entity who is addressing him, with what
she rightly recognizes as “a set remark requiring a set answer”: “Which way are we going?... Are
you going my way or am I going yours?” (68). “Not knowing the ready-made reply,” Frankie yet
again opts to engage with the soldier generously, interpreting his invitation as that of “a traveler
who meets another traveler in a tourist town” (68) and suggests that they explore the town
together. Of course, such intentions of camaraderie are wholly absent from the designs of the
soldier, who is only capable of generic anti-conversation directed toward a markedly clumsy
attempt at seduction.
The soldier is something of a mirror image of the residents of the town, with whom
Frankie connects by sharing the tale of her plans for the wedding. He is an outsider, a traveler,
and, in Frankie’s mind, “the only person that day who first spoke to F. Jasmine and invited her to
join with him” (69). (In fact, F. Jasmine speaks to him first, but perhaps she interprets his

83

invitation as an equivalent to initiating a conversation.) Because he appears to take an active
interest in her, and, crucially, asks her to “join” him, the soldier initially strikes F. Jasmine as a
promising member of her imagined community united around her storytelling regarding the
wedding. Furthermore, as a soldier who travels, he doubles Frankie’s brother and reminds her of
her plans for the wedding:
Sitting across from the soldier at that booth in the Blue Moon, she suddenly saw the three
of them—herself, her brother, and the bride—walking beneath a cold Alaskan sky….
[T]hey climbed a sunny glacier… and a rope tied the three of them together, and friends
from another glacier called in Alaskan their J A names. She saw them next in Africa,
where, with a crowd of sheeted Arabs, they galloped on camels in the sandy wind. Burma
was jungle-dark, and she had seen pictures in Life magazine. Because of the wedding,
these distant lands, the world, seemed altogether possible and near: as close to Winter
Hill as Winter Hill was to the town. It was the actual present, in fact, that seemed to F.
Jasmine a little bit unreal. (71-72)
Here Frankie’s fantasy takes her away from her “actual present” of sitting in a bar with a drunk
soldier in the middle of the day, which strikes her as both nonsensical and undesirable, and pulls
her toward the worlds she believes soldiers and heterosexuality can make accessible to her. If she
can have the military couple, Frankie reasons, she can have any world she wants. She can enjoy
many climates and landscapes and participate in the long-established and beloved western and
American tradition of exoticizing cultural and geographic difference—a tradition made possible
by military conquest. She can possess the images from Life magazine in real life and real time
and consume them through the collective imperialist gaze of the “JA three of them.”
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In the “actual present,” however, it is quite clearly the drunk, incoherent soldier and not
Frankie who possesses the othering gaze. Frankie quickly recognizes that he is “staring at her
with a peculiar expression, not as one traveler gazes at another, but as a person who shares a
secret scheme” (72). Because she in fact does not share his scheme, his “words did not make
sense to her,” and she feels “uneasy” with his “double-talk” (72). Being called a “cute dish,” for
instance, strikes her as distinctly nonsensical—“There were no dishes on the table”—and she
attempts to turn the conversation toward the subject of her brother and the military:
“I told you my brother is a Member of the Armed Forces.”
But the soldier did not seem to listen. “I could of sworn I’d run into you some place
before.” (72)
The soldier’s thorough inability to engage in a dialogue constitutes a not at all inaccurate
caricature of heterosexist romance, and F. Jasmine senses the connection between his refusal to
engage with her as a fellow traveler, an equal, and her interpellation as a heterosexual woman.
“She realized now that the soldier thought she was much older than she was, but her pleasure in
this was somehow uncertain” (72). The soldier does not simply interpellate her through
language; the soldier demands that she accompany him on a “date,” through an aggressive
physical gesture, grabbing “a piece of her dress,” just as he “grabs” the chain of the monkey he
feels entitled to purchase (73). While Frankie is excited to be asked to go on a date—“a grown
word used by older girls”—she is acutely aware that she does not inhabit the body of a “grown”
woman who goes on dates with soldiers, and this knowledge puts “a blight upon her pleasure”
(74). Heterosexual interpellation, while flattering in its suggestion that F. Jasmine is in this
instance successfully performing an approximation of mature womanhood, is ultimately
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distinctly unpleasurable for Frankie in its interruption of and indifference to her own desires and
fantasies.
This heterosexist indifference to alternative desires, and, in particular, female desire, is
ultimately a form of social violence that often manifests itself as physical and sexual violence.
During the soldier and Frankie’s “date” later that evening, conversation similarly fails. In fact,
there are “two [separate] conversations [that] would not join together, and underneath there was
a layer of queerness that she could not place and understand” (133). Indeed, more than one layer
of queerness lurks beneath: Frankie’s, which cannot respond to the soldier’s coded advances, and
the soldier’s, which performs the failure of the normative, the unquestioned, and the putatively
intuitive. Frankie cannot see the soldier’s normativity as normal, but compulsory heterosexuality
initially thwarts her rejection of a not-so-coded sexual proposition. When the soldier invites
Frankie to join him in his room at the inn, “F. Jasmine [does] not want to go upstairs, but she
[does] not know how to refuse. It was like going into a fair booth, or fair ride, that once having
entered you cannot leave until the exhibition or the ride is finished” (135). Compulsory
heterosexuality has not taught Frankie how to say “no”; indeed, it has not even taught her how to
tell the soldier that she is twelve years old. The comparison to the fair is telling: Frankie can
easily reject the non-normativity of the freaks but has greater difficulty rejecting the normative
perversity of the soldier. Thus, compulsory heterosexuality is like a carnival ride: it promises
children that it will be fun and pleasurable and demands that they not only participate in but
actually demonstrate excitement about an experience that may in fact terrify them. And, like the
rape culture with which it is entwined, it demands consent—real or imagined—as a commitment
and contract that cannot be retracted.
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The scene of the soldier’s attempt to rape Frankie is initially marked by an eerie silence.
Nothing is said because compulsory heterosexuality takes for granted that the heterosexual act
will happen; silence performs the taken-for-granted nature of the normative and the entitlement
of the heterosexual man who expects the normative act to occur. Again the soldier grabs
Frankie’s skirt, after delivering, “in an unnatural voice,” his only line in this scene: “Come on,
Jasmine…. Let’s quit this stalling” (136). To the soldier, Frankie’s initial inaction does not
communicate hesitation, uncertainty, or, indeed, the profound confusion she feels about her
strange, silent visit to his hotel room. He can only take her inaction as a sign of postponing the
inevitable because he cannot imagine the possibility of her refusal. She has said nothing and has
followed him to his room—thus enacting gestures of seeming docility very much in line with
compulsory heterosexuality’s expectations for women.
In what follows the text aptly likens compulsory heterosexuality to a madhouse. From
Frankie’s point of view, the soldier’s physical attempt at seduction is “like a minute in the fair
Crazy-House, or real Milledgeville,” the local mental institution (136). As Frankie heads toward
the door, “for she could no longer stand the silence,” the soldier makes his move:
[H]e grasped her skirt and, limpened by fright, she was pulled down beside him on the
bed. The next minute happened, but it was too crazy to be realized. She felt his arms
around her and smelled his sweaty shirt. He was not rough, but it was crazier than if he
had been rough—and in a second she was paralyzed by horror. She could not push away,
but she bit down with all her might upon what must have been the soldier’s crazy
tongue—so that he screamed out and she was free. Then he was coming toward her with
an amazed pained face, and her hand reached the glass pitcher and brought it down upon
his head. He swayed a second… and slowly he sank sprawling to the floor…. He lay
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there still, with the amazed expression on his freckled face that was now pale, and a froth
of blood showed on his mouth. But his head was not broken or even cracked, and whether
he was dead or not she did not know. (136-7)

Attempted rape is horrifying regardless of whether it involves force, and it is significant that to
Frankie the soldier’s actions and movements are “crazier” than they would have been had they
been “rough.” The passage suggests that Frankie “could not push away” not because she is
physically incapable of doing so but because she is immobilized by shock, “paralyzed by
horror.” The interaction thus emphasizes the element of psychological aggression in compulsory
heterosexuality that exists in addition to, and in some cases even takes precedence over, the
physical force on which rape culture in part relies.14 Compulsory heterosexuality is insane to
Frankie, just like Frankie’s resistance to it astonishes the soldier, who is in turn shocked when
she bites his tongue. It is not clear how he plans to respond, but Frankie’s instinct for selfdefense is well placed given his consistent disregard for her consent to his various advances. This
violence of the nonconsensual, this violence of the compulsory is rightly met with Frankie’s
swift incapacitation of the offending soldier.
Frankie’s plan to marry Janice-Jarvis may constitute a queer escapist fantasy, but this
queer escapism exists on a continuum with the highly practical queer instinct to effectively
escape compulsory heterosexuality. Of course, marrying the wedding is unrealistic; as a twelveyear-old who is just becoming aware of her queerness, Frankie conceives of a boundless horizon
of possibilities. And while, as part of the process of queer subject-formation, she attempts to
reject an identification with the deviance of the Freaks, her attempted rejection of their gaze is a
very different process from her eventual rejection of the soldier through an act of self-defense.
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Frankie is afraid of the Freaks’ long eyes because she secretly knows that they are her kin and
that she cannot ultimately escape the freakishness of her deviance; her identification of the
encounter with the soldier as the scene from a crazy house, however, reclaims the language of
freak shows that ostracize social misfits and reinforce their marginality and redirects it toward a
critique of the violence of dominant sexual regimes. The Freaks attempt to connect with Frankie
because they believe she is of their community, but, unlike the soldier, they do not expect her to
automatically consent to their interpellation.15 The soldier, on the other hand, enforces a
compulsory heterosexuality that mandates consent without attending to the question of whether
the subjects it summons identify with its program. Frankie’s escape from the soldier thus
becomes a pivotal moment likely to facilitate her realization that she is outside what Monique
Wittig calls “the heterosexual contract.”16
Her expulsion from the wedding is another such moment. As with her interaction with the
soldier, Frankie cannot comprehend the heteronormative ritual of the wedding or her experience
of it. The wedding proceeds on its own terms, without her consultation or involvement, and
Frankie ultimately concludes “[i]t was a framed game. The cards were stacked. It was a frame-up
all around” (148). The wedding “had been queer like the card games in the kitchen the first week
last June” until Berenice and Frankie discover that the jacks and queens are missing, and John
Henry eventually admits “that he had cut out the jacks and then the queens to keep them
company” (145). Neither kings nor queens, the jacks exist in a liminal space and without female
companionship, attracting the queer boy’s attention. Perhaps not knowing how else they may be
coupled, John Henry opts for their adulterous pairing with similarly “stolen” queens. Thus the
card game is rigged through queer intervention, unlike the wedding, which is a very different
kind of game, “framed” by queer exclusion.
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Because of the separation of bride and groom before the ceremony, Frankie is not given a
chance to share her plans with her “we of me” entity of Janice-Jarvis. The bride and groom are
separated, not in a queer and playful fashion like the figures in the card deck, but in accordance
with a patriarchal and misogynistic tradition where this separation is a precaution against the
groom’s rejection of the bride should he find her unattractive. Frankie’s “we of me” is thus
bisected and partitioned in a way that makes communication about love and desire impossible
and prefigures the heteronormative life Janice and Jarvis are doomed to live despite Frankie’s
earnest intention to offer an alternative:
She wanted to speak to her brother and the bride, to talk to them and tell them of her
plans, the three of them alone together. But they were never once alone; Jarvis was
checking out the car someone was lending for the honeymoon, while Janice dressed in
the front bedroom among a crowd of beautiful grown girls. She wandered from one to the
other of them, unable to explain. And once Janice put her arms around her, and said she
was so glad to have a little sister—and when Janice kissed her, F. Jasmine felt an aching
in her throat and could not speak. Jarvis, when she went to find him in the yard, lifted her
up in a roughhouse way and said: Frankie the lankie the alaga fankie, the tee-legged, toelegged, bow-legged Frankie. And he gave her a dollar.
She stood in the corner of the bride’s room, wanting to say: I love the two of you so
much, and you are the we of me. Please take me with you from the wedding, for we
belong together. (144)
Frankie, however, cannot speak. Even after the ceremony, during the reception, “Frankie
hovered close to the two of them, but words would not come” (147). The ritual separation of
Janice and Jarvis, where Frankie witnesses and experiences what is perhaps the most stark and
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shocking manifestation of gender binarism and normativity in her life, disorients and traumatizes
her, leaving her utterly speechless. Frankie is dumbfounded by the scene of “beautiful grown
girls” who participate in the wedding without any plans to create a future collectivity out of it;
confused and silenced by the interpellation as a “little sister” that accompanies Janice’s kiss; and
likely more than a little disturbed by her brother’s manhandling and gibberish baby-talk as he
directs his attention to a car rather than attempt any intelligible conversation with her or other
human participants in the wedding. He is thus not unlike the anti-conversational soldier, handling
Frankie much like the soldier may have done with the monkey he attempts to purchase.
The wedding is entirely incomprehensible to Frankie. “The wedding was all wrong,
although she could not point out single faults” (145). Furthermore, “[t]he wedding was like a
dream, for all that came about occurred in a world beyond her power…. [F]rom the beginning to
the end the wedding was unmanaged as a nightmare” (144). The wedding proves to be a ritual of
exclusivity and exclusion—hardly an antidote to the exclusion from popular kids’ “clubs” that
Frankie seeks when she falls in love with it. Its uncanny oscillation between dream and
nightmare unsettles Frankie’s queer plans as well as her emerging queer subjectivity, leaving her
screaming after the newlyweds’ departing car in a final, desperate attempt to plead her case for
inclusion into the Janice-Jarvis “we of me” (147).

Against Homonormative Closure
The abysmal failure of the wedding ultimately helps to usher in new queer possibilities for
Frankie, while Berenice and John Henry’s fates are much less encouraging. The queer life we
imagine John Henry would have lived is tragically terminated by meningitis in the fall that
follows the summer of the wedding. When Frankie’s father decides they will move to a suburb,
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Berenice gives notice of her resignation, deciding “she might as well marry [her friend] TT” and
ensure her economic security (158). Having lost her queer family to death and marriage and her
dream of the wedding to the reality of heteronormative coupling, Frankie directs her desire
elsewhere.
A short-lived attempt to run away from home exemplifies the range of alternative
possibilities Frankie imagines herself capable of pursuing. Frankie plans to take a night train
heading north. “If the train went to Chicago,” she reasons, “she would go to Hollywood and
write shows or get a job as a movie starlet—or, if worse came to worse, even act in comedies. If
the train went to New York, she would dress like a boy and give a false name and a false age and
join the Marines” (150). Thus gender identifications framed as life trajectories become as
arbitrary as train schedules, and the contingency of spontaneous travel itineraries yields multiple
performative possibilities: the high femme role of Hollywood starlet, the somewhat androgynous
(and for Frankie, less desirable) role of comedienne, and, finally, the transition to maleness that
may afford Frankie the highest degree of freedom to travel the world—and fulfill U.S.
imperialist agendas.
With the latter option, McCullers arguably anticipates, in 1946, the contemporary
development of homonationalism, as theorized by Jasbir Puar. Puar defines homonationalism as
the correlation between the state’s of concession of certain rights and privileges to LGBTQ
citizens and the latter’s participation in the state’s racist and imperialist projects.17 While there is
no such social contract between queers and the state in 1946—on the contrary, in the U.S. the
state inaugurates official forms of homophobia in the postwar years through its military, welfare,
and immigration bureaucracies18—McCullers and Frankie nonetheless envision queer freedom
through participation in U.S. imperialism.
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In the aftermath of John Henry’s death and Berenice’s announcement, Frankie recruits a
new love object, with whom she plans to form a queer and arguably also homonormative19 and
homonationalist family. In the novel’s final pages, Frankie meticulously prepares sandwiches,
“cutting them into fancy shapes” (159), in anticipation of the arrival of Mary Littlejohn, whom
Berenice describes as “marshmallow-white” and who, according to the narrator, has “long
braids… of a woven mixture of corn-yellow and brown, fastened at the ends with rubber-bands,
and, on occasions, ribbons” (160). Snow-white, blond, ribboned, and an expert on Michelangelo,
Mary Littlejohn represents a future worlds apart from Frankie’s past experience of building
queer family with a black maid and a sickly queer boy through “raggedy-rhymes” about a
disappeared cat and card games played with an incomplete deck. Frankie has this future—
immediate and long-term—carefully planned out:
Mary was coming at five o’clock to take dinner, spend the night, and ride in the van to
the new house tomorrow. Mary collected pictures of great masters and pasted them in an
art book. They read poets like Tennyson together; and Mary was going to be a great
painter and Frances a great poet—or else the foremost authority on radar. Mr. Littlejohn
had been connected with a tractor company and before the war the Littlejohns had lived
abroad. When Frances was sixteen and Mary eighteen, they were going around the world
together. Frances placed the sandwiches on a plate, along with eight chocolates and some
salted nuts; this was to be a midnight feast, to be eaten in bed at twelve o’clock. (159)
It would seem that, like homonationalism, the joke about lesbians who bring a U-Haul truck to
the second date must date back to at least 1946, as the moving van and Mary Littlejohn appear
almost simultaneously in the narrative. While Frankie’s father’s reasons for moving are not fully
known, a move to the suburbs in the postwar years inescapably evokes the phenomenon of white
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flight. Frankie’s trajectory thus orients itself toward whiteness in multiple ways, as she prepares
to say goodbye to Berenice, discuss the “great masters” of European art over a fancy midnight
snack, and move to the suburbs with Mary Littlejohn.
The novel’s apparent homonormative closure, however, should not be read as a
foreclosure of queer possibility. According to Frankie’s fantasy, Mary Littlejohn’s implied
affluence and cultural capital portends a future as a privileged American traveler—a future
doubtless made possible by postwar U.S. hegemony, whose ethical implications, as we shall see
in the next chapter, are thoroughly dissected in James Baldwin’s Giovanni’s Room. And yet,
given that such a future is clearly framed as fantasy and not reality, Frankie’s love and desire for
Mary Littlejohn much more likely plants a seed in Frankie’s mind for future possibilities of
queer life and freedom that are not confined to intra-racial, intra-national imaginaries.
Conversations with Berenice continue until the novel’s last few lines, in which news from
Jarvis’s travels in Luxembourg inspire Frankie’s own globetrotting ideas while summoning, in
an ever-skeptical Berenice, thoughts about “soapy water” (162)—an allusion to Lux soap powder
and its associations with luxurious whiteness.20 Even as McCullers, in her visionary genius,
anticipates homonormativity and homonationalism, we cannot dismiss the significance of a 1946
American novel ending on a note of excitement, an “instant shock of happiness” sparked by a
doorbell that announces the arrival of a lesbian love interest (163). Moreover, while this doorbell
announces a future, Frankie’s fantasy of queer possibility does not abide by linear temporality:
“When Frances was sixteen and Mary eighteen, they were going around the world together.”
What a strange and queer sentence. Whether Frankie (now self-fashioned as Frances) and Mary’s
world travels are set in the future, past, or past continuous remains an open-ended question. Their
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temporality is one of queer fantasy; its possibilities unbound by the linear trajectories that
circumscribe every form of normativity.
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Chapter III
Love and Tragedy: The “Complexity of Manhood” in James Baldwin’s Giovanni’s Room

This chapter reads gender through performance and performance through gender.1 I argue
that James Baldwin’s novel Giovanni’s Room (1956) critiques a specific kind of liberal white
American performative masculinity that perpetuates a heteronormative, racist, and imperialist
social order, and attempts to conceptualize a more ethical and socially responsible gendered
subjectivity through a theatrical critique of performativity. I theorize masculinities by
distinguishing between accepted theories of performative masculinity and formations of
masculinity and manhood that emerge from the novel by returning to a somewhat “oldfashioned” but ever-useful theater studies paradigm. I read the novel as a tragic narrative, where
tragedy tells us something about gender. My contention is that there are in fact three central
gender formations theorized by Baldwin, in the novel and elsewhere, that inform the novel: an
immature and dishonest performative masculinity, a more mature and complex manhood, and a
self-conscious, theatrical genderqueerness. A dialectical tension between what I identify as
masculinity and manhood, respectively, is not resolved, but rather, exploded by the third register
of theatrical genderqueerness/genderqueer theatricality, which brings the acting out of gender in
the novel to its full tragic potential. It is through this theatrical vision of tragedy that Giovanni’s
Room invites the emergence of an ethical imagination that exceeds the worldview of the novel
and operates through performances that transcend existing genres, genders, and the value
systems they express.
My primary object of analysis is Giovanni’s Room and its representation, evaluation,
reinscription, and contestation of these categories of (primarily male) gender performance. To
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contextualize this analysis within Baldwin’s larger body of work, I also engage with a few of his
essays. These essays express relevant insights and observations about the masculinity formations
under discussion and offer direct expressions of Baldwin’s own points of view, which cannot be
accessed as easily in his fiction. The author’s expository prose tends to be more polemical than
his novels, which allow more room for the contestation, negotiation, and working out of
multiple, at times conflicting and contradictory, positions in ways his essays do not.2 Thus,
putting the essays and fiction in conversation can offer a better informed reading of the novel,
based on a more comprehensive understanding of Baldwin’s thought.

Performative Masculinity and Complex Manhood

I identify a distinction between an allegedly immature performative masculinity and a more
mature, more complex manhood in Baldwin. While Baldwin does tend to use the term
‘manhood’ when discussing a desirable ideal, this masculinity/manhood distinction is not one
that he establishes. Rather, it is a distinction I find conceptually useful, which has a theoretical
and historical basis.
Elaborating upon Michael Kimmel’s conceptual and historical distinction between
manhood and masculinity, Kevin Floyd explains that

manhood is defined as the epistemological normalization of the male body
characteristic of the nineteenth century; masculinity is its twentieth-century
analogue. Manhood referred to an ‘inner quality,’ a capacity for independence,
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morality, and self-mastery that adult men were expected to have achieved . . . .
The opposite of manhood . . . was not womanhood but childhood. (87)

Nineteenth-century manhood, Floyd explains, is “defined internally” while

twentieth-century masculinity increasingly normalized the male body in terms of
exteriorized ‘behavioral traits and attitudes’. . . . Masculinity had to be performed.
It was a physical demonstration, not a moral or ethical one . . . . Its opposite was
femininity. (87-8)

According to Kimmel, as twentieth-century capitalist developments such as Fordism and
Taylorism made opportunities for the skilled labor─seen as evidence of a man’s inner
manhood─increasingly scarce, men began to perform masculinity through a set of “behavioral
traits and attitudes” (120).
In his fiction and essays, Baldwin theorizes a more ontologically stable ideal of manhood
that bears some resemblance to the nineteenth-century model Kimmel and Floyd describe.
However, while there are moments at which he rhapsodizes an ostensibly historically lost
manhood with nostalgic notes, Baldwin’s vision of manhood is largely forward-looking. He
imagines a reinvention of manhood that would be historically compatible with a twentiethcentury world of emerging queer sexual identities. Baldwin anticipates Judith Butler’s theory of
performative gender, if not its exact political and theoretical implications, by observing that
performative masculinity is simply not the province of those whom he considers real men. Of
course, one of Baldwin’s most immediately apparent differences with Butler is his belief in the
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ontological reality of manhood and the authenticity of gendered subjectivity. Butler maintains
that “there is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively
constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results” (1990, 32). In other words, we
do not perform an identity that exists prior to the performance; identity is produced through
performance. Perhaps a more generative point of comparison than the question of whether
gender is ‘real’ lies in Baldwin and Butler’s respective definitions of identity.
Baldwin would agree with Butler’s theory of performative gender when applied to a
performative masculinity he sees as a poor substitute for real, or perhaps fully realized,
manhood. In an early essay, “The Preservation of Innocence,” published in the Moroccan journal
Zero in 1949, Baldwin contrasts an immature performative American masculinity romanticized
in hard-boiled detective novels with a complex, mature manhood that resists gender caricatures
and stereotypes. The rejection of rigid distinctions between and simplistic generalizations about
male and female gender is one “which experience alone is able to illuminate . . . . The
recognition of this complexity is the signal of maturity; it marks the death of the child and the
birth of the man” (Baldwin 1949/88, 597).3 The caricature of “that mindless monster, the tough
guy”, glamorized in James M. Cain and Raymond Chandler novels, exhibits a “masculinity . . .
found in the most infantile externals” (ibid.). Unlike this externally defined hyperbolic performer
of masculinity, the mature man does not need to perform because he inhabits an internally
defined identity. Neither Baldwin nor Butler sees gender identity as something we inherently
possess. But while Butler theorizes gender identity as an external expression and performative
accomplishment for all subjects, Baldwin understands it as an accomplishment of one’s
interiority and character.
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This distinction between an immature performative masculinity and a mature manhood is
one Baldwin maintains throughout his writing career. He furthermore aligns performative
masculinity with a specifically American nationalist ideology that stunts the gender and sexual
development he believes a male adult should achieve. In “The Preservation of Innocence”, the
writer declares that “it is one of the major American ambitions to shun this metamorphosis,” in
which a boy becomes a man (ibid.). Indeed, the farcical but dangerous “tough guy” emerges out
of “the truly awesome attempt of the American to at once preserve his innocence and arrive at a
man’s estate” (ibid.). Similarly, in one of his last essays, “Here Be Dragons” (1985), Baldwin
writes that

[t]he American ideal . . . of sexuality appears to be rooted in the American ideal
of masculinity . . . . It is an ideal so paralytically infantile that it is virtually
forbidden—as an unpatriotic act—that the American boy evolve into the
complexity of manhood. (678)

Ironically, the very institutions created by the US Government with the intention of
reclaiming manhood are precisely the ones Baldwin associates with the arrested development of
American masculinity. According to Floyd, Theodore Roosevelt’s agenda for galvanizing white
American manhood in the twentieth century led to “the founding of the Boy Scouts of America”
as well as “educational programs that endorsed hunting, for example, as a practice facilitating
national, racial, and manly vigor, energy, and self-reliance” (86). Additionally, these programs
“would instill [in young white men] the qualities of competitiveness ostensibly fundamental to
building a strong nation” (ibid.). Having observed the effects of these state-sanctioned programs

100

for bolstering national manhood, Cass, a character in Another Country (1962), Giovanni’s
Room’s thematic sequel,4 remarks that America “isn’t a country at all, it’s a collection of football
players and Eagle Scouts. Cowards” (406). This characterization is consistent with a depiction of
the Boy Scout as the disingenuously innocent symbol of the nation and its masculinity in the
concluding line of “The Preservation of Innocence”.5
Baldwin thus rejects Roosevelt’s nation-building efforts and their re-invigoration of
masculine and racial supremacy. Instead, he suggests that men who hyperbolically perform
manly vigor represent a lack of personal as well as national integrity. The distinction, then,
between ontological manhood and performative masculinity, is an urgent one for Baldwin, as it
contains crucial ethical dimensions. In much of his fiction and many of his essays, the loss of
ontological manhood is a fundamental character flaw that seriously impedes America’s ability to
become an equitable society. In the case of Giovanni’s Room, a particularly Baldwinian ideal of
manhood is mobilized within a tragic narrative that critiques, interrogates, and finally condemns
the integral and constitutive racial and sexual violence of modern white American masculinity.
While Baldwin’s condemnation of American masculinity is largely effective, his almost
exclusive focus on masculinity and manhood and exclusion of femininity also detract from the
effectiveness of his analysis. By reifying manhood, Baldwin forfeits a more comprehensive
critique of sexual and racial violence.

Giovanni’s Room and the Performance of Guilt

Narrated retrospectively by the protagonist David, a closeted gay white American expatriate,
Giovanni’s Room is set in early 1950s Paris, where David meets his lover, the Italian bartender
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Giovanni. David and Giovanni meet while David’s American fiancée Hella is in Spain, where
she has journeyed in order to ‘think’ about whether she does in fact wish to marry David.
Giovanni’s employment is precarious and at the mercy of the bar owner Guillaume, an older gay
man who is sexually interested in him. Guillaume eventually fires Giovanni. When Hella returns
from Spain, David, who has been living in Giovanni’s room and off of his income,6 abandons
Giovanni, claiming that two men cannot have a life together. The emotionally and financially
desperate Giovanni returns to Guillaume with the intention of regaining his job. Instead, the
meeting ends, as we are led to believe by David’s narration, in Giovanni’s murdering Guillaume.
After Giovanni is sentenced to death for the murder, Hella catches David with a sailor in a gay
bar and consequently returns to the US alone. David is left to confront the question of his guilt
for having abandoned Giovanni at a time of dire need, as well as the uncertain possibility of his
redemption.
In the blurb for the 1962 Dial Press edition of Giovanni’s Room, Baldwin writes that
“David’s dilemma is the dilemma of many men of his generation; by which I do not so much
mean sexual ambivalence as a crucial lack of sexual authority” (qtd. in White 252). David’s lack
of ‘sexual authority’ and his sexual ambivalence, however, are not mutually exclusive terms. In
fact, for David, it is unambivalent homosexuality and sexual authority that are mutually
exclusive. What begins, for a teenage David, as a positive experience of desire leading to a
sexual encounter with his male friend Joey, quickly turns into an experience of sexuality framed
by revulsion against a femininity aligned with sickness and death. Joey’s body is associated with
emasculating anal imagery, likened to “the black opening of a cavern in which I would be
tortured until madness came, in which I would lose my manhood” (Baldwin 1956, 9). The word
‘cavern’ appears again several sentences later, in connection with David’s deceased mother and
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his replacement of her as his father’s companion: “I thought of my father, who had no one in the
world but me, my mother having died when I was little. A cavern opened in my mind . . . full of
dirty words. I thought I saw my future in that cavern. I was afraid” (ibid.). This reflection is
followed by descriptions of David’s childhood nightmares about his dead mother, replete, this
time, with vaginal cavernous imagery of death and disease: David’s mother, whom he fears
resembling by losing his manhood to homosexuality, appears “blind with worms . . . straining to
press me against her body; that body so putrescent, so sickening soft, that it opened, as I clawed
and cried, into a breach so enormous as to swallow me alive” (10-11). David’s negatively formed
homosexuality is also racialized: emasculating caverns, such as the one on Joey’s body, are
black, and both Joey and Giovanni are described as having dark bodies and features—Joey’s is
specifically “brown” (8)—in contrast with David’s blond whiteness.
David’s performative masculinity, then, represents a predictable effort to negate his
homosexuality; moreover, the latter is projected onto brown or effeminate men, such as a “fairy”
with whom David is involved in the Army, “who was later court-martialed out” (20). The
performance, which ultimately proves impossible to carry out successfully, involves passing for
a straight man who fulfills a post-war ideal of wholesome white American reproductive
masculinity—a fantasy of wholesomeness that evokes the false innocence of the Boy Scout
image in “The Preservation of Innocence” and Another Country. David’s performative
masculinity, though a consciously constructed instrument of his elaborate sexual closet, becomes
second nature to him for a time, and is to this extent very much in line with Butler’s concept of
performative gender. However, while Butler theorizes performative gender as a set of discursive
practices imposed from outside oneself and adopted almost unconsciously through repeated
performances (1991, 24), Baldwin imagines performative masculinity as a structure constituted
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through a subject with more agency than that of Butler’s subject, and this subject is faced with an
ethical choice. The formation of David’s performative masculinity begins as a conscious choice
and eventually becomes his second nature.
David, in his narration, tells the reader of the exact moment at which he decided to
inhabit a performative position that forecloses honest introspection and honest self-presentation
in front of others. In David’s words, after sleeping with Joey, “I had decided to allow no room in
the universe for something which shamed and frightened me. I succeeded very well—by not
looking at the universe, by not looking at myself, by remaining, in effect, in constant motion”
(Baldwin 1956, 20). The novel acknowledges that internalized homophobia is largely what
precludes David’s ability to look at himself and, consequently, to really look at and see others, to
relate to them in a transparent way. Yet, at the same time, Baldwin’s ethical imagination also
challenges us to resist these kinds of defensive performative postures even in the face of
considerable structural challenges such as homophobia. Giovanni therefore identifies David’s
behavior patterns not simply as a set of performative gestures but as a hopelessly entangled web
of lies. When David breaks up with Giovanni and claims that he cannot love him because he
cannot love another man, Giovanni tells him, “[y]ou lie so much, you have come to believe all
your own lies” (140). Lying is clearly a conscious decision, but, with enough repetition, it can
become a seemingly natural part of one’s everyday performative practices. Baldwin’s
performative, then, similar to Butler’s, encompasses a system of learned behaviors, but endows
the subject with a higher degree of ethical responsibility for these behaviors.
For Baldwin, David represents a particularly nefarious form of performative masculinity
because of his ambivalent attitude toward understanding the motivations and desires of his
performance. David says of his expatriation to France:
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Perhaps, as we say in America, I wanted to find myself. This is an interesting
phrase, not current as far as I know in the language of any other people, which
certainly does not mean what it says but betrays a nagging suspicion that
something has been misplaced. I think now that if I had any intimation that the
self I was going to find would turn out to be only the same self from which I had
spent so much time in flight, I would have stayed at home. But, again, I think I
knew, at the very bottom of my heart, exactly what I was doing when I took the
boat to France. (21)

“I wanted to find myself,” David suggests, is a phrase that expresses a peculiarly American
brand of hypocrisy that both signals an awareness that one lacks self-knowledge and performs an
ambivalence about (indeed, for David, a refusal of) embarking on a journey of self-discovery in
good faith. David flees not because he truly wishes to find himself but because he fears the
consequences of self-discovery. His journey is both facilitated by American imperialism—his
status as a wealthy white American provides the resources for his travels—and emblematic of
this very same imperialism, which makes grandiose and self-important claims.
David’s reflection also points to the limits of one’s access to self-knowledge and thus
raises ethical questions about the nature of responsibility and guilt in the context of the
performative. In Butler’s terms, if the performative is not something a “subject elects to do,” but,
instead, the performance “constitutes as an effect the very subject it appears to express” (1991,
24), how can the subject be held responsible for the performance? If a performance that a subject
has not consciously orchestrated has rendered that subject guilty of self-misrepresentation, how
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can the guilty party truly understand the nature of his guilt? Again, Baldwin’s variation on these
questions assumes that the subject has agency and control over the performance. In his
formulation, even an unconsciously executed performance is an effect of a prior willful refusal to
engage with reality—more specifically, in David’s case, to face an enormously important fact
about oneself.
The critique of this kind of refusal is central to Baldwin’s critique of American whiteness
and white masculinity, a critique applicable to David’s situation insofar as he embodies a type of
white American masculinity Baldwin so frequently scrutinizes. I would like to suggest that
David, who at certain points in the novel expresses liberal attitudes toward issues such as
women’s liberation while also treating women unethically and contemptuously,7 is not unlike the
white liberal that Baldwin identifies as having a similarly hypocritical relationship to racial
justice. Baldwin identifies guilt as an ambivalent emotion and structure that mobilizes and
functions as a kind of metonym for the liberal subject’s ambivalent attitude toward social justice.
Specifically, his critique of white liberal guilt—a type of guilt structurally similar to David’s—
suggests that guilt, when felt but not understood, can only perpetuate the entitlement of a guilty
party, especially when that party is in a position of power or privilege.
Throughout his work, Baldwin calls attention to white liberals’ tacit complicity with
white supremacy and the sexual regimes of power that perpetuate it. Significantly, the white
liberals under scrutiny are often, though not always, men, and the critique is often inseparable
from a judgment about these liberals’ masculinity. (That these liberals are almost exclusively
men suggests a troubling conflation between integrity and masculinity which I will address in the
next section.) His book-length essay No Name in the Street (1972) is most explicit and
exemplary in making these connections. In this work, Baldwin surmises that his “contempt for
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most” white American liberals “dates from what [he] observed of their manhood” during
McCarthyism, the period during which he wrote Giovanni’s Room, when friends betrayed one
another and “justifi[ed] their treachery by learned discourses,” and “the cowardice and
irresponsibility of the liberal community” was among the causes for the execution of Ethel and
Julius Rosenberg (30). White liberal guilt, then, emerges as a structure of feeling8 that is not only
formed by but also perpetuates the hypocrisy and cowardice of whites who both knowingly
betray other whites and willfully ignore their implication in the structural racism they tellingly
call “the Negro Problem” (54). Just as whites “were lying about their motives” for being disloyal
to each other because they “were being blackmailed by their guilt” (31), so has “a guilty and
constricted white imagination” (54) compartmentalized American racism as a black problem for
which whites are not responsible. Stated otherwise, the guilt feelings of white liberals who were
complicit in McCarthyist witch hunts has led to their refusal to acknowledge their motives, and
this lack of understanding of the substance of their guilt has only perpetuated their complicity.
Similarly, white liberals’ feelings of guilt about their complicity with the racist oppression of
black Americans cause them to willfully ignore their implication in structures of racial injustice.
At its very worst, white male liberal guilt is a performative speech act that exonerates the
speaker from responsibility for his actions—a performative profession of one’s innocence. David
enacts a similar performance of guilt about having used Hella as a prop in the heterosexual
masculinity performance intended to shore up his male privilege. When Hella, in the novel’s
denouement, catches David, in flagrante delicto, as it were, at a gay bar, David tells her that he is
sorry about having deceived her, that he was in fact only deceiving himself, and that, in his
words, “whatever I’ve done to hurt you, I didn’t mean to do it!” (Baldwin 1956, 163). His
evasive non-apology rightly strikes Hella as disingenuous and self-indulgent: “[H]ow guilty you
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are,” she retorts sardonically, “how you love to be guilty!” (164). This particular profession of
guilt becomes, for David, a source of pleasure not because it redeems him but because it allows
him to feel entitled and justified in having misled Hella. And while it is true that David deceived
himself and was encouraged to do so by structural homophobia, the fact that he does not seem to
care that he has hurt and humiliated Hella suggests it is unlikely that he will develop a more
ethical and accountable subjectivity as a result of coming out. What matters to him, in the end, is
his own self-deception, not his unethical behavior toward others. He is assured of his innocence
because he is more invested in this innocence than he is in honestly evaluating the motives for
his actions and their consequences, just as ‘the guilty and constricted white imagination’ Baldwin
describes is more interested in purging itself of its guilt than it is in examining it and attempting
to act responsibly.

Manhood and Theatricality

Whereas Baldwin’s critique of David’s performative masculinity astutely dissects the ethical
problems with both the masculinity norms David is compelled to perform and the performance
itself, his representation of self-conscious gender theatricality as suspiciously effeminate
weakens his critique of heteronormativity and male privilege. The essay “Here Be Dragons,”
written toward the end of Baldwin’s life, is often cited as an affirmation of the author’s nonbinary thinking about gender and race. “[W]e are all androgynous,” Baldwin asserts in its
conclusion, “not only because we are all born of a woman impregnated by the seed of a man but
because each of us, helplessly and forever, contains the other—male in female, female in male,
white in black and black in white” (690). This conclusion, however, does not represent a position
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he held throughout his entire career, but is rather the result of a lifelong dialectical process of
engaging with, at times battling and at times reinscribing, binary categories—a process reflected
in the narrative of the essay.
Baldwin describes his young self, on whom David and Giovanni are partially based, as an
adolescent man who leaves Harlem to live in Greenwich Village. By his account, he dates a few
white women who seek to sexually liberate themselves through the socially transgressive act of
sex with black men, on whom they project special sexual powers. Subsequently, Baldwin finds
“clouds of imitation white women” (1985, 686) in the men of the “queer—not yet gay—world”
of the Village (685). Having been called a sissy on the streets of Harlem his entire life, Baldwin
is “afraid that [he] already seemed and sounded too much like a woman” (ibid.) and feels further
feminized by his interactions with these men. Not only do they express “speculations concerning
the size of his organ,” not unlike the women he has dated, but their speculations are also
“sometimes accompanied by an attempt at the laying on of hands” in public spaces (686).
The entitlement that allows white gay men to publicly attempt to grope Baldwin in a socalled ‘polite’ social space crucially distinguishes these men from Baldwin’s female lovers, a
power differential he does not acknowledge. Thus, derisively calling these men “imitation white
women” (ibid.) misguidedly identifies femininity as the root of racist oppression and crafts a
fantasy of a more ethical masculine subjectivity unsullied by degenerate effeminacy.9 If white
men were real men and not imitation women, Baldwin seems to be saying, they would not
exoticize a black man and exploit him sexually. But in fact, the history of American racism
suggests just the opposite through the phenomenon of lynching, whereby white men use white
women and their safety as a pretext to perform sexual violence against black men.10 By
positioning itself in opposition to femininity, Baldwin’s ideal of manhood aligns itself more

109

closely with twentieth-century performative masculinity, in Floyd’s historical formulation, than
the nineteenth-century ideal of a more ontologically stable manhood. In other words, Baldwin
does not always succeed in theorizing a type of manhood that is necessarily distinct from
performative masculinity, and his formulation of manhood at times only reinforces the rigid
categories of binary gender it purportedly sets out to complicate.
Just as Baldwin’s sexist characterization of Greenwich Village gay white men as
‘imitation white women’ detracts from his otherwise shrewd critique of the racist entitlement that
allows them to molest black men, so do derisive descriptions of Giovanni’s employer Guillaume
and his friend Jacques as “old theatrical sisters” (Baldwin 1956, 31) and “disgusting old
fair[ies]” (150) trouble the novel’s dissection of power dynamics based on class, ethnicity, and
citizenship. As a queer working-class immigrant, Giovanni is clearly a vulnerable target for men
such as Guillaume and Jacques. When he is not ridiculing Guillaume’s wardrobe and choice of
perfume (107), Giovanni’s analysis of the problem is quite accurate. Describing an episode in
which Guillaume publicly humiliates him in front of his patrons, falsely accusing him of stealing,
Giovanni explains to David that

You can tell when Guillaume is in a dangerous mood because he then becomes so
respectable. When something happens to humiliate him and make him see, even
for a moment how dirty he is, and how alone, then he remembers that he is a
member of one of the best and oldest families in France. (106)
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The respectable and wealthy Guillaume makes a scene in front of his wealthy friends in a sadistic
display of his power over Giovanni, a scene in which his friends are more than happy to act as a
supporting cast.
When Guillaume publicly accuses Giovanni, throwing money at him and throwing him
out of the bar, all the other patrons

knew that Guillaume was right and I was wrong . . . . And, oh, the faces in that
bar . . . . They were so wise and tragic and they knew that now they knew
everything, that they had always known it, and they were so glad they never had
anything to do with me. (109)

For Guillaume’s wealthy entourage, the guilt of a working-class immigrant man is a foregone
conclusion. This elaborate theatrical spectacle orchestrated by Guillaume, his public humiliation
of Giovanni, serves the self-congratulatory purpose of reminding the powerful of their power, an
enactment of respectability that, to Giovanni, is as ‘disgusting’ as it is pathetic because it signals
that Guillaume is indeed alone and friendless, insofar as all of his social connections are
mediated by capital. The family name, and the capital that comes with it, is all the powerful
appear to have in the way of kinship or community.
From Giovanni’s point of view, Guillaume is not a man because manhood cannot depend
solely on bourgeois respectability and the theatrical rituals that reinforce it. Giovanni states this
opinion directly in an earlier conversation with David, painting a picture evocative of the groping
gay white men depicted in “Here Be Dragons”: “I did not . . . altogether succeed in remaining
untouched by him; he has more hands than an octopus and no dignity whatever . . . . He is really
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not a man at all . . . . I do not know what he is, he is horrible” (61). Here Giovanni’s perspective
is clearly aligned with the correlation Baldwin draws between manhood and ethics. Troublingly,
ethical manhood is only evaluated through interactions men have with one another. David’s
mistreatment of women, for example, is only a minor concern in the novel’s moral universe.
Even more alarmingly, Giovanni’s description of Guillaume suggests that if one is not a man,
one is not anything definable in human terms: a non-man translates to a non-human.

Theatrical Genderqueering

The novel’s representation of bourgeois theatricality, filtered through Giovanni’s relationship to
Guillaume, positions the theatrical as a more self-conscious form of performativity as defined by
Baldwin. Because this definition of theatricality is not too different from a definition proposed
by theater scholars and practitioners, the field of theater studies can usefully illuminate this
relationship between performativity and theatricality in the novel. According to Kate Bornstein,
“we’re always performing identities, but when we consciously perform one, and people
acknowledge our performance, it’s theater” (147). Theatricality is distinct from performativity
not only because a theatrical performance is fully conscious and self-aware, but also because the
performance is highly self-referential, calling attention to the fact that the spectator is watching a
performance and inviting that spectator to consider the implications of the genre. As Alisa
Solomon notes, theater is similar to performative gender as theorized by Butler in that both are
“automimetic” (12), or in other words, copies of copies. There is no original that either theater or
gender copies. Accordingly, there are no ‘imitation women’ or imitation men, just as there is no
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imitation of life. “Theatrical presence”, in Solomon’s words, “displays the absence of any prior
cap-T truth” (12), but, unlike gender, is always self-conscious about this absence.
While Giovanni’s recognition of Guillaume’s theatricality enables him to dissect and
denaturalize Guillaume’s position of power, Guillaume has, in a way, already denaturalized his
own subject position by being so flagrantly theatrical. He deliberately makes a scene—he throws
the money at Giovanni—a scene which reminds the latter of his first encounter with Guillaume
in the theater lobby where they fatefully met.11 When performing in front of Giovanni,
Guillaume is not invested in naturalizing his power over Giovanni because Giovanni is not in
any position to question this power. Indeed, his ‘remembering’ that he is a member of one of the
oldest families in France is a strategic appeal to the benefits of heteronormative lineage—a
system whose ‘natural’ order a homosexual man inevitably questions. Self-consciously theatrical
performance, then, is not necessarily a form of critique in and of itself, but it does open up a
space for critique through its ability to reveal the performativity of all subject positions,
including ones invested with social power over others.
The text also presents an anti-bourgeois12 incarnation of theatricality—which I am calling
genderqueer theatricality—that complicates Giovanni’s dismissive view of the theatrical as the
province of unethical, wealthy non-men. Genderqueer theatricality in the novel questions and
unsettles the binary between the fantasy of a fully realized manhood and the presumed ethical
and existential inadequacy of performative masculinity. This form of theatricality does not
amplify the performative, but rather transcends it by employing the dramatic genre of tragedy—a
sensibility that, I argue, more closely approximates the complexity of gender Baldwin seeks to
theorize than do his formulations of mature and ethical manhood.
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It is not only the wealthy and powerful who are represented as theatrical in the novel, and
their affected performances of tragedy—the ‘tragic’ faces they put on to condemn Giovanni—are
mere shadows of the novel’s deeper tragic sensibility and its emphatically theatrical expression.
While the theatricality and effeminacy of the corrupt and powerful Guillaume serves to highlight
the novel’s equation of performative masculinity with failed masculinity, the theatricality of
more intentionally gender-bending figures disrupts the text’s hierarchical system of gender-based
value. One such figure in particular not only disturbs David’s sense of his own masculinity in a
profound and visceral way but also questions the hierarchy of masculinity/manhood and their
respective alignment with the performative and the ontologically stable by inhabiting the realm
of tragic wisdom and prophecy.
On the night when David meets Giovanni in the bar where Giovanni works, an old
“coquettishly” dressed gay man approaches David, “horrifying” him with the “lasciviousness” of
his hips, the “violent . . . oil” in his hair, the “rag[ing] lipstick” on his mouth, his open shirt, and
the “silver crucifix” glistening on his “hairless chest” (Baldwin 1956, 39). David is too disturbed
by the man’s flagrantly feminine presentation to perceive him as human at first, likening him to
“a mummy or a zombie” and repeatedly referring to him as “it” while describing his appearance
and attire. His narration drops the objectifying and dehumanizing “it” when the man begins
speaking to him. Yet the impossibility of denying the reality of his existence, which surfaces
during this transition from “it” to “him,” arouses violent anger and gay panic in David: “It was
impossible to hit him . . . . It did not seem real, he did not seem real” (ibid.).13 When David
curses at the stranger in response to his inquiry about his interest in Giovanni and his cryptic
warning that Giovanni is “dangerous,” especially “for a boy like you,” the face of the gender-
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bending Tiresias-like prophet assumes “the mask of tragedy” (40). “You will be very unhappy,”
he professes. “Remember I told you so” (ibid.).
While this prophetic, seemingly otherworldly character is not exactly cross-dressing or
wearing drag, his disruption of the novel’s reification of manhood fulfills a function much like
what Marjorie Garber has identified as the cultural role of the transvestite. Drawing on Lacanian
theory, Garber aligns the figure of the transvestite with a “third term” that destabilizes a binary
structure and embodies a liminal space of in-betweenness and possibility. This space enacts an
interruption of familiar structures, signaling “not just another category crisis, but—much more
disquietingly—a crisis of ‘category’ itself” (32). In a heteronormative and transphobic culture,
people who are not easily placeable within an either/or gender schema can become targets of
physical violence such as the violence David momentarily considers. When gender-nonconforming, genderqueer, or transgender people are met with verbal violence, it is often in the
form of a demand to give an account of their existence, expressed in some form of the question
‘What are you?’ This ‘What are you?’ question, while ostensibly and literally directed at the
genderqueer person, is a particularly urgent one for the speaker because it is in fact directed at
himself. Garber’s transvestite figure, that is to say, does not embody a category crisis because the
transvestite or transgender person is not the one who is experiencing a crisis. The crisis belongs
to the normatively gendered or dressed person who becomes defensive and at times violent
because the genderqueer has dared to question the category system to which the former is
wedded and within which he hopes to maintain what he believes to be his secure position.
For David, then, the crisis is an existential one. The gender-bending figure has dared to
directly confront him with the question of his closeted homosexuality by remarking on his
obvious attraction to Giovanni and to indirectly confront him with the related crisis of his
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masculinity simply by being effeminate and wearing makeup. “What are you?” is a question
David must inevitably ask himself. Most of David’s friends in Paris are of “le milieu,” the
Parisian gay community, and he is “intent on proving, to them and to [himself], that [he] was not
of their company” (Baldwin 1956, 22). Earnest as David may be to make a case for his
heterosexuality, he is largely unconvincing. When, in Guillaume’s bar, Jacques suggests that
David offer Giovanni a drink, he defensively responds that he would only make such an
invitation “[i]f that was his sister looking so good” (30). To this denial—a tellingly failed one in
that it only affirms that Giovanni “look[s] . . . good”—Jacques responds with a “cheery, brave
smile,” taking great pleasure in mirroring the verbal irony of David’s failed performance: “‘I was
not suggesting that you jeopardize, even for a moment, that’—he paused—‘that immaculate
manhood that is your pride and joy’” (ibid.). David’s false conception of his “immaculate
manhood” and (homo)sexual innocence is emblematic of the novel’s depiction of the immaturity
of American masculinity. Jacques’ comment recalls David’s observation of the American men in
line at the American Express Office in Paris who “seemed incapable of age” and “smelled of
soap . . . their preservative against the dangers and exigencies of any more intimate odor,” who
appear “unsoiled, untouched, unchanged,” and whose wives “might have been [their] mother[s]”
(89-90). In this passage, washing and cleanliness conjure up protective gestures mobilized in
response to fear of life experience, sexual or otherwise,14 that may lead to introspection and
change—a fear that consistently shapes David’s decisions. His fear assumes the shape of a
distinct horror when he is confronted with theatrical displays of gender ambiguity, both in his
encounter with the aging, effeminate prophet of doom and at the sight of drag queens in the bar.
While both the prophet and the drag queens are self-consciously theatrical and disturb
David by dramatizing and hyperbolizing the performative nature of gender, he is especially
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horrified by the drag queens. His misogyny and its relationship to his internalized homophobia
render the drag queens not just horrifying but also, in his view, abject. He describes the gossiping
queens—“les folles”—in the bar as “screaming . . . parrots” (26) that “looked like a peacock
garden and sounded like a barnyard” (27). Responding to the content of their gossip, he finds it
“difficult to believe that they ever went to bed with anybody, for a man who wanted a woman
would have certainly rather had a real one and a man who wanted a man would certainly not
want one of them” (ibid.).
David’s terror of being gay thus translates to a fear of being not just a woman but an
“imitation woman,” which is what he perceives these queens to be. To him this is a position so
abject that it evokes the image of feces-eating primates. He avoids talking with one boy in
particular, who dresses in drag, because “his utter grotesqueness made [him] uneasy; perhaps in
the same way the sight of monkeys eating their own excrement turns some people’s stomachs.
They might not mind so much if monkeys did not—so grotesquely—resemble human beings”
(27). In contrast to David’s detailed description of the older, Tiresias-like figure, his narration
offers few details about this boy’s appearance, except for the fact that he wears makeup and
earrings and has “his heavy blond hair piled up high.” He also “[s]ometimes . . . actually wore a
skirt and high heels” (ibid.). Young and blond, like David, this fairly generic gay boy dressed in
drag becomes a site for David’s projection of his worst nightmare about his own fate: that by
accepting his attraction to men he will become a woman and a parody of gender, a subject
robbed of his manhood and thus, according to David’s sexist logic, of his humanity.
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Theatricality and Tragedy

While David does not react to the Tiresias figure and the boy in drag in identical ways, his
reactions are caused by an identical fear. On a symbolic level, David’s fear is associated
precisely with the Tiresias figure whose reality he has difficulty accepting. He fears becoming
Tiresias-like, punished for his “crime” of being a man who is attracted to other men15 in the same
way Tiresias was punished for his violent interruption of a pair of snakes in the act of coitus—by
being made into a woman.16 While Tiresias’s sexual crime is outwardly directed, David comes to
understand his violation as primarily self-directed as he begins to realize that the crime of
depriving himself of love is more serious than the social crime of his homosexuality. David’s
tragedy thus illustrates Raymond Williams’s designation of liberal tragedy as “the struggle of
individual desire, in a false and compromising situation, to break free and know itself” (1966,
99-100). According to Williams, historically, the genre of liberal tragedy, epitomized by the
plays of Henrik Ibsen, is a development in which the struggle of the individual is a struggle
against his society, and through this struggle the victim becomes the hero. Arguably, the journey
of self-discovery of any queer person socialized in a heteronormative and heterosexist society
and that person’s rebellion against this “false and compromising situation” (1966, 100) follow,
up to a point, the narrative of a liberal tragedy. A queer person’s trajectory need not complete the
narrative arc of tragedy, but it can under certain conditions. The heroic story of self-liberation
becomes a liberal tragic narrative at the moment when this “heroic position of the individual
liberator” turns into a position of “the self against the self.” In liberal tragedy, guilt is selfimposed rather than assigned from the outside. Guilt “has become internal and personal, just as
aspiration was internal and personal” (ibid.). Unlike Greek tragedy, where Tiresias is punished
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for his crime by the goddess Hera, in Baldwin’s liberal tragedy, David punishes himself. His
punishment is his own guilty conscience, a punishment that exemplifies what Williams calls the
“twentieth-century breakdown” (ibid.) of liberal tragedy—the foreclosure of its progressive
promise.17 This liberal tragic narrative, useful as it may be in telling a coming out story in the
pre-Gay-Liberation era, arguably places the wrong hero at its center. Indeed, the centrality of the
bourgeois liberal hero may be among the root causes of the eventual and inevitable dissolution of
the genre of bourgeois liberal tragedy.
The narrative’s central focus on David’s guilty conscience eclipses the struggle of
Giovanni, the character most severely victimized by social inequities, mirroring the way in
which an overly self-indulgent attention to one’s own white liberal guilt can prevent the liberal
from actually addressing the inequities for which he feels guilty. David, in a sense, usurps
Giovanni’s position as tragic hero. Giovanni’s crime is very different from David’s. His guilt is
determined by external moral and juridical laws and not, as is the case with David, a
psychological conflict marked by an internal recognition of having been unfair to himself and
others. In fact, both Giovanni’s crime and his punishment resemble crime and punishment in
Greek tragedy in that both are assigned arbitrarily—not by gods but by people in positions of
economic and social power.
If white male liberal guilt is a structure of feeling that perpetuates racial and sexual
injustices, in Giovanni’s Room working class immigrant guilt is an arbitrary condemnation of
criminality that exemplifies these injustices. There is no reason to believe, in the end, that
Giovanni is guilty of any social crime. Giovanni’s trial for Guillaume’s murder is not represented
in the novel. There is also no way of knowing whether Giovanni in fact killed him. Guillaume is
found dead in the private quarters above his bar, strangled with the sash of his dressing gown
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(Baldwin 1956, 148), and David imagines an argument between Giovanni and Guillaume that
ends in Giovanni’s accidental strangulation of Guillaume (156-7).18 The only account of the
murder, then, exists in David’s imagination. It is David’s imagination and narration that, in the
end, condemn Giovanni. It is the guilty conscience and the guilty consciousness of the white
American liberal that send the working-class immigrant hero to the guillotine.
David’s condemnation of Giovanni suggests that he has fundamentally misunderstood
Giovanni’s tragic worldview as well as his own motivations. While Giovanni does express a kind
of tragic determinism in his interpretation of history, David misconstrues the implications of
Giovanni’s point of view. In his first conversation with David, Giovanni offers the following
analysis of what he perceives as the American understanding of history:

“The Americans are funny. You have a funny sense of time—or perhaps you have
no sense of time at all, I can’t tell. Time always sounds like a triumphant parade
chez vous—a triumphant parade, like armies with banners entering a town. As
though, with enough time, and that would not need to be so very much for
Americans . . . as though with enough time and all that fearful energy you people
have, everything will be settled, solved, put in its place. And when I say
everything,” he added, grimly, “I mean all the serious, dreadful things, like pain
and death and love, in which you Americans do not believe.” (34)

The American progress narrative, in Giovanni’s view, pays little attention to the actual
exigencies and limitations of history. It imposes itself imperiously and imperialistically, like a
triumphant army—and often quite literally as a triumphant army—on the history of the rest of
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the world. It does not believe that human factors such as pain, death, and love can or should
complicate a narrow, single-minded view of progress. When prompted by David to explain how
he sees time, Giovanni explains that “[t]ime is just common, it’s like water for a fish . . . . The
big fish eat the little fish and the ocean doesn’t care” (34-5). Giovanni’s nautical simile is indeed
deterministic, verging on reactionary pessimism, in its suggestion that the powerful inevitably
win and that history is indifferent to this fact. However, given that his livelihood depends on the
whims of an employer who sees him as an object he is free to exploit both economically and
sexually, the comparison is a fairly accurate reflection of the world Giovanni inhabits. He can be
fired, framed, convicted, and executed at the hands of the powerful without anyone caring to
come to his defense.
It is significant, then, that David feels “a subtle war within” himself, when he responds
that in the US, “the little fish have gotten together and are nibbling at the body of the whale”
(35). Whether he is referring to communists, pacifists, early civil rights activists, or feminists,
David conceivably feels a subtle sense of guilt, gnawing, nibbling perhaps, at his conscience,
about his lack of participation in the populist movements he claims as his own—and possibly
also an anxiety about the possibility of losing the privileges he is afforded by racial, economic,
and gender inequities. Instead of recognizing the limitations of his own choices and addressing
his own fears, he depicts Giovanni as a reactionary, Old World figure.
David tells Jacques, shortly after Giovanni’s sentencing, that

[i]t might have been better . . . if [Giovanni had] stayed down there in that village
of his in Italy and planted his olive trees and had a lot of children and beaten his
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wife. He used to love to sing . . . maybe he could have stayed down there and
sung his life away and died in bed. (24-5)

While Giovanni does express misogynistic sentiments—for example, he quips that liberated
women should be beaten into submission (80)—David, who knowingly takes advantage of
women and is deathly afraid of being feminized by his homosexuality, is hardly a feminist. Yet,
David sees Giovanni as essentially different from him, as fundamentally patriarchal because premodern, in a schema where the patriarchal, pre-modern world is represented as Giovanni’s
“Eden” (25). If David is the only American Giovanni knows well, then it is understandable that
Giovanni would conclude that “Americans have no sense of doom” (143), as he says when David
abandons him. David thwarts the progressive possibilities of tragedy and manifests its liberal
bourgeoisfication to a solipsistic extreme by displacing Giovanni from the position of tragic hero
and placing himself and his guilty conscience at the center of the narrative.
While Giovanni’s tragic demise is underwritten by his economic precarity, it is
precipitated by the emotional despair he experiences in the wake of David’s abandonment.
David’s misguided and impossible ambition to cultivate a conformist American masculinity
through a preservation of sexual innocence becomes the catalyst for the tragic resolution of
Giovanni’s drama. Tellingly, Giovanni conceptualizes David’s refusal of queer love as an
absence of gendered embodiment. David, according to Giovanni, is “a lover who is neither man
nor woman, nothing that I can know or touch” (139). The ungendered here is ultimately
intangible, elusive, and unknowable. An absence of gender translates, for Giovanni, to an
absence of love, similar to the way an absence of manhood translates to an absence of humanity
for Baldwin.
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Beyond Giovanni and David’s individual tragedies lie, to borrow a term from David
Scott, the tragic dilemma and paradox of Baldwin’s simultaneous and fervent belief in two
contradictory principles: the bankruptcy of the labels of binary gender and the promise of the
manhood ideal as a way of inhabiting the complexity of gendered subjectivity. While Baldwin’s
own approximation of the sexual “dilemma” in the novel connects it to a “lack of sexual
authority” over and against “sexual ambivalence,” ambivalence, a defining component of
tragedy, may in fact be the novel’s most compelling and generative structural element. The
ambivalence of David’s guilt, and liberal guilt more generally, contains a potential for the
transformation of guilt into a more decisive, authoritative, and ethical subjectivity, perhaps even
creating a post-liberal subject who ceases to upstage other kinds of actors and stories. Similarly,
Baldwin’s ambivalent investment in the gender binary leaves the utility of the manhood ideal an
open question, inviting the transformation of “the complexity of manhood” (1985, 678) into a
more comprehensive conceptualization of the complexity of gender.
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Chapter IV
Love and Revolution: Les Blancs and Lorraine Hansberry’s Decolonial Queer Feminist
Thought

The polemical dimension of the term “Africa” flows precisely from the strange
power that resides within it, the terrible ambiguity that it conceals like a mask….
The mask is the power of the double, the crossing of being with appearance….
[T]he mask always denounces itself as a mask. The name “Africa” plays the role
of the mask in the drama of contemporary existence.
—Achille Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason

In this final chapter, I offer an examination of Lorraine Hansberry’s important and
understudied anti-colonial play, Les Blancs, completed by her ex-husband Robert Nemiroff after
her death and premiered on Broadway in 1970. I explore the play’s queering of accepted notions
of political, anti-colonial subjectivity and subjecthood, and discuss how Hansberry is in
conversation with both Jean Genet, to whose play The Blacks (Les Nègres) (1958) Hansberry’s
play responds directly, and Frantz Fanon, whose book Black Skin, White Masks (1952), I believe
serves as a backdrop to both plays. Responding to the critically limited anti-colonial satire of
Genet as well as Fanon’s sexist and homophobic projections onto the colonized in his otherwise
incisive anti-racist text, Hansberry unmasks the intersections of patriarchal and racist humanism
in the work of her two interlocutors.
Genet’s Les Nègres, premiered in Paris in 1959 and in New York as The Blacks in 1961,
is an absurdist play about European colonizers’ inability to accept the death of colonialism as a
just resolution to its existence and their attendant expectation that black Africans perform
caricatures of themselves as a form of aesthetic and comic relief for the colonizers as they mourn
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the demise of their supremacy. The Blacks is performed by an all-black cast of actors who play
black characters in blackface and don white masks to play a royal European court that comprises
the audience for a play-within-a-play performed by the black characters. While Genet— whose
choice of blackface and white masks parodies racist theatrical conventions— effectively exposes
the colonial invention of race as a mask, his play is not interested in the question of what lies
beyond (yes, beyond, not beneath) the mask of race. In this sense, he also parodies Fanon’s title
of Black Skin, White Masks without offering an alternative formulation. The Blacks performs a
critique of whiteness and its resistance to decolonization but does not go far enough in its
critique. Genet’s parody of whiteness and its colonial logics may express solidarity with the
colonized but offers little in the way of hope and a vision for the future. Hansberry responds
accordingly, turning the mirror on the whites (Les Blancs) once more, and crafting white
characters capable of examining their complicity in colonial plunder and racial injustice and of
accepting their role in a dying colonialism.
I have chosen Fanon as a kind of mediator for the transatlantic conversation between
Genet and Hansberry for several reasons. The most obvious of these is Fanon’s transatlantic
thought and existence, as a French-educated Martinican intellectual working in Algeria during
the period in which Genet and Hansberry write Les Nègres and Les Blancs, respectively. In
addition to his Francophone African diasporic context, Fanon’s specifically North African
location offers a window into Genet’s relationship to Africa. Genet, known for his political
solidarity with Arabs, Palestinians, and American Black Panthers,1 is ambiguously positioned in
relation to the Black Africa that is the subject The Blacks. Fanon’s insights on the white French
relationship to Arabs, North Africans, and black Africans can be illuminating given Genet’s
background and political commitments.

125

Additionally, Fanon’s work is both informed by and illuminates important contradictions
within a tradition of male-dominated pan-African Black nationalist thought to which Hansberry
responds. Fanon’s writing very much works in tandem with this tradition but also exposes its
contradictions, sometimes intentionally and other times in spite of itself, but often in ways
helpful to a queer and feminist investigation of racism and colonialism. As Susan Gubar
explains, “[a]lthough Fanon consistently universalizes the masculine perspective, his application
of psychoanalytic concepts to the construction of racial subjectivity has encouraged critics to
study race and gender as reciprocal, interactive categories” (xix). Thus queer and feminist critics
of race and racism are enormously indebted to Fanon while also at times fiercely critical of his
gender and sexual politics. This chapter is similarly informed and driven by what one might call
a “complicated” relationship with Frantz Fanon, who, in his own messy complicatedness, helps
us understand the conversation between such differently positioned figures as Lorraine
Hansberry and Jean Genet.
Hansberry’s Les Blancs offers a feminist and queer critique to the predominantly malecentered, anti-racist, anti-colonial humanism of her contemporaries. This chapter begins with an
unpacking of the masculinist currents with which she is in dialogue through a reading of the
interrelated anxieties about miscegenation and homosexuality in Fanon’s Black Skin, White
Masks. I argue that Fanon produces an imaginary sexually normative black male subject as a
defense against the colonial and white supremacist production of racial otherness through the
phobic specter of the black (often, though not always, implicitly male) body. Hansberry’s play
exposes the related masculinist and nationalist fictions of a universally heterosexual black male
subject whose sovereignty as a subject is threatened not only by racism and colonialism as such
but by racism and colonialism as specifically homosexual and culturally amalgamating systems.
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It is precisely the homosexual and miscegenated subject in Les Blancs who understands the
colonial situation with clarity and is most capable of directed and determined anti-colonial
revolutionary action. After unpacking Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks as framework, I offer a
close reading of Genet’s The Blacks and conclude with Hansberry’s response—both her initial
reaction to Genet’s play and her artistic response in Les Blancs.

Fanon, Miscegenation, and Homosexuality
Fanon’s concern for the miscegenated colonial subject and anti-colonial intellectual is
central to his work. Miscegenation in Fanon occurs at the level of the embodied, the cultural, and
the intellectual. Black Skin, White Masks poignantly explores miscegenation in what is perhaps
its most literal incarnation—in the realm of the sexual. Fanon discusses interracial sexual
relationships at length in chapter-long case studies of two individuals – accessed through their
autobiographically inspired literary writings – Mayotte Capécia, a Martinican woman who,
according to Fanon, wishes to be white, and, René Maran, an Antillean man who is raised and
lives in France and despises his blackness. From these case studies and reflections on his own
experience of embodiment as a black man living under a colonial and white supremacist visual
regime in the chapter on “The Fact of Blackness,” Fanon draws larger conclusions on “The
Negro and Psychopathology” in an eponymous chapter. This chapter includes a lengthy footnote
in which Fanon claims he has had “no opportunity to establish the overt presence of
homosexuality in Martinique,” presumably because “of the absence of the Oedipus complex in
the Antilles.” While he acknowledges “the existence of what are called there ‘men dressed like
women,’” he is “convinced they lead normal sex lives.” However, in Europe, Fanon has
observed Martinicans “who became homosexuals, always passive.” Nonetheless, even in Europe,
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and even for those Martinican men thus transformed, heterosexual manhood remains intact. They
do not engage in “passive” homosexuality because they desire to; rather they participate in a
transactional, survival homosexuality: “[T]his was by no means a neurotic homosexuality: For
them it was a means to a livelihood, as pimping is for others” (180.n44).
That this footnote appears within a text largely concerned with consensual heterosexual
miscegenation is no accident. Sara Ahmed observes that because in a colonial, racist, and antiblack context, “compulsory heterosexuality is the grounds for reproduction of… normative
whiteness,” the “prohibition of miscegenation and homosexuality belong, as it were, in the same
register” (2006, 127).2 Compulsory heterosexuality works analogously for Fanon, producing and
reproducing an imaginary normative blackness within a colonial dynamic where blackness is
produced as non-normative. Fanon’s study of Maran’s racial complexes on the one hand and
Capécia’s double—racial and sexual—transgressions on the other pays asymmetrical attention to
the body along gender lines in a situation in which female and male bodies are equally involved.
While the black male body as a site of projection of the psychoses of white racism is a central
focus in Black Skin, White Masks, the black male body as a sexual body is conspicuously absent.
Conversely, female relationships (black or otherwise) to race and racism are always already
sexual. Men can be sexually embodied, however, if they are homosexual. White men’s racist
projections onto the bodies of black or otherwise racialized men, for instance, operate within a
psychically “homosexual territory” (183). Fanon cannot conceive of the existence of lesbians
(201) and believes black male homosexuality exists only in the context of survival sex work.
Thus, Fanon’s sexually embodied figures in Black Skin, White Masks—(heterosexual) women
and (male) (white) homosexuals—are necessarily either racially traitorous (black women) or
simply racist (white men).3
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Tellingly, in the same breath, Fanon also reveals an ignorance about and perhaps
indifference to the sensuality and sexuality of women as well, astonishingly claiming it is
unusual for a woman to comment on the desirability of another woman. Indeed, he is alarmingly
frank about his indifference toward and his inability to see women of color in any meaningful
way. As Teresa de Lauretis points out, the homosexuality footnote is “immediately contiguous”
in the text with “the disclaimer about the woman of colour: ‘I know nothing about her’” (Fanon
180 in de Lauretis 63). Similarly, Fanon cannot know anything about the homosexual man,
unless he is a white Negrophobe. “If he were black… much better to know nothing about him
and think he does not exist” (de Lauretis 64, ellipses in the original). The sexuality of the woman
of color and the queer man of color, while impossible not to see, remain in the murky zone of
Fanon’s peripheral vision, forever deferred as an object of investigation.
It is somewhat ironic then that Fanon tells Michel Salomon, a doctor who believes black
men are inherently more “sensual” (202) than their white counterparts, that “[t]he eye is not
merely a mirror, but a correcting mirror. The eye should make it possible for us to correct
cultural errors” (202). Fanon thus also alludes, intentionally or not, to what his own eye does not
wish to see. While the eye of our perception can and should correct the inherited cultural biases
that sexually fetishize black men, for Fanon the eye cannot look further and unflinchingly
observe the sexual desires men have for other men and the displacement of their own desires on
the purported “sensuality” of black men in particular. Fanon can only allude to this displacement
as a white racist problem, not a larger male sexual problem compounded by racial and colonial
power dynamics.
For all of Fanon’s pity for René Maran and vitriol against Mayotte Capécia, inescapably
set against the backdrop of his own interracial relationship and, later, marriage to the white
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French woman Marie-Joséphine (Josie) Dublé, Fanon’s most virulent condemnation remains
reserved for the white homosexual man, who is charged as singularly responsible for the failure
of heterosexuality to produce a coherent and unadulterated black racial identity. Facing the
impossible task of becoming unreachable by imperialists’ predatory sexual habits, Fanon puts
forth the fantasy that the black male body is by definition alien to homosexual desire.

Black(ed Up) Skin, White Masks
Fanon and Genet explore an identical metaphor, that of “black skin, white masks,” to
highlight the fictionality of race but arrive at dramatically different conclusions. Genet quite
possibly read Peau Noire, Masques Blancs, originally published in 1952, or was at the very least
aware of its existence, and his 1958 Les Nègres (The Blacks: A Clown Show), featuring black
actors in literal white masks as well as black actors in blackface, can be plausibly read as a
response to and satire of Fanon’s text, or at least its title. Because race is both fictional and
performative, in Genet’s play whiteness is simply a mask, and blackness nothing other than the
racist theatrical convention of the “blacked up” actor. In the epigraph of the published script,
Genet writes: “One evening an actor asked me to write a play for an all-black cast. But what
exactly is a black? First of all, what is his color?” (3). One could answer Genet’s first question
quite simply. “A black” in the noun form is an absurd invention of the French and other
European languages. There is no such person as “a black” because “a black” is not a person (nor
a noun of any other kind). Genet was not asked to write a play for “a cast of blacks,” but for an
“all-black cast,” where “black” in its adjectival form functions as a social and political
designation of a human being and not the designation of “a race” or species suggested by the
noun form. I am interested in exploring these questions through a reading of Genet that assumes
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he is well aware of the distinction between “black” and “a black.” Let us assume that Genet is
not misinterpreting and ridiculing the black actor in question by asking him, “But what exactly is
a black?” but is instead directing this question toward the white audience for which he states the
play is intended (4). “A black,” then, is in the first instance a racist caricature, represented in his
play by a black person in blackface, intended to challenge the presumed racism of the white
audience.
Yet, as a response to Fanon’s phrasing of “black skins,” “What exactly is a black?” also
reads as a white man’s challenge to a black man’s seemingly essentialist formulation of racial
embodiment. A superficial reading of Fanon’s text and his metaphor of skin and masks could
posit an authenticity of “black skin” against a social façade of “white masks.” A more careful
reading reveals Fanon uses not only the colloquial “skin” but also the scientific terminology of
“phenotype” as a metaphor for socially constructed racialization. “The black man wants to be
white,” writes Fanon (11), and the primary way in which the Antillean black man “becomes
white” is through a process of acculturation that occurs by visiting the metropole. “The
[Antillean] black man who has lived in France for a length of time returns radically changed. To
express it in genetic terms, his phenotype undergoes a definitive, an absolute transformation”
(19). In a footnote, Fanon clarifies what he means by the idea of transformation of phenotype:
“Negroes who return to their original environments convey the impression that they have
completed a cycle, that they have added to themselves something that was lacking. They return
literally full of themselves” (19.n3). Black men who have visited the metropole return “full of
themselves,” that is, full of illusions of cultural sophistication and of having gained a social
status akin to that of the colonizer. Fanon purposely uses scientific terminology such as “genetic”
and “phenotype” to describe this type of cultural whitening to impress upon us that there is
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nothing biological about race and racialization. Like metropolitan sophistication, race, too, is a
fiction invented by the colonizer.
Genet’s play displays a similar understanding of race as a colonial invention but is
specifically interested in investigating blackness as a performance for white people. Unlike Black
Skin, White Masks, The Blacks: A Clown Show is not interested in the interiority of black people.
The play does however expose quite a bit about, and also mercilessly mocks, the psychology of
white Europeans faced with the potential consequences, on the eve of decolonization, of their
colonial conquest of Africa. One could counter Hansberry’s critique in her Village Voice review
of the play (which I address below) that Genet projects feelings of hatred onto the colonized by
observing that Genet is in fact critical of such projections by white Europeans. At the same time,
it is difficult, if even possible, to entirely separate Genet from the white subject-position and
psychology he satirizes. His focus on blackness as performance, then, perhaps constitutes not so
much a projection as a deflection. Genet, in this play, cannot critique the psychology of the
colonizer without also scrutinizing the opacity of the “other side” and its role in obstructing
communication and a path to reconciliation.
One could even argue that since there are no white actors in the play, and the “white”
characters are only white in scare quotes—black actor-characters in white masks in the playwithin-a-play—only the opacity of “the Blacks” is immediately available to the audience for
critical investigation. The absurd anxieties of the whites, lacking on-stage embodiment, are thus
presented as less real and less serious. And yet, Genet is clear in his intentions that the play is
meant to be seen by a white audience. Given that the stage is designated for black actors playing
caricatures of black people, while the audience seats are meant for white spectators, the satire of
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white racist psychological complexes that appears on the page does not fully materialize in the
theater.
Genet’s second opening note in the script, following his initial questioning of what it
would mean for him, as a white playwright, to write a play for an all-black cast, belabors, with
comic extravagance, the point that the audience will see a play written by a white person for
white people.
This play, written, I repeat, by white man, is intended for a white audience, but if, which
is unlikely, it is ever performed before a black audience, then a white person, male or
female, should be invited every evening. The organizer of the show should welcome him
formally, dress him in ceremonial costume and lead him to his seat, preferably in the
front row of the orchestra. The actors will play for him. A spotlight should be focused
upon this symbolic white throughout the performance.
But what if no white person accepted? Then let white masks be distributed to the black
spectators as they enter the theater. And if the blacks refuse the masks, then let a dummy
be used. (4)
The Blacks is not only a play written by a white man for white people, but also a play in which
white men (the playwright Jean Genet and directors Roger Blin and Gene Frankel, of the French
and American premieres, respectively) direct black actors who are meant to entertain white
people. While the very loose plot of the play is structured by the device of diversion—the ritual
sacrifice of a white woman is supposedly a diversion from “the Blacks’” execution of a traitor
within their ranks—Genet’s larger diversion concerns the direction of the black actors. The black
Master of Ceremonies Archibald Absalom Wellington’s constant on-stage direction of “the
Blacks” in the play-within-a-play distracts the audience from the structural and material
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conditions of the production they are seeing: white men’s creation of a drama in which black
actors entertain a white audience.
At the same time, Genet’s note expresses a wish that black people will go see his play
and even a fantasy of an evening on which an all-black audience patronizes his all-black-cast
play, but only in order to further impress his point that the play is not for them. If no white
person were to attend his play, and if Genet’s imaginary all-black audience were to refuse to
actively participate in the “clown show” of the play’s American subtitle by wearing white masks,
then let them be clowned anyway, instructs Genet—by the presence of a spotlight shone upon a
white dummy sitting front-row, center.
It is worth noting that the comedic absurdity of the play presents a challenge to a critique
of its racial politics. It is difficult to parse the intentions in Genet’s expression of a fantasy that a
play intended to be seen by white people will be attended by an all-black audience who shares
the theater with a spotlight-illuminated white dummy. Comedic interruptions of dialogue and
action throughout the play make Genet’s commentary on the racial dynamics of a dying
colonialism all but impossible to engage with. Yet, Genet chose to write a play about colonialism
in the genre of the absurd, because the absurd is the exclusive theatrical genre in which Genet
operates.4 And since he chose to do so, scholars in critical race studies have no choice but to
engage the play’s racial and gender politics despite the difficulties presented by its comedic
absurdism and despite the ease with which such politics can be brushed off as “just absurd.” It is
by now an axiom in much of male-authored comedy that feminists have no sense of humor, just
as people of color are repeatedly told that they do not understand racial satire, such as the racist
caricatures of Charlie Hebdo publications, to name just one example. If absurdism and comedy
are propped up as shields against political criticism, then it is all the more important that scholars
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continue to engage with the politics of such supposedly depoliticizing (or politically
uncriticizable) genres, particularly when their author is a gay white man from a colonizing nation
who claims solidarity with colonized people and with people of color.

The Blacks: A Funeral for Whiteness
Genet’s The Blacks: A Clown Show, opens with an apparent funeral for whiteness. The
opening stage directions situate “a catafalque, covered with a white cloth” at the center of the
stage. “At the foot of the catafalque, a shoeshine box,” which will aid in the further “blacking
up” of “the Blacks” as part of a ritual in which they execute white people. Around the catafalque
stand “four Negroes in evening clothes—no, one of them, Newport News, who is barefoot, is
wearing a woolen sweater—and four negresses in evening gowns are dancing a kind of minuet
around the catafalque to an air of Mozart which they whistle and hum” (7). The stage is lit with a
“very garish neon light,” and “[t]he ladies’ costumes—heavily spangled evening gowns—
suggest fake elegance, the very height of bad taste” (7-8). We are clearly situated, from the
outset, in both the theater of the absurd and the theater of camp. The funeral for whiteness is
neither a somber nor joyful occasion; it is a neon-lit scene of four “negroes” who have not quite
managed to dress in matching formal clothes, and four “negresses” humming Mozart, dressed in
over-the-top, fake-elegant poor taste.
Poor taste and a campy attention to artifice and theatricality persistently punctuate
Genet’s absurdist play-within-a-play, undercutting serious statements and discussions about the
relationship between (a dying) colonialism and (decolonizing) colonized nations. The play’s allblack cast plays an all-black cast of actors in blackface divided into a group of actors donning
white masks—the royal Court—and a group of actors without masks: the Blacks. The white
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mask of each member of the Court “is worn in such a way that the audience sees a wide black
band all around it, and even the actor’s kinky hair” (8). Thus the white audience for which the
play is intended is at no point allowed to forget that all actors on stage, masked or not, are black
people in blackface, playing caricatures of themselves. A white man, Genet, offers a white
audience his understanding of not just black performance of blackness but also black
performance of white fantasies about blackness. Moreover, he announces from the start that his
play is determined not to arrive at any kind of understanding between white and black people. As
members of the Court interrupt the black Master of Ceremonies Archibald Absalom
Wellington’s opening remarks out of panic about impending violence from “the Blacks,” he
assures the audience:
This evening we shall perform for you. But, in order that you may remain comfortably
settled in your seats in the presence of the drama that is already unfolding here, in order
that you be assured that there is no danger of such drama worming its way into your
precious lives, we shall even have the decency—a decency learned from you—to make
communication impossible. We shall increase the distance that separates us—a distance
that is basic—by our pomp, our manners, our insolence—for we are also actors. (12)
Opacity and the refusal to communicate are central to “the Blacks’” performance of blackness;
originality is not. Blackness here is not just a copy of a copy but also a performance learned from
white people. While making communication with the colonizer impossible can be a strategy for
survival or decolonization, the addendum that it is a practice learned from white people
undercuts the inventiveness suggested by an all-black cast’s orchestration of a spectacle about
race and its performativity.

136

The spectacle is indeed in many ways strikingly unoriginal, rehearsing some of the most
vulgar white-supremacist and colonial stereotypes about black Africans. The central spectacle in
the performance given by “the Blacks” is the supposedly repeated ritual sacrifice of a white
woman, who is first “seduced,” or raped, then murdered by Deodatus Village (the character who
comes closest to a protagonist in this play, played by James Earl Jones in the American
premiere), followed by a funeral rite. According to Archibald’s running commentary, a rape and
murder occur every evening because a “fresh corpse” is needed for each performance of the
funeral rite. Each of these announcements of the details of the ritual is predictably followed by
gasps and remarks from the Court about the barbarity of “the Blacks,” as well as empty threats of
prosecuting them through the colonial justice system.
The Queen of the white-masked royal court (played by Maya Angelou in the U.S.
premiere) doubles with the sacrificed white woman as a specter of white womanhood
endangered by black barbarity used to justify racial and colonial violence against black bodies.
Also a symbol of colonial power, the Queen sleeps through much of “The Blacks’” performance,
in an act of denial of impending decolonization. The Governor, who aims to suppress the “The
Blacks’” imagined insurrection through brute force wishes to awake the Queen and seek her
approval. The Judge, on the other hand, understands the Queen’s sleeping and dreaming as an act
of ideological resistance against decolonization. “She’s hatching,” he explains. “Hatching what?
Celtic remains and the stained-glass windows of Chartres” (43). Imagined to possess unlimited
symbolic power, the figure of the Queen hatches in her dreams artifacts of European civilization
deemed “timeless” in one last desperate attempt to secure the immortality of European
colonialism.

137

The Blacks performs, in the words of the Queen’s Missionary, “the long death struggle”
(47) of the royal Court and the European colonial regime it symbolizes. In addition to Celtic
ruins and the windows of the Chartres Cathedral, the Queen also calls “to the rescue” a number
of other European cultural emblems such as “Lord Byron, Chopin, French cooking,” and “heroic
couplets” (47). Yet, the futility of her invocations is clear to her, as is the paradox of
colonialism’s enthusiastic self-assertion during the process of its dissolution. In “a dying voice,”
the Queen remarks: “And we’re still too lively, aren’t we? Yet all my blood’s ebbing away” (47).
The dominant “white” voice in Genet’s all-black-cast play for a white audience is thus a lively
dying voice. This “white” voice is just as performative as the voices of “The Blacks,” and while
the performance by the black actors within the play refuses to reveal how they may actually feel
about the moment of decolonization, the performances by the white Court, Genet seems to
suggest, much more closely approximate how white colonizers may actually feel—by displaying
a grotesque sentimentalism about the end of a colonial era.
Moreover, Genet intends to shame white people for their sentimentalism. In a brief scene
just before the play’s conclusion, the masked actors lift their masks, break the fourth wall, and
address the (presumably white) audience in the theater:
The One Who Played the Queen: We masked our faces in order to live the loathsome life
of the Whites and at the same time to help you sink into shame, but our roles as actors are
drawing to a close. (114-15)
Genet thus stages black actors to facilitate the feelings of shame he demands of white people, but
he refuses to explore how black Africans indigenous to decolonizing nations may feel about the
monumental historical moment of decolonization.

138

In the play’s conclusion, the masked actors once again don their masks, and the actors
playing “The Blacks” symbolically kill each member of the royal Court and send them “off to
Hell” (118-126), in an ironic gesture intended to horrify Christian colonizers who believe in Hell
and missionaries who imported this concept to Africa. Decolonization is thus staged ironically. It
must be so because, as Archibald announces, “[t]he time has not yet come for presenting dramas
about noble matters” (126). Genet effectively dramatizes the absurdity of colonialism and
satirizes Europeans’ unwillingness to accept the inevitable end of their imperial rule over, in this
case, the African continent, but he does not offer much in the way of hope or a future vision for
the black audience members who may decide to attend his play.

Unmasking Les Blancs
Hansberry’s play Les Blancs responds directly to Les Nègres, translated into English in
1960 and premiered on Broadway as The Blacks: A Clown Show in 1961.5 In her Village Voice
review of The Blacks, Hansberry notes that in imagining how black Africans “should behave and
feel” based on how “they have been treated” by European colonizers, Genet “has rendered an
equation and calculated, one must say reasonably, for a sum” that comprises “an abstraction
possessed of great flashes of power and… inventive poetry” (“Thoughts on Genet, Mailer, and
the New Paternalism” 14). (Here, my reading of The Blacks, differs from Hansberry’s, as I
maintain that Genet in fact refuses to imagine how colonized Africans may feel. I do, however,
generally agree with the rest of her analysis.) However, its artistic merits notwithstanding,
Genet’s calculation, in Hansberry’s view, remains an abstraction that lacks a humanistic
understanding of decolonial consciousness. In Genet’s play we are “spared the anguish of man’s
oppression of man because the abstraction is utilized to affirm, indeed entrench, the quite
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different nature of pain, cruelty, ambition in ‘The Blacks.’ The dramatist does not impress upon
us,” Hansberry continues, “the sameness of kind which oppressors most despise in the
oppressed;” [that] “[i]t is the reflection of oneself that most enrages when we are enraged in our
crimes against a fellow human creature” (14, second emphasis added).
Hansberry’s review, which also responds to Norman Mailer’s review of The Blacks, also
dissects the problems with what she calls the “romantic racism” (10) of Genet, Mailer, and other
white male critics who romanticize black dispossession as a way out of the perceived existential
malaise of their generation’s white (and even black) bourgeoisie. Speaking on behalf of herself
and other like-minded black artists and intellectuals, Hansberry opines that “[o]ur life-eating
sense of fatigue began with, of course, the appearance of Norman Mailer’s ‘White Negro,’” the
essay perhaps most starkly indicative of a tendency “on both sides of the Atlantic” to claim
“fraternity” with “what the balance of society is always pleased to hope are ‘the damned’:
prostitutes, pimps, thieves, and general down-and-outers of whatever persuasion” (10).
Hansberry also uses her review as an occasion to respond to “the new paternalists’” criticisms of
her renowned play A Raisin in the Sun (1959). She specifically mentions Jonas Mekas, who has
understood Raisin as “of all things, a play about ‘insurance money’ and/or ‘real estate’” (10) and
notes the irony and hypocrisy in self-avowed leftist critics’ refusal to treat her “homely, workingclass” play with the same degree of critical sensitivity as work by Genet and Antonioni (14).
Hansberry contends her critics performed “a display of public dishonesty or stupidity by refusing
to see that [Raisin] was, more than anything else, a long and, perhaps, laborious assault on
money values,” alluding to the gradual transformation in the play’s conflicted protagonist Walter
Lee Younger, who ultimately refuses to be bribed out of integrating a white neighborhood (14).
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The rebuttal of Raisin’s critics serves Hansberry’s larger purpose of condemning her
interlocutors’ romanticization of black poverty and dispossession and its attendant demonizing of
the black middle class as reactionary, assimilationist, or somehow embodying “white” values.
Her response eloquently illuminates the relationship between a willful refusal to appreciate the
gravity of black dispossession and a willful misreading of black culture:
[B]lues or no blues, life roots or no life roots, Negroes of all classes have made it clear
that they want the hell out of the ghetto as fast as the ascendancy of Africa, the courts,
insurance money, job upgrading, the threat of “our image overseas,” or anything else can
thrust them…. Misery may be theatrical to the onlooker but it hurts him who is miserable.
That is what the blues are about. (14, original emphases)
Because these “new paternalists have mistaken [the black person’s] oppression for the Negro,”
“the middle class Negro’s search for comfort offends: it is an ugly fall from ‘naturalness’” (14).
For leftist intellectuals—among them writers such as Mekas, Mailer, and Genet—Hansberry
suggests, appear quite confused about the sources and manifestations of oppression, conflating
the oppressed subject with an essentialist idea of a racialized subject. The musical tradition of the
blues is, for these critics, an expression of an essential nature that somehow thrives in suffering
rather than an index of historical and ongoing oppression as well as the necessity for survival
under such conditions. It is no wonder, then, that the strivings of the black middle class are
offensive to white leftists whose unexamined racism precludes them from distinguishing
between a person seeking to survive under systemic political and economic oppression and a
fantasy of a person called a “Negro,” who is destined to suffer to satisfy a cultural expectation of
producing superior and more profound art than white cultural producers who are understood as
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“unhip”—because not attuned to “hip” cultural blackness—by Mailer and some of his
contemporaries.
While Hansberry’s reference to the “ascendancy of Africa, ” when grouped with shortterm tactics for economic advancement such as collecting “insurance money,” sounds somewhat
flippant, it actually signals her unique perspective in connecting the struggles of black Americans
with international struggles for liberation. Throughout the piece she delivers a number of similar
seeming “throwaway” lines that in fact gesture toward complex and sophisticated connections
between seemingly disparate realms of politics. After inviting her readers’ understanding that
black Americans need to access a basic standard of living by whatever means the economy or the
state may offer, Hansberry asserts that the “new” white paternalists’ disdain for the black middle
class is in fact nothing new but only the latest iteration of “the spectacle of white people insisting
on telling all sorts of colored peoples how they should behave to satisfy them” (14). Echoing her
mocking allusion to Cold War politics’ role in black American civil rights—“our image
overseas”—Hansberry insists that white Americans’ policing of the behavior of “all sorts of”
people of color (presumably not only American ones) remains “the most characteristic aspect of
the nation’s foreign policy” (14). This brief reference to the US’s monitoring of and working to
suppress decolonial movements overseas reads somewhat abruptly in a text primarily concerned
with white American paternalistic attitudes towards their fellow black citizens. Yet Mailer’s
othering of black people renders them precisely “foreign” to hegemonic understandings of
Americanness, which position white male subjects as normative. Hansberry’s attack on the
racism of self-avowed leftists such as Mailer thus brings us back to the original occasion for her
piece: to review Genet’s The Blacks.
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For all his strivings for “hipness,” Hansberry’s response leads us to believe, Mailer is no
less “square” than a CIA agent spying on the Mau Mau rebels in Kenya, whose revolutionary
movement Hansberry’s dramatic response to Genet, her play Les Blancs, alludes to. Similarly,
Hansberry suggests that for all of his anti-colonial sympathies, Genet’s caricaturesque (if
parodic) rendering of Africans’ rage and violence in The Blacks reinscribes their racial othering
and makes him complicit with a colonial representational regime that dehumanizes the
colonized.
It is no wonder that someone like Mailer, who refuses to understand a basic point about
Black people’s access to housing and public services, would share Genet’s cynicism toward the
idea of a liberatory Black decolonial consciousness. Genet and Mailer, of course, are hardly the
same caliber of artist. The Blacks is self-aware. Beyond mere cynicism about the future of
decolonizing nations, its biting satire also assails a dying colonialism and the racial panic that
accompanies it. It is perhaps for this reason that Hansberry’s grouping of Genet and Mailer is so
important and revelatory. While Genet mocks Mailer’s brand of romantic racism, he does not
venture to imagine what kind of human substance (and political vision) his black characters do
possess. Despite the sophistication of his play, Genet in the end replaces one brand of racist
paternalism with another. His worthy critique of colonial Europe gets lost in what one could
argue is not just a satire of white paternalism but also a failed satire of the colonized, on whom
he projects his own failure to imagine a truly decolonized world.

Confronting Insurrection: The Expatriate Returns
There are currently two print editions of the text of Les Blancs: one from 1972, which is
the closest to the script used in the original 1970 productions, and one from 1983. In “A Note
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about the 1983 Edition,” Nemiroff explains that a 1980 off-Broadway production of the play
presented the opportunity “to reconsider some material which had been cut from the original
production for reasons relating less to the text than to the dynamics of that particular mounting—
and to sharpen the focus of some passages with small cuts and clarifications” (Hansberry 1983;
35). This chapter’s reading of Les Blancs relies primarily on the 1972 edition, whose text is
closer to that of Hansberry’s original drafts, currently housed in the Manuscripts, Archives, and
Rare Books Division of the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture.
Hansberry’s Les Blancs responds to Genet’s essentialist production of racial difference
by foregrounding the ethical conflict of the diasporic subject Tshembe Matoseh, a British
resident who returns to his African homeland, a fictional country loosely based on Kenya,6 for
his father’s funeral. Tshembe, who has maintained his childhood emotional ties to the European
(Dutch and Scandinavian) missionaries who run a makeshift hospital in the village, is asked to
join the violent insurrection against the occupying British forces that would surely obliterate the
mission. While Tshembe’s initial hesitation to join the rebel forces counters the idea of a
homogenous anti-colonial African consciousness, his character also refuses co-optation by
Western liberal universalism and its ahistorical rhetorics of racial colorblindness.
Tshembe frequently refutes such rhetorics in conversations with Charlie, an aptly named
white liberal American journalist visiting the Mission, who mistakes the historical antagonism
between colonizer and colonized for a racial antagonism marked by the black African’s
borderline pathological hatred for the white Westerner. During one of these conversations an
exasperated Tshembe confronts Charlie with the question of why it is that he harbors “this
absolute lo-o-onging for [his] hatred” (54). Tshembe’s response to Charlie’s fantasy of “tribal”7
hatred asserts that white Westerners should suspend their projection of feelings onto the
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colonized and that what Hansberry sees as Genet’s equation of how black Africans should feel
based on how they have been treated is, while at first glance reasonable, also arrogant,
presumptuous and unhelpful to the anti-colonial struggle.
In another conversation, Tshembe lucidly articulates the crucial distinction between the
fiction of race and the material reality of racism, which Charlie fails to grasp: “[R]acism is a
device that, of itself, explains nothing,” but
it also has consequences: once invented it takes on a life, a reality of its own…. I may
recognize the fraudulence of the device, but the fact remains that a man who has a sword
run through him because he refuses to become a Moslem or a Christian—or who is shot
in Zatembe or Mississippi because he is black—is suffering from the utter reality of the
device. And it is pointless to pretend that it doesn’t exist—merely because it is a lie! (67,
original emphases)
Tshembe thus attempts to impart upon Charlie the importance of addressing and exposing lies of
the magnitude and historical consequence of imperialist, racist ideology that cuts across nations
and continents; such fateful and noxious lies cannot and will not, as Charlie wishes, evaporate on
their own without a process of truth and reconciliation. Pretending that the lie is not a problem is
akin to keeping an open secret: sooner or later the tides of history rupture the consensus of
collective cognitive dissonance required to sustain the “secret.”
Among the open secrets that propel the action in Les Blancs is the paternity of Tshembe’s
biracial brother Eric. The secret is not revealed to outsiders such as Charlie and the audience
until late in the play. The racially mixed Eric is also portrayed as a gender and sexual deviant,
and Tshembe suspects that his brother’s relationship with the mission doctor Willy DeKoven is
more intimate than he is comfortable with. Consequently, Tshembe violently, albeit privately,
“outs” Eric by snatching his bag and “angrily” emptying its contents, which include “[a]
woman’s cosmetics! So, Eric,” Tshembe charges, “if you cannot quite be a white man you have
decided to become a white woman?” (63). Equally offensive to Tshembe is Eric’s pith helmet,
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which he “cruelly” knocks off of Eric’s head before continuing with his insinuations: “And toys
like this! What else does he give you to make you his playtime little white hunter?” (63). While
the representation of the putatively queer, white-fathered Eric appears to feed into masculinist
pan-Africanist notions of white male effeminacy, Hansberry’s representation of Tshembe’s
paternalistic treatment of his brother actually performs a critique of such narratives. “Tenderly”
“[r]eaching out to embrace him,” Tshembe beckons Eric to return with him to England where he
can be an uncle to Tshembe’s own mixed-race son (63). It is unclear why Tshembe imagines life
in England will save Eric from the white men who presumably prey on him; the logic is lost – or
perhaps found – in his own savior fantasy and guilt for having abandoned his family in their
colonized homeland.
A discrepancy between the 1972 and 1983 editions of the play bears discussion here.
Missing from the text of Les Blancs revised by Nemiroff in 1983 is a stage direction adding
further context to Tshembe’s homophobic observations. In this stage direction, Hansberry
literally frames Tshembe’s own “manhood” in quotation marks, immediately preceding his
lecture on the distinction between race and racism. Both versions of the text which are currently
in print preface his explanation with the direction that he “proceeds with the maximum clarity he
can muster” (1972: 67; 1983: 92). The 1972 edition adds the following line absent from the 1983
revision: “It is a challenge that he relishes—for if at this point in life Tshembe can assert his
‘manhood’ in no other satisfactory way, there at least remains this: the power to articulate and
define his world for himself without illusion” (67). We could speculate as to why Nemiroff
removed this sentence after the play’s original production, but if we are to do justice to
Hansberry’s feminist vision, our attention is better spent on the line itself.
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Tshembe, at this stage in the narrative, has not yet resolved to join the insurrection and
likely wonders what his hesitation suggests about his manhood, if manhood is defined by a
resolve to fight injustice by any and every means necessary. Manhood in this context works as a
kind of metaphor for true conviction and commitment to action, and Hansberry’s scare quotes
question the gendered nature of the metaphor as well as the legacy of European liberal
Enlightenment that both requires a black man to make his humanity intelligible to a white man
and equates “human” with “man,” rendering that humanity always already male. Hansberry thus
interrogates the misogynist structures of both colonialism and anti-colonial movements as well as
a racist discourse that insists a diasporic African subject out himself as such by demonstrating an
ability to speak the language of the European or American.
Hansberry proceeds to interrogate this genre of masculinist humanism through an
exploration of Tshembe’s ambivalence framed by contrasts with the consciousness of each of his
brothers. Tshembe, Eric, and his presumably older brother, Abioseh (named after their father),
each challenge patrilineal expectations for continuing their father’s legacy as a leader in the
village in ways that demonstrate their divergent understandings of and positionings with respect
to the colonial situation. Tshembe, an expatriate intellectual, adopts a cosmopolitan and
universalist perspective, in which he envisions a decolonized Africa and a post-imperialist
Europe thriving in peaceful co-existence. Moreover, Tshembe is aware of the contradictions of
this position, the difficulties of cultivating a peaceful relationship within a power imbalance
derived from multi-century colonial legacies. His perspective is necessarily flawed but also
situated within the play as a nuanced middle ground between the diametrically opposed positions
of (as the play eventually reveals) a traitorous Abioseh and a militant Eric.
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While sympathetic to the nuanced and ambivalent position of an intellectual such as
Tshembe, particularly in regard to endorsing violent resistance, Hansberry also problematizes
this ambivalence and points to its bankruptcy in moments when colonized people under siege
must take swift action. When Tshembe hesitates to join the rebel forces in the village, claiming
he is among the “men in the world… who see too much to take sides” (70, original emphasis),
Ntali, an elder (known to settlers as the servant Peter), reminds Tshembe of the folk tale of
Modingo, “the wise hyena who lived between the lands of the elephants and the hyenas” (70).
Asked to settle a quarrel over land between elephants and hyenas—the hyenas were on the land
first, but the elephants are large and need more land—Modingo asks for time to think. While
Modingo thinks, the elephants act—and take over the hyenas’ land. “That is why the hyena
laughs until this day and why it is such a terrible laughter,” Ntali explains. “Because it was such
a bitter joke that was played upon them while they ‘reasoned’” (71). Tshembe is presented with
the choice of interpreting the story as either a cautionary tale or a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Finding the comparison between himself and Modingo fatefully accurate, Tshembe ruefully and
with “quiet irony—at his own expense” declares: “If they need a Modingo to study the tides
while the sea engulfs them—I am their man! But a leader I am not” (71). Seeing the reminder of
the folk tale of Modingo has not sufficiently appealed to Tshembe’s reason or emotions (in
perhaps summoning an expatriate’s nostalgia for the folklore of his motherland), Ntali calls on
Tshembe to fulfill his father’s legacy.
Peter: Then become one! (Tshembe turns away. Peter plays his ace in the hole.)
Tshembe, your father—(Softly—so as not to be overheard by anyone) was my
commander in the Freedom of the Land Army.
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Tshembe: (Staring at him, incredulous.) My father? (He is quiet as the revelation sinks
in.) You mean my father approved—?
Peter: (Pointedly.) —Conceived, Tshembe.
While Tshembe does not agree to join Peter/Ntali and his soldiers in armed resistance, Ntali’s
invocation of Tshembe’s father and his role in the creation of a resistance army fundamentally
transforms Tshembe’s relationship to the idea of violent insurrection. Although Tshembe warns
Ntali that the “few rifles and the spears of our fathers” (72) in the possession of his soldiers are
hardly adequate to fight an occupying colonial army, the ideals of his father and the idea that he
must do justice to his father’s legacy shifts his understanding of the situation much closer to
Ntali’s. The word “conceived,” not accidentally emphasized by Ntali, helps to mobilize a
patrilineal understanding of legacy that ultimately compels Tshembe to think and act in a manner
more closely approximating the subjectivity of a guerilla revolutionary than that of a
cosmopolitan intellectual. Entering the scene as Peter/Ntali exits, Abioseh, oblivious to his role
in the insurrection asks Tshembe for the reason of the former’s visit. “He came to remind us that
we are supposed to be our father’s sons” (74), responds Tshembe, clearly moved by the elder’s
revelation and wishing Abioseh would have chosen a path more closely aligned with the
patrilineal legacy carried by his name.

The Queer Rebel
Although Ntali clearly influences Tshembe’s attitude toward the insurrection, it is from a
conversation with his younger brother Eric, whose paternity and queerness subvert the
heteronormative model of patriarchal lineage and legacy Tshembe finds so compelling, that
Tshembe is able to gain greater clarity about the stakes of the rebel movement and his
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participation in it. While the exchange with Peter/Ntali awakens Tshembe to the fact that he,
through a familial connection, is more implicated in the actions of the rebels than his chosen
position as an intellectual with critical and geographical distance from the decolonial struggle
may have initially allowed, this exchange leaves Tshembe’s ambivalence about the movement
intact. Opposed to violence and its use against the doctors and missionaries whom he also
considers family, Tshembe attempts to convince Ntali that the violent insurrection has already
achieved its effects. The settlers, Tshembe argues, have been sufficiently scared by acts of
violent resistance and are ready to negotiate with local leaders who demand self-governance (7273). When the colonial government betrays the disingenuousness of previous promises to
negotiate by arresting local leader Amos Kumalo on charges of “conspiracy,” Tshembe’s
ambivalence turns to cynicism. Interrupting a confrontation between his two brothers, a
discouraged and inebriated Tshembe mocks Eric’s revolutionary fervor:
Abioseh: What do you know about any of it?
Eric: I know it is time to drive the invaders into the sea. And that I shall carry
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spear and shield of our father.
Tshembe: (Amused.) You are half European. Which part of yourself will you drive into
the sea?
Eric: I am African enough not to mock when my people call!
Tshembe: And what will you do when your doctor calls, Eric? It takes more than a spear
to make a man.
Eric: (Fighting tears of fury. Lashing out.) What does it take, Tshembe? You teach me!
What does it take to be a man? A white wife and son?
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Eric’s claim to the warrior legacy, the spear and shield, of their father, the old Abioseh, carries
an implicit critique of the biologically essentialist, heteropatriarchal nationalist narratives, and
their attendant constructions of masculinity, that inform Tshembe’s understandings of that same
legacy. Unlike Tshembe, the queer and “half-European” Eric has no ambivalence about
participating in an anti-colonial insurrection. While Tshembe cannot decide if he wants to claim
Africanness—on the one hand it is important for him to participate in the funeral rites for his
father wearing the traditional clothing reserved for such rituals, and on the other, he informs
Peter/Ntali that he “can longer think of [himself as a Kwi” but “[o]nly as a man” (70)—Eric
observably “knows who he is.” In response to Peter/Ntali’s observations of Tshembe’s cultural
ambiguity—“Tshembe Matoseh, the Wanderer—who has come from Europe with the white
man’s tongue…. I hope you do not have his heart” (73-4)—Tshembe can only resort to
deflection that targets Eric’s racial hybridity and homophobic jabs at his masculinity. Eric is well
aware that Tshembe, too, cannot conform to the heteropatriarchal expectations of reproducing a
cultural and biological lineage and takes the opportunity to in turn expose Tshembe’s apparent
failings. Notably, all three sons exhibit pronounced failures in fulfilling their father’s legacy—
Abioseh in his colonized mentality and missionary work, Tshembe through his expatriation and
interracial marriage, and Eric through his queer relationship with a European settler. Ironically,
the queer and racially “mixed” Eric, who is, in the most literal and biological sense, not his
father’s son, is closest to inheriting the quality most relevant to the action of the play: old
Abioseh’s anti-colonial warrior spirit.
Tshembe and Abioseh share a paternalistic attitude toward Eric and argue over which one
of them should act as his guardian. Tshembe wishes to take Eric with him to London, while
Abioseh announces his plans to send Eric to a Catholic monastery.
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Tshembe: […] Eric would only run off.
Abioseh: They have ways at St. Cyprian’s to keep boys from running off.
Tshembe: […] Yes, come to think of it, they must.
Abioseh: (Looking back at Eric.) Father Mettinger would make him welcome.
Tshembe: (Suggestively) No doubt. (86)
Tshembe’s opposition to Christian indoctrination bears a clear relationship to his previously
stated concerns about Eric as target for sexually predatory white men. At the same time, he once
again fails to coherently explain how London would benefit Eric, and remains unconvincing,
especially in the face of Eric’s passion for his motherland and devotion to the anti-colonial
movement. Eric decisively rejects both of his brothers’ proposals:
Eric: No. I am staying here—where I belong! (Sits up. To Tshembe, pleading.) They call
me by the name my mother gave me—
Tshembe: (Derisively.) –Ngedi! (He is mocking at the impulse toward national pride—the
‘tired’ revolutionary who cannot bear to face the pure, innocent fervor of the newborn
revolutionary—who is, nonetheless, doing what he knows he should be doing.)
Eric: Yes. Ngedi. They have asked me to take the oath. (87)
Perhaps the fact that he is not his father’s son, that he is not the son of either of his fathers—the
father of his brothers or the rapist of his mother—is not just incidental but formative in Eric’s
anti-colonial consciousness. For, much more fatefully, he is his mother’s son, and he carries the
legacy of the woman warrior who died giving birth to a queer rebel; perhaps the same woman
warrior whom Hansberry envisioned as the protagonist in the earliest drafts of Les Blancs.8 A
queer warrior, Eric fights colonialism alongside the patriarchal and nationalist allegorization of
his mother as the ravaged African continent. That the queer Eric, conceived through a colonizer’s
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rape barely discussed by the characters in the play, is the most militant of the three brothers
serves as Hansberry’s most strident condemnation of the nationalist narratives of masculinity that
only reinscribe colonial discourses even as they are putatively mobilized towards anti-colonial
aims. Similarly condemning of such narratives is the simple naming of the traitorous son
Abioseh. Performatively named as an intended copy of his father, Abioseh much more closely
copies his mother’s rapist, the British military Major George Rice, in his beliefs about the
benefits of colonialism and Christianity for a previously “undeveloped” and heathen African
nation.

Whiteness and Decolonization
We do not learn much about the relationship between Eric and Mission doctor Willy
DeKoven beyond what is suggested in the brief exchange in which Tshembe confronts Eric over
receiving gifts from DeKoven, including feminizing accessories such as a compact mirror and
facial makeup marketed for women. In response to Tshembe’s insinuations about his relationship
with DeKoven, Eric offers a simple defense: “He is kind. No one else is kind. You and Abioseh
were gone” (63). Having abandoned Eric for the metropole and the priesthood, respectively,
neither Tshembe nor Abioseh can lay a legitimate claim to the role of a mentor for Eric. Yet, it is
not so much that Willy DeKoven becomes a last resort for Eric’s quest for love and
companionship; he is, rather, a logical choice. The colonial situation makes intimacy with settlers
inevitable. Tshembe, too, shares an intimacy with Madame Neilsen, albeit a platonic one. The
kind settler becomes a friend and romantic partner of Eric’s by virtue of his proximity to him.
We are oriented, as Sara Ahmed reminds us, toward objects within our reach (15). It is not so
much that colonialism makes Eric queer. An orientation or attraction towards a privileged settler
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is in many ways normative. And while homophobia in a homophobic person can be sparked at
the slightest provocation, it is perhaps exactly the non-spectacular and predictable nature of the
relationship between Eric and DeKoven that makes it all the more infuriating for Tshembe. A
homosexual relationship with a settler, despite everything it symbolizes under the interpretive
rubric of nationalist and patriarchal anti-colonialism, is in the end hardly sensational when placed
alongside the larger context of colonial plunder and genocide.
DeKoven’s ability to grasp and poignantly articulate the nature and magnitude of these
larger violences may, however, result in a more meaningful relationship with Eric than would a
simple intimacy with a “kind” but less conscious settler. Relieving Tshembe of the maddening
task of educating a liberal American about the dangers of liberal “solutions” to the daily horrors
of life under colonialism, DeKoven explains the counterproductive nature of his own
philanthropic work to Charlie Morris. DeKoven and his physician colleague Marta Goterling
work in an unsanitary makeshift hospital that in and of itself symbolizes the larger disparities in
basic standards of human living created by colonialism. As Tshembe tells Charlie in an earlier
scene, “[I]n your own country you would not be paying tribute to this place, you would be
campaigning to get it closed!” (68). DeKoven debunks the racist rationale provided by Marta
Goterling for the hospital’s existence in its present condition, which Charlie happily accepts—
that “the African wouldn’t come” (91) to a hospital resembling that which is standard in
wealthier nations, explaining that “the struggle here has not been to push the African into the
Twentieth Century—but at all costs to keep his away from it!” (91, original emphasis). Further,
DeKoven acknowledges his own complicity, though his philanthropic work as a doctor, in
normalizing colonial subjugation:
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DeKoven: […] I came here twelve years ago believing that I could—it seems so
incredible now—help alleviate suffering by participating actively in the very institutions
that help sustain it.
Charlie: You’re not suggesting that lives have not been saved here, Doctor? Why, you
alone…
DeKoven: Oh, I have saved hundreds of lives […] and, in so doing, if you will please try
to understand, I have helped provide the rationale for genocide. (92)
Charlie does not understand, and DeKoven therefore attempts to relate, through an anecdote, the
extent of the structural violence that his philanthropy helps disguise. DeKoven recalls a bygone
era when peaceful delegations of Kwi led by the old Abioseh would ask the Mission’s Reverend
Neilsen’s advice before petitioning the colonial government for rights to their own land. The
Reverend would meet with the delegations but provide little help, and the petitions would yield
little success. “[T]hey were invariably herded on less land, the taxes were raised higher—or
something” (93, original emphases). Failing to have basic and reasonable demands met, the
delegations opted for a new strategy: to demand the impossible. During their last visit to the
Mission, the members of old Abioseh’s delegation announced they “were petitioning, of all
things, to govern the colony; quite like that” (93). In demanding the impossible—impossible as
long as colonial governance remains intact—the Kwi delegation forces the Reverend to articulate
without equivocation how directly he is aligned with the agents of colonial violence, his
philanthropy notwithstanding. DeKoven does not simply narrate but performs this part of the
story, achieving a dramatic effect that renders his philanthropic work continuous with the
Reverend’s:
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DeKoven: (He is standing on the very spot, acutely recalling the moment.) Yes. He had
the most extraordinary expression when he finished reading the petition and he put it
down—like this, you know— (In telling, he has become the Reverend—so much so that
Charlie—and we—are actually catapulted back in time to that fateful day.) And he stood
up and wiped his glasses and then put them back on, and he smiled at them and they
smiled back as they always did, and then he walked among them, his arms outstretched,
saying, “Children, children… my dear children… go home to your huts before you make
me angry. Independence indeed!” […] [U]ntil that moment, standing here, I hadn’t
understood in the least, not the slightest, any different than he. The fact that it was all
over was in the face of the second old man there, Abioseh. (94, original emphases)
In the moment of the Reverend’s rejection of the delegation’s demands, DeKoven understands
that he is the same as the Reverend. He understands that until this moment he has been equally
aligned with the colonial project in its full subjugation and cruelty. The Reverend’s reaction acts
as a turning point marking the emergence of DeKoven’s anti-colonial consciousness. What
DeKoven does not understand until much later is the meaning of the look in old Abioseh’s eyes.
For Abioseh’s expression communicates “the fact that it was all over” not for the decolonial
cause but for the settlers. DeKoven remembers, with nostalgia but also with hope, the
delegation’s “pitiful piece of paper with its awkward syntax and utterly lucid demands which
presumed to do what was and remains impossible: ask for freedom!” (94, original emphasis).
DeKoven understands that the delegation’s demand remains impossible because one cannot ask
for freedom; one must take it. And at the time of his reenactment of these events, DeKoven
further comes to understand that the exhaustion of various delegations’ non-violent demands for
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freedom and justice prefigures a bloody end to all colonial agents, including missionary clergy
and doctors.
“They will murder us here one day—isn’t that so, Tshembe?” DeKoven asks,
“undramatically,” seemingly resigned to his fate and capable of analytic detachment (94). Unlike
Genet, Hansberry gives us a white character with a sober, unsentimental understanding of the
necessity of his death in an anti-colonial revolution. Hansberry nonetheless gives a nod to
Genet’s poignant representation of the grotesque sentimentality with which colonialism prepares
for its own funeral. DeKoven continues:
And the press of the world will send a shudder through men everywhere. It will seem the
crowning triumph of bestial absurdity. We pillars of man’s love for man rewarded for our
pains: our very throats slit ear to ear by rampaging savages. […] No, my friend, do not let
the drums, the skins and the mumbo-jumbo fool you. We might as well stop pretending it
is the middle of the night because the sun really is starting to rise in the world. They are
quite prepared to die to be allowed to bring it to Africa. It is we who are not prepared. To
allow it or to die. (94, original emphases)
Whereas Tshembe rightfully refuses Charlie’s invitations for a “man-to-man” (page #?) dialogue
within a symbolic order that does not allow Charlie to fully see Tshembe as a “man” (a
designation problematically equated with “human”), DeKoven instead opts for a sober colonizerto-colonizer talk with the American. DeKoven shares Genet’s understanding of the “bestial
absurdity” with which imperialist hegemony and its propaganda machines regard Africans who
have exhausted every non-violent attempt to decolonize their land and societies. Africans
“cannot be reasoned with” according to colonial logic, but this is so precisely because colonial
power has refused every attempt at reason which recognizes the humanity and sovereignty of the
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colonized. What Genet attempts to achieve through satire that risks reinscribing the racist,
colonial tropes it seeks to expose and critique, Hansberry endeavors to do through a sobering
soliloquy. If one approach to decolonization is to stage a conversation in which whites talk to
other whites, as Genet does in Les Nègres, then, Hansberry seems to suggest, here is what they
should say. Charlie is included in the “we” of colonizers who will die despite, or perhaps because
of, their lack of preparedness to do so. He cannot be included in the “we” of the universal
humanity he would like to share with Tshembe until he accepts his position in a colonial
hierarchy as well as his place in a decolonized future.
In her analysis of Les Blancs, Cheryl Higashida makes the case for a relationship between
DeKoven’s ability to empathize with the subjectivity of the Africans among whom he lives and
his homosexuality. Higashida argues that Hansberry represents “homosexuality as a site of
interracial, international reciprocity, thus countering the sexualized, racial othering that
underpinned Genet’s cynicism about anticolonial struggle” (914), and, moreover, puts
Hansberry’s imagining of interracial reciprocity in conversation with Fanon’s reflections on the
relationship between violence and liberation in The Wretched of the Earth (1961):
Like Fanon, Hansberry believes that in risking their lives in violent struggle, the
colonized can become psychologically as well as politically liberated subjects […].
Unlike Fanon, however, Hansberry explores forms of interracial reciprocity possible even
within the Manichean colonial world. (914)
I similarly see a relationship between queer sexuality and interracial reciprocity but would like to
complicate this argument by emphasizing that the attempted reciprocity is not only interracial
and international, but, much more troublingly, one between colonizer and colonized. DeKoven’s
capacity for reciprocity with black Africans is accompanied by an understanding of the colonial
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situation that suggests his death may be necessary for the process of decolonization. In
DeKoven’s case (and, as I will show, also in Madame Neilsen’s), interracial reciprocity informed
by a decolonial consciousness, does subscribe to a binary, if not exactly a Manichean division,
between colonizer and colonized and a binary distribution of life and death through violence. Coexistence under colonial conditions is not viable in DeKoven’s view or Hansberry’s. For
DeKoven specifically, decolonization can only occur if the colonizer’s existence on the
colonized’s land is extinguished.
And while, as I argue above, the fact of Eric’s relationship with DeKoven is not an
especially spectacular event for Eric in the context of life under colonialism, DeKoven’s
relationship with Eric may be radical for DeKoven. His reference to “man’s love for man” in the
rousing speech he delivers to Charlie in Tshembe’s presence queers a missionary platitude by
expressing an emotionally and politically profound meaning for DeKoven. His relationship with
Eric subverts the Mission’s mission of indoctrinating the Kwi into Christian morality by directly
defying its puritanical and heteropatriarchal sexual prohibitions and their colonial aims. Beyond
the goal of ideological colonization that creates what Fanon, in The Wretched of the Earth, has
called the “colonized intellectual” (38) often seen in the character of Tshembe, and the
collaborator personified in Abioseh, Christian indoctrination, particularly through its sexual
prohibitions, enforces a narrowly circumscribed definition of love designed to foreclose the
possibilities for radical empathy produced by queer sexuality. Les Blancs presents two examples
of sexual encounters between colonizer and colonized: the heterosexual rape that led to the birth
of Eric and the death of his mother and the queer relationship between Eric and DeKoven that
has provided Eric with kind companionship and DeKoven with a radical consciousness. Within
the logic of this contrast, the queer relationship in Les Blancs signifies unambiguously as a
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harbinger of hope and healing, even as it emerges from conditions of possibility created by
colonial violence. DeKoven’s acceptance that an indigenous inhabitant of the land—perhaps
even his lover—may murder him in the name of liberation, and justly so, is not only a
recognition of his own complicity in that violence but also a dedication to decolonial justice that
carries with it a revolutionary defiance of colonial declarations, made explicitly by Major George
Rice, that a white life is worth more than a black one (76).

Decolonization, Mutuality, and Hospitality
Madame Neilsen, the wife of the reverend who founded the Mission, shares DeKoven’s
politics. Her solidarity with the colonized is not informed by queer sexuality but a rather
normative and by all appearances classically colonial role as a female educator of the colonized
who forms a maternal relationship with Tshembe and his brothers. In the play’s penultimate
scene, “Tshembe sits cross-legged at her feet, his head resting gently against her” (101). In this
final manifestation of interracial mutuality in the play, Tshembe and Madame Neilsen share a
moment of familial tenderness, as Madame Neilsen suggests she is preparing to die. “At my age
one only goes home to die,” Madame Neilsen explains in response to Tshembe’s question
concerning whether she will stay on the land in the wake of Reverend Neilsen’s death at the hand
of rebel warriors and the subsequent establishment of colonial Marshall Law by Major Rice. “I
am already home” (101). Madame Neilsen remains a colonizer even in death, understanding the
colonized land as her “home,” and is moreover quite aware of the symbolism of her death on this
colonized land. Like DeKoven, she understands her death as an augur of a just future for the
colonized.
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The relationship between Tshembe and Madame Neilsen as colonized and colonizer is
especially complicated given Madame Neilsen’s role in Tshembe’s family history. This final
conversation between her and Tshembe reveals the extent of her maternal role, played at the
scene of Eric’s birth, when she delivers Eric against the wishes of her husband, who wills Eric’s
death as well as his mother’s, and allows his mother to die in childbirth. “I do not think most
missionaries’ wives would have delivered that child,” Tshembe tells Madame Neilsen
“affectionately” (102). As long as colonialism exists, so do affectionate and erotic relationships
between colonizer and colonized as well as relationships between colonizers with diametrically
opposed views on their respective roles in colonialism. Scripts for intra-racial, intra-national, and
monogamous heterosexuality allow Madame and Reverend Neilsen to co-exist in a relationship
despite their being at war ideologically.
Yet the appearance of peaceable co-existence is in fact only an appearance. “[Reverend
Neilsen] never forgave me for interfering,” Madame Neilsen reveals. “He never spoke of it again
after that night—nor, as you know, acknowledged the existence of Eric” who “was the living
denial of everything he stood for: the testament to three centuries of rape and self-acquittal”
(102). Because of Madame Neilsen’s humanitarian intervention, the Reverend, in lieu of murder,
is left with sustained acts of symbolic and psychological violence against Eric: the persistent
refusal to acknowledge his existence. His refusal to forgive Madame for her act of defiance
likely manifested in ongoing and similarly silent punishments and acts of erasure. While she
experiences a different form of violence from Eric, the retaliation she suffers aligns her
subjectivity with his. Both colonizer and advocate for the colonized, Madame Neilsen becomes
an ambiguous figure. Due to this ambiguity and her relationship with Tshembe, she is uniquely
suited to address Tshembe’s ambivalence about taking part in violent anti-colonial struggle.
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Madame Neilsen encourages, one could even say, instigates Tshembe by following her
recollection of his mother’s death at the hands of the Mission with the question, “Do you—hate
us terribly, Tshembe?” (103). Tshembe responds very differently than he does to a similar
question from the American liberal (and newcomer) Charlie, who asks this question with the
opposite intent: to sway Tshembe towards participating in the absurd project of achieving peace
with colonial powers. I quote this conversation between Tshembe and Madame at length because
of how thoroughly it illustrates the dynamics of their relationship, Tshembe’s hesitation and
ambivalence, and their respective relationships to the rather complicated concept of “home”:
Tshembe: Madame, I have seen your mountains. Europe—in spite of all her crimes—has
been a great and glorious star in the night. Other stars shone before it—and will again
with it. (Lightly, smiling at his own imagery.) The heavens, as you taught me, are broad
and can afford a galaxy.
Madame: And what of your mountains, Tshembe? Your beautiful hills. What will you do
now?
Tshembe: (She has touched a nerve and it is very painful.) What will I do? Madame, I
know what I’d like to do. I’d like to become an expert at diapering my son… to sit in
Hyde Park with a faded volume of Shakespeare and come home to a dinner of fried
bananas and kidney pie and— (He is fighting tears now as a terrible anguish rises within
him.) turn the phonograph up loud, loud, until the congo drums throb with unbearable
sweetness […]. I’d like—I’d like my brothers with me. Eric—and Abioseh […]. I want to
go home. It seems your mountains have become mine, Madame.
Madame: Have they, Tshembe?

162

Tshembe: I think so. I thought so. I no longer know […]. I am lying, Madame. To myself
and to you. I know what I must do…
Madame: (Simply.) Then do it, Tshembe.
Tshembe: (Desperately.) But when I think of… (He lowers his head to touch the top of
hers.) Help me, Madame.
Madame: […] I once taught you that a line goes on into infinity, unless it is bisected. Our
country needs warriors, Tshembe Matoseh. Africa needs warriors. Like your father.
Tshembe: (Staring at her.) You knew about my father…
Madame: Warriors, Tshembe. Now more than ever. (Abruptly, but gently.) Goodbye,
child. Now leave me with my husband […]. (103-104, original emphases)
Here Hansberry introduces another model of interracial, international, colonizer-colonized
mutuality—a model of hospitality in which the two exchange homes. Madame claims Africa as
her home, while Tshembe claims Europe as his. Tshembe’s country is Madame’s adopted home,
and her mountains in Europe have become his. Both Madame and Tshembe, however,
understand that while this model of hospitality and cosmopolitan exchange may suit their
relationship, it is not a viable one for Europeans and Africans more generally as long as Africa is
still colonized by Europe. The cosmopolitan Tshembe claims Hyde Park, Shakespeare, and
congo drums as his, and expresses an expatriate’s longing to permanently reunite with his family
in one geographical place, where the fantasy of this place is often that it is a place unplagued by
the problems of his native land.
Madame awakens Tshembe from a dream, perhaps through her claim to his homeland
(“our land,” original emphasis) as much as her exhortations that this land needs warriors. While
colonialism allows Tshembe’s home to become hers, her home can never become his as long as
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it controls the resources of and governance over his people. Under Major Rice’s military control,
in these final scenes, the landscape Tshembe calls his home is showered with deadly explosives
in an act of retaliation for Reverend Neilsen’s death and attempted repression of the insurrection.
As “the surge of live drums” on stage in one of these scenes “replaces and at last drowns out the
sound [effects] of [military] destruction” (97), a “poet-warrior” named Ngago mobilizes
resistance against the occupying army.
Les Blancs ends on a note of triumph as well as a cry of grief. An empowered Eric hurls a
grenade at the Mission, destroying an institution both symbolic and iterative of the ideological
colonial violences of racism, sexism, and homophobia that killed Eric’s mother and produced
him as a queer outcast within his family. With the destruction of the mission and death of
Reverend Nielsen, Eric is vindicated and his mother avenged. Yet the violence of the play’s
finale also proves devastating for Tshembe, who is driven to kill his traitorous brother Abioseh in
response to Abioseh’s revelation of Peter/Ntali’s identity as a revolutionary to the occupying
forces which subsequently kill Ntali, and who embraces “Madame’s lifeless body” (106) after
she is shot by revolutionary warriors.
In the play’s final sentence, Tshembe “throws back his head to emit an animal-like cry of
grief” (106). Unlike Tshembe, Madame Neilsen understands the finality of her goodbye in the
earlier scene, and unlike Genet’s Queen, she gracefully accepts and resolutely awaits her fate.
Perhaps his cry of grief, in addition to the immediate emotion it signals, is also indicative of the
clarity (intellectual and visceral) he has gained about the necessity of revolutionary violence, and
of having gained this clarity too late. Tshembe threatens Abioseh with a spear when he learns
that his brother intends to betray Peter/Ntali but cannot kill him then, only to do so in the play’s
tragic resolution after Ntali, too, has been killed.
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This tragic unraveling, coupled with Eric’s triumphant and exuberant participation in the
insurrection, culminates in an ambivalent conclusion. We are reminded that Hansberry could not
finish this play due to her own death, tragic in its untimeliness, at age thirty-four. This
ambivalent ending is admittedly unsatisfying to a scholar inspired by Hansberry’s queer and
feminist decolonial vision. It is tempting to blame Nemiroff, the straight white ex-husband of a
black lesbian visionary, for concluding the play with the tragic ambivalence of the heterosexual
male protagonist, a punctuating finish of too many dramas that can hardly be called queer,
feminist, or decolonial. Genet’s Master of Ceremonies, Archibald Absalom Wellington,
concludes The Blacks by declaring that “the time has not yet come for presenting dramas about
noble matters” (126). Nemiroff appears to say the opposite: that the time has not yet come to stop
presenting dramas about noble matters, that we as audiences are not yet ready to relinquish our
investment in glorifying the ambivalence of an arguably reactionary heterosexual male hero.
Tshembe accepts a colonizer as his surrogate mother and rejects his brother’s queerness even
while being inspired by the rebellious spirit this queerness cultivates.
We cannot, however, lay the blame on Nemiroff. It does not lie with him or with anyone
else. Hansberry, in her drafts, very much struggled with Tshembe’s ambivalence. She did not
write the female protagonist she envisioned in her earliest notes, and opted instead for a more
traditional hero, instructive in his limitations. Tshembe’s cry of grief is perhaps Nemiroff’s in the
face of his complicated love for Lorraine and her shockingly premature death. Or it is perhaps
the cry of the unfulfilled promise. We do not have the black queer female revolutionary
protagonist Hansberry may have given us had she lived to see the Gay Liberation movement. But
we do have Eric, Tshembe’s queer revolutionary conscience, to inspire us in our own
decolonizing projects.
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Notes

Introduction
1

See Margot Canaday, The Straight State (2009).
The framing of my project both riffs on the title of Grace Hong and Roderick Ferguson’s
Strange Affinities: The Gender and Sexual Politics of Comparative Racialization(2011) and
engages with Hong and Ferguson’s project of “imagining alternative modes of coalition beyond
prior models of racial and ethnic solidarity based on a notion of homogeneity or similarity”
(Hong and Ferguson 1).
3
I understand “white feminism,” a prevalent term in debates on political organizing in recent
years, to refer to a brand of feminism practiced predominantly by middle-to-upper-class
cisgender white women that ignores how gender-based oppression intersects with other forms of
oppression, thus rendering invisible the struggles of the majority of women in the world.
4
See D’Emilio (2003).
5
See Bell-Scott (2016), Randolph (2015), and Theoharis (2013).
6
See Samuel Delany, Times Square Red, Times Square Blue (New York University Press), 1999.
2

Chapter 1
1

See the chapter “Killing Sympathies: Racial Liberalism and Race Novels” in Melamed’s
Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism (2011).
2
I develop the idea of the uncanny and its relevance to a queering of racial liberalism in the next
chapter.
3
I elaborate on the vulnerable position of the lover in the following chapter.
4
Kevin Floyd builds on the theories of Michael Kimmel to argue that US masculinity formations
beginning in the early twentieth century are accurately described via a Butlerian model of gender
performance, whereas earlier, nineteenth-century formations, more closely resemble a model of
“manhood” judged by qualities thought to be internal, rather than externalized and performed. I
further elaborate on this distinction in my analysis of James Baldwin’s Giovanni’s Room (1956)
in the third chapter of this dissertation. See Floyd (2009) and Kimmel (1996).
5
I frame the word “race” in scare quotes when used as a noun to designate a racialized group of
people, as this use of the word “race” has long been proven to be a fiction created by eugenicist
scientific discourse. The fiction of biological race, however, has created a markedly non-fictional
concept of sociological race. While there is no such thing as “a race” of people, race as a
category of social division and political and economic disenfranchisement has remained, since
shortly after the beginning of the Atlantic slave trade, among the most important concepts for
understanding the uneven distribution of resources, freedom, violence, life, and death in our
world. For a history of the development of the modern concept of race in relation to the Atlantic
slave trade, see Mbembe 2017.
6
Hardly an advocate for queer experimentation with Lacan’s formulae, Fink has even suggested
that lesbian parent couples, gay male parent couples, and single parents are more likely to raise
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psychotic children than their heterosexual couple counterparts. In a lengthy footnote, Fink writes:
“Given how frequently the traditional family structure already fails, despite centuries of dividing
love and Law between the sexes in considerably codified sex roles, what are the chances that
both roles will be played by one parent alone or by two parents raised into similarly codified sex
roles? Isn’t the incidence of psychosis likely to rise in such cases?” (Clinical Introduction
111.n71).
7
Judith Butler asks, rhetorically, “whether the notion of a lack taken from psychoanalysis as that
which secures the contingency of any and all social formations is itself a presocial principle
universalized at the cost of every considertation of power, sociality, culture, politics, which
regulates the relative closure and openness of social practices” (1993, 202, emphases in the
original).
8
The question of sex vs. gender was settled in 1990 by Butler’s argument that “sex” is no more
prediscursive than gender—“sex” was “gender all along” (1990, 11)—yet many scholars
continue to ignore Butler’s groundbreaking intervention, an obstinacy that speaks to the deeply
entrenched influence of patriarchy and sexism in our institutions as well as its relationship to a
persistent unwillingness to abandon binary thinking in favor of more imaginative modes of
intellectual and creative engagement.
9
See Miranda Kronfeld, “How to Deal with Insomnia while Your Boyfriend Sleeps the
Effortless Sleep of the Unoppressed Beside You,” Reductress 28 January 2019, Web.
10
I discuss Laura’s lesbianism in the final section of this chapter.
11
Nonnie is described as light-skinned elsewhere in the novel, but here, on page 301, is the first
mention of her as “mulatto.” While this is not a central motif in the novel, I explain in the next
section how Smith may be alluding to and revising the trope of the “tragic mulatto.”
Chapter 2
1

I examine the problematic achievement of queer freedom through U.S. imperialism, known
today as homonationalism, in the concluding section of this chapter.
2
I borrow this term from Gayatri Gopinath who “use[s] the notion of impossibility as a way of
signaling the unthinkability of a queer female subject position within various mappings of nation
and diaspora” (15). While McCullers’ historical context is markedly distinct from that of the
South Asian public cultures Gopinath addresses, “impossible desire” strikes me as an appropriate
term for a queer female instinct to disrupt white, American, heteronormative marriage. See
Gopinath, Impossible Desires: Queer Diasporas and South Asian Public Cultures (Durham and
London: Duke UP, 2005).
3
To Berenice’s charge that Frankie is jealous of her brother because he is getting married,
Frankie responds: “I couldn’t be jealous of one of them without being jealous of them both. I
sociate the two of them together” (17). I am hyphenating “Janice-Jarvis” to highlight Frankie’s
understanding of the pair as a single entity, as opposed to two people separable from one another,
and her desire for that entity rather than its individual members.
4
By “agency,” a term that evokes a number of connotations and associations, I mean very simply
the state of being a subject who is capable of action.
5
See Judith Butler’s “Imitation and Gender Insubordination” in Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories,
Gay Theories (1991).
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6

The first meaning of “creep” in the Oxford English Dictionary is “the action of creeping; slow
or stealthy motion,” found in literary examples from 1818 (Keats), 1842 (Wordsworth), and 1862
(G.W. Thornbury). The OED’s second definition is of “a sensation as of things creeping over
one’s body; a nervous shrinking or shiver of dread or horror. Usually in pl., the creeps or cold
creeps (colloq.).” Additionally, Freud maintains that the uncanny “belongs… to all that arouses
dread and creeping horror.” "creepy, adj," OED Online, Oxford University Press, December
2014, Web, 22 January 2015; Freud 1.
7
See Eve Sedgwick’s Between Men: English Literature and Homosocial Desire (1985).
8
In “Melancholy Gender/Refused Identification,” Judith Butler reads Freud’s “Mourning and
Melancholia” and Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality to demonstrate that masculine and
feminine gender identity formations are coextensive with the production of heterosexuality and
that such identifications are “the effects of laborious and uncertain accomplishment” and “are
established in part through prohibitions which demand the loss of certain sexual attachments, and
demand as well that those losses not be avowed, and not be grieved” (135; original emphasis).
9
Jasbir Puar adopts Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s concept of an assemblage to theorize a
post-identity queer subject. For Deleuze and Guattari, an assemblage is both a multiplicity and an
“increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes as it expands its
connections” (Deleuze and Guattari 8 in Puar 212). In this sense, both Janice-Jarvis and Frankie
are assemblages; Janice-Jarvis are among the various multiplicities that comprise Frankie’s
larger assemblage of social connections.
10
Ludie Freeman is Berenice’s deceased ex-husband and the love of her life.
11
Significantly, Berenice marries Ludie when she is thirteen years old, only a year older than
Frankie, and so, both Berenice and Frankie meet their first true loves in early adolescence.
12
McCullers uses the term “jail” colloquially in the text, and the text suggests that the building is
used as both a jail and a prison.
13
Adrienne Rich defines compulsory heterosexuality as “the enforcement of heterosexuality for
women as a means of assuring male right of physical, economic, and emotional access.” Rich
also emphasizes that “heterosexuality has been both forcibly and subliminally imposed on
women. Yet everywhere women have resisted it, often at the cost of imprisonment,
psychosurgery, social ostracism, and extreme poverty.” This capacity for resistance, of course,
crucially distinguishes women from dolls, and portraying women as dolls is among myriad
tactics of obscuring the options of resistance and non-consent. See Rich, “Compulsory
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,” 647, 653).
14
Rich quotes Catharine MacKinnon in reference to the continuum between normative
heterosexual sex and rape: “As one accused rapist put it, he hadn’t used ‘any more force than is
usual for males during the preliminaries’” (qtd. in Rich 642).
15
A fascinating counterpoint to the behavior of the Freaks in The Member of the Wedding is the
representation of circus freaks who do have an agenda to incorporate and outsider into their
group despite her lack of consent in Tod Browning’s 1932 film Freaks.
16
Wittig argues that lesbians are outside the heterosexual contract—a compulsory arrangement
of male and female bodies and desires—because lesbians are also outside “the categories of sex
(woman and man).” Wittig’s “heterosexual contract” largely inspires Judith Butler’s concept of
“the heterosexual matrix.” While I do not think “lesbian” is the most appropriate term for
Frankie’s emerging queer sexuality, her rejection of compulsory heterosexuality puts her in a
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similar category to that of “lesbian” as used by Wittig. See Wittig, The Straight Mind (Boston:
Beacon, 1992) and Butler, Gender Trouble (New York and London: Routledge, 1990).
17
See Puar, Terrorist Assemblages (2007).
18
See Margot Canaday, The Straight State (2009).
19
See Lisa Duggan’s “The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism”
(2002).
20
See Roland Barthes, “Soap-powders and Detergents” in Mythologies (1957).
Chapter 3
1

Here and elsewhere in the essay I use “performance” and “perform” as umbrella terms that
encompass more specific performance-related designations such as the performative (as derived
from “performativity”), the theatrical, and the tragic.
2
Rolland Murray argues that Baldwin’s critiques of patriarchy and masculinity are more
comprehensive in his fiction than in his essays and more rigorous in his writing as a whole prior
to 1964, a year Murray identifies as the start of Baldwin’s increasingly uncritical acceptance of
masculinist Black Power ideology. I am not suggesting that the essays necessarily clarify what
Baldwin is attempting to accomplish in his fiction; the two genres are clearly doing different
kinds of work. However, these essays do articulate theoretical and political positions that inform
his fictional work.
3
Baldwin does not offer an analogous statement to characterize mature womanhood. Although
the essay argues that conformity to rigid gender roles is responsible for “the debasement of the
relationship between the sexes” (1949/88, 595), its main concern is with male subjectivity and
immature masculinity as a barrier to men’s involvement in meaningful relationships with people
of any gender.
4
Baldwin initially drafted Giovanni’s Room and Another Country as a single novel. Set mostly
in New York and partially in France, Another Country also addresses the relationship between
expatriation, queer sexuality, and white male liberal guilt.
5
“A novel insistently demands the presence and passion of human beings, who cannot ever be
labeled . . . . Without this passion we may all smother to death, locked in those airless, labeled
cells, which isolate us from each other and separate us from ourselves; and without this passion
when we have discovered the connection between that Boy-Scout who smiles from the subway
poster and that underworld to be found all over America, vengeful time will be upon us”
(Baldwin 1949/88, 600).
6
Here it is important to note that David does not need to be supported by Giovanni’s meager
wages but chooses to be. He could write to his father and ask for money—and eventually does,
when he decides to leave Giovanni—or even seek employment.
7
When Giovanni expresses indignation about Hella’s traveling extensively alone, without the
companionship of her male partner, David explains that Hella is “intelligent” and “complex” and
that he has no desire to restrict her mobility. He also points out that women “don’t seem to like
[the] idea,” proposed by Giovanni, that “their inside life . . . is not like the life of a man”
(Baldwin 1956, 80). At the same time, David knowingly uses a woman named Sue by having sex
with her in an attempt to prove to himself that he is a properly heterosexual man and despises her
desire for him. He uses Hella in a similar way, and over a much longer period of time, through
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his engagement to her and his continuation of his relationship with her despite having fallen in
love with Giovanni.
8
Raymond Williams distinguishes structures of feeling from terms such as “world-view” or
“ideology” because a structure of feeling is “a social experience which is still in process,”
“concerned with meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt” (1977, 132). Similarly,
I see white liberal guilt as a dynamic process rather than a fixed ideology, an ever-evolving
formation with both progressive and reactionary potentialities. In Giovanni’s Room, it is the
latter that are realized, even while the former are presented as possibilities.
9
This is not to suggest that white femininity does not perpetuate racism or does not operate in
racist ways; rather, the critique is of Baldwin’s isolation of femininity as a singular racist force
without considering, in this instance, how it may operate in tandem with masculinity.
10
Aliyyah Abdur-Rahman poignantly defines lynching as “a kind of racialized gang rape” (21)
in her discussion of Pauline Hopkins and William Faulkner novels.
11
Giovanni tells David that he first met Guillaume in a movie theater lobby where Guillaume
makes a scene after losing his expensive scarf, suggesting that Giovanni may have stolen it.
“[N]ot even Garbo ever gave such a performance,” Giovanni insists (Baldwin 1956, 109).
12
Although Guillaume descends from aristocracy (150), there is no evident distinction between a
bourgeois class and a ruling class in the world of Giovanni’s Room. Guillaume, whose
occupation positions him as bourgeois, is the most wealthy and powerful character in the novel
and wields control over the livelihood of Giovanni and other working-class men.
13
The statement “it did not seem real” could also signal a moment of self-awareness, a
momentary observation that the crisis in front of David is one that he imagines, which ultimately
allows David to calm down.
14
The double entendre in Baldwin’s choice of the word “preservative,” the French word for
condom, is especially evocative in this context.
15
While narrating a conversation with his French landlady after Hella has discovered his
homosexuality and left him, David reflects: “My crime, in some odd way, is in being a man and
she knows all about this already” (68). At this moment in the narrative, on the eve of Giovanni’s
execution, David thus considers how in the eyes of the social order he is no less of a criminal
than Giovanni.
16
For this and other versions of the Tiresias myth, see Luc Brisson’s “The Myth of Tiresias.”
17
“Liberalism, in its heroic phase, begins to pass into its twentieth-century breakdown: the selfenclosed, guilty and isolated world; the time of man his own victim” (Williams 1966, 100). The
conditions that prolong the tragedy of David’s trajectory are largely self-chosen. While he is
struggling with his internalization of structural homophobia, he is also depicted as someone who
lacks the courage and resolve to pursue the socially taboo but personally fulfilling path of queer
love. Giovanni’s trajectory, on the other hand, is directly circumscribed by the material
conditions of his life in Paris, over which he has little control. His story, unlike David’s, is not a
bourgeois liberal tragedy, but rather, an unmistakably working-class tragedy.
18
Matt Brim performs a stunning reading of the murder weapon, described by David as
“theatrical,” as indicative of transphobic rage and transphobic violence in his book James
Baldwin and the Queer Imagination.
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Chapter 4
1

See Sarah Schulman, “Feasting with Panthers (and Palestine): Edmund White’s Jean Genet.”
Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology performs a brilliant reading of Fanon’s Black Skin, White
Masks and is indebted to what Ahmed understands as Fanon’s own queer phenomenology of the
black body. Interestingly, she does not engage with Fanon’s homophobia. For an in-depth study
of the relationship between homophobia and miscegenation anxiety in the United States, see
Siobhan Somerville’s Queering the Color Line: Race and the Invention of Homosexuality in
American Culture (Duke 2000). Other important literary studies on the subject include Susan
Gubar’s Racechanges: White Skin, Black Face in American Culture (Oxford 1997) and Mason
Stokes’ The Color of Sex: Whiteness, Heterosexuality, and the Fictions of White Supremacy
(Duke 2001).
3
For excellent readings of this note and homophobia in Fanon, see Kobena Mercer,
“Decolonization and Disappointment: Reading Fanon’s Sexual Politics”; Teresa de Lauretis,
“Difference Embodied: Reflections on Black Skin, White Masks”; and Rey Chow, “The Politics
of Admittance: Female Sexual Agency, Miscegenation, and the Formation of Community in
Frantz Fanon.”
4
Although Martin Esslin’s reading of The Blacks is hardly anti-racist, Esslin usefully situates the
play within Genet’s larger absurdist oeuvre in The Theatre of the Absurd.
5
The caption of the photo accompanying Norman Mailer’s review of the play in The Village
Voice uses the subtitle “A Clown Play,” whereas “A Clown Show” is the subtitle in the
published English version.
6
See Joy L. Abell, “African/American: Lorraine Hansberry’s Les Blancs and the American Civil
Rights Movement.”
7
I am using this loaded term intentionally. “Tribalism” refers to the tendency for blind allegiance
to one’s ethnic or religious group. Moreover, the tendency to refer to African societies and ethnic
groups as “tribes” reinscribes the racist and colonial myth that African societies are more
primitive and “tribal” in the aforementioned sense of the term.
8
See Adrienne Rich, “The Problem with Lorraine Hansberry.”
2
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